620 K A 
■ Whatever happens is contingent. It only happened on 
account of its caufe; and this caufe happened on account 
of its caufe. But a feries of conditions requires fome- 
thing abfolutely unconditioned ; whether it be the feries 
itfelf, or lomething different from the feries. Therefore 
there is an abfolutely-necejfary Being cxijling. 
The aflertions of the Thefes in all the four Antinomies 
are termed the Dogmatifm , and thole of the Antithefis the 
Empiricifm, of pure Reafon. As rational beings, we can¬ 
not be indifferent to thefe queflions, in which our moral 
nature prompts us to take a decided interelt, But we are 
wholly interefted in favour of Dogmatifm, which affords 
a number of firm points on which the morally-good mind 
can fafely rely, becaule the Validity of the Dogmatical af¬ 
fections is fecured by Practical Reafon. On the other 
hand, the Empiricifm of Pure Reafon is more favourable 
to the interefts of the underltanding; for the underitand- 
ing, in its original ufe, never quits the regreffiue fynthejis 
from the conditional to the condition : it therefore rejects 
the conception of an abfolutely firlt condition, as repug¬ 
nant to the Spirit of the Category. But it appears, that 
it only attends to the interelt of underltanding for a 
longer time, lince it alfo quits this fynthejis in conlidering 
the ablolute totality as confilting in the infinity of the 
feries; and can be eafily refuted by the proofs of the The¬ 
fes. Therefore all thefe judgments are equally falfe, both 
thole of the Thefes and thole of the Antitheses : they are a 
mere play of thoughts, and w ant intelligibility. That is to 
fay, they cannot be carried back to the original ufe of un¬ 
derltanding. 
Critic of Rational Theology. 
Rational Theology inveltigates the Idea of an Intelligent 
Firf Caufe, which fpeculative reafon forms by carrying the 
Category of mutual concurrence inaCtion and re-action to 
the ablolute. The profyllogifm of the disjunctive mode 
of inference deads reafon to the idea of a molt real being 
which it perfonifies, and attempts to prove by the prin¬ 
ciple, that, when fomething is given that is conditioned, 
there mull alfo be an ablolute unconditioned likewife 
given. The conception of the molt real being is formed 
in the following manner: We cannot place him in Time 
and Space, for they are reftrictive conditions of reality. 
He is therefore to be confidered as Omniprefent and Eter¬ 
nal, as Simple and Individual; and this is the Tranfcen¬ 
dental conception of God. It is eafy to perceive, that 
all original ufe of underltanding is neglected in thefe po¬ 
rtions, consequently all intelligibility is wanting to them; 
that is to fay, it is a mere play of thoughts ; and, in attempt¬ 
ing to carry the Conception of the molt real being back 
to the original ufe of the underltanding, all conception ef- 
capes us. It does not follow, that, becaufe the Idea of God 
cannot be demonltrat.ed in a theoretical point of view, it is 
not a valid idea. Practical Reafon proves it to be an 
Axiom; for it is a felf-evident principle of our moral na¬ 
ture that can never be got rid of in a practical point of 
t'iew. This fact prevents the poffibility of the exillenceof 
Atheills. Thofe who are confidered fucb, are merely men 
that are foiled in attempting a logical proof of that which 
is only fufceptible of a tranfcendental proof. For the 
aim of the morally-good man readies far beyond this life, 
and the changeable phenomena of Nature. The objeCt of 
the Critic of Rational Theology is therefore to keep fpe¬ 
culative reafon clear from the contradictions in which it 
unavoidably entangles itfelf, by making a conftitutive ule 
of merely regulative principles. 
We have now proved that no dogmatical ufe of pure 
Reafon can lead to the reality of thefe Transcendent 
Ideas, which Reafon produces by an application of the Ca¬ 
tegories as abfolute predicates ; and thereby negleEling all 
original ufe of under/anding, which alone fecures intel¬ 
ligibility to all onr conceptions. It is clear that we can 
have no knowledge of the objeCts to which fpeculative 
reafon refers ; namely, the Soul, the Fir/ Caufe, the 
N T, 
As every member of a feries of events is contingent, 3 . e. 
only dependent upon its caufe, the whole feries itfelf can¬ 
not be thought as necelfary. Now to fuppofe a firft mem¬ 
ber, or the whole feries itfelf, as abfolutely necelfary, con¬ 
tradicts the Caufal law of Nature. Therefore no abfolutely - 
necejfary Being ex/s. 
Deity ; for, as thefe objects cannot accommodate themfelves 
to Time and Space, we can have no intuitions of them. 
But how can we hope to poflefs knowledge without an, in¬ 
tuition, which always contains the given matter of knowledge, 
and mult be in Time and Space. If, therefore, we be¬ 
lieve that we have any knowledge of thefe objeCts, we not 
only deceive ourfelves mod grofsly, but fuch a belie! is 
quite abfurd, for it is really pretending to a knowledge 
of things beyond the bounds of our Knowing Faculty, 
which is ftriCtly limited to Time and Space. What can 
be more abfurd, than to pretend that the Soul or the Deity 
are objeCts that can prelent themfelves to our fenfes? As 
thefe objeCts never can become Subltances, namely, ob¬ 
jects of our fenlitive faculty, that is to fay, intuitions 
united to conceptions, (for then they would be different 
things from what they are at prelent,) we mult be content 
to let them remain Ideas of Reafon, having their validity 
fecured to us by Practical Reason. Therefore, the 
pretended reality which fpeculative reafon gives to thefe 
Ideas is mere illvfion, and arifes entirely from its neglect¬ 
ing all original ufe of underltanding in the Categories, 
and making a conjlitutive ufe of thofe principles of Reafon 
which are only defigned for a regulative ufe. As regula¬ 
tive principles, they are indifpenfably necelfary to bring 
all the knowledge we have acquired intojthe greateft fyf- 
tcmatical unity, and for the purpofe of forming fuch plans 
as may belt promote our invelligations into the nature of 
the fubftances of the furrounding world, and that of the 
Human Mind, or the Faculties o! Reafon, Underltanding, 
and Senfe. 
Thus Theoretical Reafon Itrives after the unity or con¬ 
nection of all our knowledge, by clading all our Ideas un¬ 
der a few heads which it fuggelts, and which are, Abfolute 
Subftance, Abfolute Caufe, &c. As Reafon, the Intellect, 
and the Senfitive Faculty, are confined to experience, it 
follows, that all that man can know are the objeCts in Time 
and Space, and thofe conditions in the Mind which ren¬ 
der fuch knowledge pofiible. 
The Canon of Pare Reafon proves that the real validity 
of thefe Ideas is to be met with in Pure Practical 
Reason ; and thus fully convinces us that we ought not 
to fpeculate with Theoretical Reafon ; for, when we ven¬ 
ture to fwerve from the laws of experience and the per¬ 
ceptions of the fenfes, we fall into mere incomprehenfibi- 
lities and contradictions ; in faCt,- into a chaos of uncer¬ 
tainty, obfeurity, and inconfiltency. The fpeculative Phi- 
lofopher does not even know the ground on which lie 
ftands, fo long as he is not well acquainted with that 
which conftitutes all intelligibility. Therefore, it is ab¬ 
folutely neceffary for him to become a Tranfcendental Phi- 
iofopher before he dare venture to criticife the /peculations 
of others, with the hope of difeerning their unintelligibi¬ 
lity. Speculative Reafon has the peculiarity of not being 
able to bring its Ideas to intelligibility; but, in attempt¬ 
ing to do fo, always terminates in an unavoidable DialeRic, 
which, however, the Critic of Pure Speculative Reafon 
completely folves, and for ever puts at reft._ Indeed it 
does more, for it actually prevents the fatal influence of 
fpeculation from ever hereafter dilturbing the deciiions of 
Sound Reafon. 
' Critic of Pure PraElical Reafon. 
As all Theoretical Knowledge refts upon the original ufe 
of Underltanding in the Categories, fo does all PraShcal 
Knowledge depend upon the original ufe of Practical Rea- 
fon in the Category Moral Liberty; that is, in confi- 
dering the Caufality of the Will as independent of every determi¬ 
native of Nature, Man is called a moral being, fo far as 
we 
