KANT. 
der one or other of thefe clafles. Even God liimfelf muft 
come under Idea ; for, if we fay we have no Idea of God, 
we lower gurfelves to the level of the brutes, who aft 
conformably to blind inltinft. If there is any pofiible ob¬ 
ject of thought that is not included in thefe three wholes, 
I confefs I am quite at a lofs to know what it can be ; for 
it mull needs imply, that, betides Reafon, Underftanding, 
and Senfe, there mull be fome other powers for forming 
Knowledge. 
Having obtained all pofiible Wholes, we now give an in- 
61.5 
fiance of a Disjunctive Judgment, or the dividing a Whole 
into its Parts. A Divilion is either logical or mathema¬ 
tical. In the former, the parts which compofe the whole 
are themfelves wholes, and are analytical when they con¬ 
cern mental things, and anatomical when they relate to 
corporeal things. The former regard Conceptions and 
Intuitions ; the latter pure Intuitions or Mathematical 
Wholes, which do not differ in quality, or form complet* 
wholes again. 
Example of a Disjunctive Judgment. 
I. Wholes. 
r~ ---— -----■—- 1 , 
1. Ideas. 2. Conceptions. 3. Intuitions. 
11. Parts. 
1. 2. 
Such as are limited in their nature, and which are them¬ 
felves complete wholes. 
t -•'-^-- 1 
1. 
Of Ideas. 
1. Genus, 
2. Species. 
2. 
Of Conceptions. 
1. Marks, 
2. Analylis. 
3 -. . 
Of Intuitions. 
Anatomy. 
In this Table of Divilion, Intuition, Conception, and 
Idea, are taken in their moil general fignification. For 
Intuition does not imply any particular reprefentation, 
but all pofiible intuitions ; Conception implies intuitions 
perceived by the fenfes and clafled in order ; and Idea im¬ 
plies conceptions elevated by means of genus and lpecies, 
even to the abfolute, which alone renders a Conclufion pof¬ 
lible. Thus Reafon is occupied in dividing Ideas into 
genus and fpecies ; Conceptions are divided into, and 
tried by, their effential and primary marks ; and this is 
called Analyfis. And the divifion of Intuitions into their 
particular parts, is termed Anatomy. Intuition is the 
Matter of Knowledge ; Conception that which renders a 
Judgment pofiible ; and Idea that which renders a C011- 
clulion poflible. 
Conclufions are Judgments of Reafon which differ from Judg¬ 
ments of Underltanding, as the latter require no proof. For 
example, “ The Grafs is green.” This is perceived im¬ 
mediately by the fenfes. We here merely enquire whe¬ 
ther the mark green, that is predicated of the conception 
grafs, is contained in the intuition or objedl ; or, whether 
the intuition Grafs, is comprehended under the conception 
green. If this be done with clear confcioufnefs, then this 
is a found and good judgment of Underltanding. 
But conclufions of Reafon require a proof or third con¬ 
ception, in order to apply the predicate to the fubjedt. 
For example, of the Judgment Hcautonloruminos can carry a 
Man ; I have no means to determine either in the affirma¬ 
tive or negative; the judgment is perfectly dark to me. 
But, the inftant I introduce the middle term, every thing 
becomes clear and bright. When I add that Heautontoru- 
minos is a Horfe, by means of this intermediate Conception, 
the predicate is applied to the fubjedt; and this is a Syl- 
logilm of Reafon which runs thus: Major, Every horfe 
can carry a man. Minor, Heautontoruminos is a horfe. 
Conclufion, Therefore Heautontoruminos can carry a man. 
As conclufions of Reafon can only regard the relations 
of things, it is eafy to determine that there are but three 
claffes of conclufions pofiible according to the Table of 
Judgments of Underltanding under the head Relation-, 
namely, Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive, con¬ 
clufions. But it mull be particularly remarked, that thefe 
Syllogifms of Reafon infer from univerfals or generals to 
particulars; wdiich inference, if logically corred, will al¬ 
ways contain Truth ; whereas, in conclufions of Under¬ 
ftanding, namely, Induction and Analogy, which infer 
Such as are not limited, but are in their 
nature infinite, and which are not 
themfelves complete wholes. 
Of Time and Space, which may her 
determined, 1 . by arbitrary meafures; 
2. by Realon. 
from particulars' to generals, errors are very liable to oc¬ 
cur, and millead our judgment. 
It is a great fault in logic to treat of diflinB and complete 
conceptions before Judgments and Ratiocinations. Fordif- 
tinCl conceptions are only pofiible by a Judgment, and 
complete conceptions by a Conclufion. It is equally ob¬ 
vious, that no other fundamental power of the Soul is requi- 
fite to apply an immediate mark than is required to apply 
a mediate mark to a thing. Both arife from the judging 
faculty, which in the one cafe judges immediately, and in 
the other infers and concludes. This may aflift in point¬ 
ing out the difference between rational and irrational 
animals. For the chief power of Knowledge conlifis 
in the faculty of judging, and is a diftinguilhing charac- 
teriftic of Man. But the power of Judging is pofiible only 
by means of internal fenfe, by which we make our repre- 
fentations the objedts of our thoughts; and this can be¬ 
long to rational beings Only. 
Imagination is an aclive power, a fpontaneity. It is this 
power which furnifhes us with intuitions as a ftore of ob¬ 
jects for forming Conceptions and Conclufions. It in¬ 
cludes three powers; namely, the reprefentative, the cre¬ 
ative, and the retentive. The fir It produces intuitions, or 
fenfible reprefentations; the fecond is the region of fancy, 
which forms new combinations of the fenfible materials ; 
and the laft is memory, which recalls to the mind, by the 
law of the affoeiation of ideas, fuch objedts as have once 
impreffed our fenfes. 
Truth confilts in the agreement of the conception with the 
objeEl ; that is, when the conception we have formed of a 
thing agrees corredtly with the appearance of the thing. 
For example, if the conception of St. Paul’s Cathedral 
agrees with the objedt upon re-examining it, there is 
Truth in the conception, and no contradiction. Thus I 
fay I have truth in my Idea of the Human Mind, when X 
affirm that it confilts of Twelve Categories, Six 
Ideas of Reason, and Time and Space. 
Error is caufed by our feelings adting upon our Reafon 
at the time we are judging, and forcing it out of its pro¬ 
per courle. Reafon itlelf cannot err, becaufe it is created 
by our Maker with its proper powers and limits to adt as 
he has defigned. Nor can Error lie in our fenfes, for they 
always receive the fame impreflions from the !anie objects, 
or we could have no certain knowledge at all. But, we 
fuffer our feelings and inclinations to work upon our rea- 
fon while it is judging, and Hill call the reiult the pro- 
id us& 
