6 - 1(3 
K A 
ilnceof r'eafciif. This is fire real foarce of Em>r. A -ftone 
let full from an eminence, has, by the power of gravity in 
the earth, an inclination to fall in a perpendicular line ; 
but, if any thing obflruft its courfe, it cannot follow the 
laws prefcribed to it by its nature, but will Hill fall as 
nearly in the proper line as the power aching againft it 
will permit. 
This whole logical procedure is firicfly Dogmatical ; 
that is, it does not fearch to the bottom to difcover how 
conceptions are fornred with refpeft to their matter, but 
is content to alfuine that things are as they appear. This 
principle is logically correct ; for the proper province of 
logic is merely to regulate our knowledge, and bring it 
into a fyftetnatic unity; and it never is the bufinefs of 
logic to conftitute objefts as to their matter, but only to 
raife conceptions as to their form, for the purpofe of olaff- 
ing all our Knowledge. Therefore the grand fault we 
commit is the making a confitulive ufe of this merely regu¬ 
lative principle, as is done in the following conclufion : All 
objeEls of nature appear to my fenfes as extended and figured 
bodies ; therefore they are extended and figured in themfelves in¬ 
dependent of my mind. Nothing in the world can be more 
erroneous than this conclufion, which contains more in 
the concluding part than is warranted by the premifes. 
In the firft place, Extcnfion is the form of external recep¬ 
tivity, and therefore cannot belong to the things in them¬ 
felves ; for it is an cjjential form or part of the Human Mind. 
The objeft upon entering our receptivity imbibes the form of 
extcnfion ; but this object is no longer the tiling in it¬ 
felf. When it is confounded with a form of the Mind it 
becomes a Phenomenon , or mere appearance ; but is not the 
Noumenon, or the caufe of the Phenomenon ; for the Caufe 
is always heterogeneous from the Effeft. Therefore it is 
quite falfe to aflert that the Things in themfelves are ex¬ 
tended independent of the Mind ; for Extenfion is given 
to the objects of Nature, that is, to the Phenomena, by Ex¬ 
ternal Senfie. In other words, all objefts of Nature are Ex¬ 
ternal Intuitions. It is equally falfe to aflert that the 
things in themfelves are figured bodies; for this depends 
upon the Schematifm of the pure intellect under the guidance 
of the Categories, which produces all conception of figure 
and body, and every picture under which the beautiful 
varieties of nature appear to us. Therefore Form and 
Body are given to the objefts of Nature by the Under¬ 
funding, which gives a form to the matter that is received 
by our receptivity, and which we cannot create. Thus it 
as evident that we know nothing of the things in them- 
i'elves, but only how they appear to us : the former are 
Ncumena, the latter Phenomena. It muft be equally evident 
that we cannot apply the predicate Extenfion to a Subjeft 
of which we know nothing; but we can undoubtedly ap¬ 
ply it to the Phenomena of which we have true and good 
Knowledge, and of whole exiftence we are clearly confcious. 
Hence it follows that the objefts of Nature are conftituted 
by the Original ufe of Unfierftanding in the Categories, 
and that the bufinefs of Logic is to regulate and reduce 
-to order the immenfe variety of thefe objefts, i. e. Intui¬ 
tions, with which u : e are iinpreffed. See farther under the 
article Logic. 
Nothing can be more agreeable to the diElates of common fenfie, 
nor more conformable to the friElef rules of found philofophy, 
than to name the objeEis of nature, of which we ourfelvcs alfo form 
a part, real, fiubfantial, material, things, occupying each a 
place in Space, and filling up a portion of Time ; for in- 
ftance, to fay that this is a real, material, fubftantial, ta¬ 
ble upon which I write; that the chair upon which I fit, 
the houfe in which I refide, in Ihort every object of ex¬ 
ternal fenfe, is a real, fubftantial, thing. The firft part of 
this polition requires no proof, for the appeal to common 
fenfe is here fufficient. No one in his fenfes will fay, 
this table is net a material fubfance, but a phantom of the‘brain. 
Were this the cafe, there could be no real fubftantial 
knowledge-in the world. If we cannot depend upon the 
teftimony of our fenfes when accompanied with clear con- 
feioufnefs, then every thing mult be mere illulion, aa 
,'N . T. 
maintained by Berkeley, and there is nothing in the world 
worth knowing, irtuc'h lels Worth philofopbizing upon. 
But it fhould feem that there is fome difficulty in prov¬ 
ing the fecond part of this pofition ; namely, that that 
which is fo fully admitted by common fenfe is equally confor¬ 
mable Jo the friElef rule's of found philofiophy. It muft not 
be forgotten that we have been here treating of the Logical 
ufe of underfanding ; which is precifely the ftation of Dog¬ 
matical Philofphy, and not of the Original ufe of UndcrLand¬ 
ing, which is the ftation of Tranfiendcntal Philofiophy. Thus 
Dogmatical philofophy Hates, with great truth, that the ob¬ 
jefts of nature are real, fubftantial, material, given, objefts, 
that we are confcious of theirexiftence,and equally confcious 
that we did not create them ; and that the reprefentations we 
form of thefe objefts are not the objefts themfelves. But we 
fay, and fay jultly, that we have truth in our conceptions 
when they agree with things without the Mind ; that the 
conception we have of St. Paul’s Cathedral contains truth, 
wdien upon examining the objeft we find all the parts of the 
conception accord with real fafts without the Mind, and 
this with clear confcioufnefs. We are equally certain that 
thefe real Subftances of Nature are endowed with powers to 
produce certain effefts. We are well allured that the Sun 
gives light and heat to this terraqueous globe ; that fire 
burns; that the magnet attrafts; that heavy bodies fall to 
the earth ; that animated nature propagates its kind; and 
that in the vegetable w'orld feeds produce plants, plants pro¬ 
duce flowers, which again produce feeds ; and that it thus 
fuftains itfelf. Some of thefe objefts muft be coniidered 
as Caufes, and others as Effefts produced by them ; as 
light is an effect of the Sun, and the Sun the caufe of light. 
We ftill difcover other relations among the various ob¬ 
jefts of Nature, or Subftances of the world ; namely, that 
they mutually determine each other’s fituation in Space ; 
that is, that they not only aft, but are alfo afted upon. 
That, for example, in the planetary fyftem, the greateft 
harmony of adliori and reattion fubfifts, and which alone 
fuftains it as a whole; for, if the leaftdeviation from equal 
power were to take place, the fyftem would beat an end. 
Should the Sun’s attraftion obtain a decided fuperiority 
over the projeftile motion of the Earth, this planet would 
foon find itfelf at reft in the Sun. Thus every Subftance 
is only iuftained in the lituation it occupies in Space by 
the contaft of furrounding fubftances, which mutually 
determine each other’s place, and thus a grand and beau¬ 
tiful whole arifes, which we denominate the Univerfe. 
The whole of this procedure is not only logically cor- 
reft, but is alfo ftriftly true. Yet all this is ftill nothing 
but Dogmatical Philofophy, which is fully fufficient for all 
the purpoles of common life ; and, while we carefully 
avoid committing logical blunders, that is, drawing falfe 
conclufions, we are fure to obtain found empirical Know¬ 
ledge upon which we can fafely depend. 
Tranfcendental Philofophy not only admits the correftnefs 
of the whole of this logical procedure, but aftually con¬ 
firms its truth. It further Hates, that this is not all the 
Knowledge which the human mind is capable of obtaining 
with refpeft: to the objefts of nature. For by a Critic of 
its own faculties we dilcern in the cleared: manner the 
lhare which the mind has in producing thefe very objefts 
of nature. It is briefly as follows: 
Our Receptivity is affefted from without; but only by 
the exertion of a mental aftivity can we become confci¬ 
ous of this affection. For ipontaneity in connefting to¬ 
gether the affections of our external fenfe affefts our re¬ 
ceptivity from within. Hence External and Internal 
Intuitions. Now this is the given matter of all Know¬ 
ledge. But Knowledge muft alfo have a form-, and this 
form is produced by the Original Ufe of Underfanding in the 
Categories. Hence Conceptions. But Intuitions united 
to Conceptions conftitute Knowledge. Confequently 
all the Phenomena of Nature, which can only exift in Time 
and Space, are nothing but Intuitions united to Concep¬ 
tions. But Intuitions united to Conceptions are the foun¬ 
dation of all real, fubfanlial, material, Knowledge. Thus 
i is 
