613 K A 
of phenomena, every caufe depends upon a preceding 
caufe. Reafon, which looks for abfolute totality in a le¬ 
vies of conditions, finding no fuch totality in time and 
fpace, becaufe there is no end to preceding caufes, forms 
the idea of an ah folate caufe. 
Thirdly, The idea of unconditioned Concurrence. If 
we think an afiemblage of Subftances in time and fpace 
mutually working upon each other, we (hall find, that in 
each of the fubltances there is a caufe, which not only 
produces efrefls upon the others, but which is itfelf an 
effeCt. Now, as in all the fubltances which ftand thus in 
connection, there are caufes that have other caufes, thefe 
caufes again others, and fo on ad infinitum , it is clear, that 
the feries of caufes which conned and determine fuch an 
afiemblage of fubltances, has no end in time and fpace. 
Reafon, which requires completenefs or totality in a feries 
of caufes, and not finding it in the world of phenomena, 
forms an idea of unconditioned concurrence, that is, an idea 
which contains the complete and full Caufe of the various connec¬ 
tions between the fubfiances of the world. This idea of a com¬ 
pletely-determined concurrence is unconditioned, that is, 
it excludes the conditions of time, and contains only a 
concurrence where the connection is determined by caufes 
that are no longer effeds of other caufes in time. 
Reafon, by connecting the Categories of Modality, 
produces the idea of abfolute Necellity. The Categories 
of Modality are Pofiibility, Exiltence, and Necefiity. They 
mark only the various modes of conceiving, of which 
man is capable. Pojjibility cxprejfes conceivablcnefs and its 
laws-, Ex fence fignifies real conception and its laws ; and i\ r e- 
ceffity implies real conception , determined by the invariable laws 
ef the conceiving faculty. Abfolute necefiity is that whofe 
contrary is impofiible, that is, contradictory. There is 
r>o abfolute necefiity in time ; for all that is in time is 
an event or a change. Every change in time is deter¬ 
mined by a preceding change, and therefore is not abfo- 
lutely neceflary. Reafon, which requires totality in this 
feries of changes, and not finding it in time, forms an idea 
of fomething which does not depend on a preceding 
change, which is exempt from thefe conditions of time, 
and which is in all time, that is, which is abfolutely nc - 
tejfary. 
Table of the primary Ideas of Reafon. 
j. Abfolute Totality. 
а. Abfolute Limitation. 
3. Abfolute Subftance. 
4. Abfolute Caufe. 
5. Abfolute Concurrence. 
б . Abfolute Necefiity. 
N. B. The accompanying diagram may ferve to illuf- 
irate this procefs of the mind. 
By thefe Ideas of Reafon it is evident we cannot know 
any objeCt; for who will conclude, becaufe his Reafon 
gives him Ideas of abfolute fubftance, caufe, &c. that he 
knows fuch things. To know a thing, we mull be able to 
inftance a particular intuition of the thing: but how can 
we obtain intuitions of abfolute fubftance, abfolute caufe, 
Sec. Reafon has no intuitive faculty : we can only con¬ 
ceive fomething by means of thefe Ideas, but we cannot 
know any thing. 
Thefe pure Ideas of Reafon refer by means of the Ca¬ 
tegories, which they conned, to the Schemata of the pure 
intellect 5 and, by means of the Schemata, to our intui¬ 
tions. Thefe references produce the following Judg¬ 
ments : 
Firfl, Abfolute Totality gives the following judgment: 
All extended quantity of the Phenomena of Nature is uncondition¬ 
ed that is, whatever limits their extenlion may have re¬ 
ceived from the Intellect, yet we mult confider it by Rea¬ 
fon as determinable ad infinitum. This induces us to con¬ 
tinue our inquiries ad infinitum. 
Secondly, Abfolute Limitation gives the following judg¬ 
ment : All intenfive quantities of the Phenomena, when viewed by 
Reafon , are unconditioned. Intenfive quantities are the events 
that are in Time, and not in Space ; that have no breadth 
N T. 
nor height, yet arife and vanifh. There is in time neither 
abfolute Reality nor abfolute Negation. 
Thirdly, Abfolute Subftance gives the following judg¬ 
ment : All conneflion of Properties with their Subjlances in the 
world of Phenomena, when viewed by Reafon, mujl be confidered as 
unconditioned. The Subftances viewed by the intellect have 
only a certain duration and certain properties ; and are 
phenomena, that is, intuitions which arife and vanifti. 
But Reafon fays, thefe properties, have no limits; for we 
may .difeover new properties and things without end. 
There is in experience no abfolute fubftance. 
Fourthly, Abfolute Caufe gives the following judgment: 
All connexion between caufe and effedt in experience, when 
viewed by Reafon, mujl be confidered as unconditioned. Caufes 
and EffeCts determined by the intellect have a limited 
duration; but Reafon fays, in the world of Phenomena 
there Is no firft caufe, nor any effeCt we can reafonably 
call the laft. A Firft Caufe is an Idea of Reafon, and 
cannot therefore be met with in experience. 
Fifthly, Abfolute Concurrence gives the following judg¬ 
ment : All mutual adiion and re-adtion in the world of Pheno¬ 
mena, when viewed by Reafon, mujl be confidered as unconditi¬ 
oned. Experience viewed by the underftanding difeovers 
a determinate co-exiftence, confequence, and duration. 
But Reafon fays, this whole is infinitely determinable in 
its duration, co-exiftence, and mutual actions; confe- 
quently there is nothing abfolutely unconnected nor ab¬ 
folutely beginning. 
Sixthly, Abfolute Necefiity gives the following judg¬ 
ment : The exiftence of the phenomena in the whole of time, when 
viewed by Reafon, mujl be confidered as unconditioned. Expe¬ 
rience viewed by the underftanding difeovers a limited 
neceftity; that is, the EffeCt is neceflary only as far as the 
Caufe is neceflary. But Reafon requires completenefs in 
thefe conditions ; namely, fomething that is ablolutely ne- 
ceflary, and which mult be in all time. 
It is evident that thefe principles of Reafon can be only 
of a regulative ufe. By means of them we are enabled to 
give the greateft fyftematical unity to all our Knowledge. 
They are, therefore, indifpenfably neceflary in all our in- 
veftigations of Nature. For want of a “ Critic” of this 
Faculty, it is ufual, not only to de.rive thele principles 
from experience, but to make a constitutive ufe of them ; 
that is, really to fancy that we can difeover objects that 
correfpond to thefe Ideas of Reafon. This only arifes 
from our neglefting to pay attention to the original ufe of 
under/landing, which alone fecures intelligibility to our 
conceptions. Therefore, we can make no fpeculative ufe 
of pure reafon that can terminate in intelligibility; but, 
we may by all means make a confiftent regulative ufe of 
this faculty. Hence it follows, that Theoretical Reafon 
eafily overfteps its limits, and lofes itfelf among unat¬ 
tainable objefts and contradictory conceptions, To pre¬ 
vent this, it is abfolutely neceflary to have a “ Critic” of 
this faculty. 
Critic of pure fpeculative Reafon. 
Reafon, by means of fyllogifms, deduces one judgment 
from another. When the laft of thefe deductions wants 
intelligibility, then this is a mere play of thoughts, and 
nothing but mere Speculation, which totally negieCts the 
original ufe of underitaading in the Categories. 
By the three Syllogilins of Reafon, namely, the Categori¬ 
cal, the Hypothetical, and the Disjunctive, Reafon produces 
three Tranfcendental Ideas, and attributes objective vali¬ 
dity to them, by not attending to the original ufe of un¬ 
derftanding, or to their intelligibility. Thus, from the 
Categorical arifes an Idea of the Soul, confidered as abfo¬ 
lute Subftance, which is treated of in Rational Pfycology. 
From the Hypothetical arifes an Idea of a Firjl Caufe , 
which is treated of under Rational Cofmology. And, 
laftly, from the Disjunctive arifes the Idea of God , which 
is treated of under Rational Theology. 
None of thefe objeCts are to be met with among our in¬ 
tuitions or in experience; but can only be inveftigated 
by our Reafon, and it is in Practical Reason that 
thele 
