K A 
we attribute this PraBical Liberty to him. He confiders 
himfelf, by this idea, as a being independent of Nature, 
and belonging to another (intelligibilis) world. Man con- 
fequently Hands under an Idea of Reafon, and alfo under 
a Conception of Underftnnding; both of which have their 
objective validity. Agreeably to the original ufe of un- 
derftanding, he is a Being of Nature ; that is, a Phenomenon 
■which fills up Time and Space ; or, in other words, he is 
an external intuition united by the underftanding to the ob¬ 
jective unity ; and is thus conftituted a Being of Nature. 
But, conformably to the Original ufe of Practical ReaJ'on, he 
is a Moral Being; that is, he excludes himfelf from Na¬ 
ture, and is a Noumenon which does not exilt in Time and 
Space; but, being an Idea formed by Pure Reafon, and 
having objective validity by means of the original ufe 
of Practical Reafon, he is thus a being thoroughly inde¬ 
pendent of the determining caufes of nature; that is, he 
is Free. The phenomena of nature are ftriCtly confined 
to Time and Space ; that is, they are intuitions and concep¬ 
tions produced by Underftanding and Senfe from given matter. 
Thus man is a Phenomenon to himfelf; but, as a Moral 
being viewed by Reafon, he is a thing in itfelf ; that is, a 
Noumenon which cannot fill up Time or Space ; for then 
it would be an intuition. 
This Idea of Man as a Moral being is taken from the 
original ufe of practical Reafon-, and has as much validity, 
that is to fay, it is as good Practical Knowledge, and 
is as much a fact in our confcioufnefs, as the Phenomenon 
Man (which forms a part of nature merely becaufe it is 
united by the original ufe of underftanding) is a faCt in 
our confcioufnefs, and is good Theoretical Know¬ 
ledge. 
It therefore does not involve the fmalleft contradiction 
to ftate, that Man occupies two ftations at once. Conii- 
dered by the underftanding, he is a being of nature, of 
which he forms a part, is aCted upon and aCts conformably 
to the laws of Nature. Hence appetites and inclinations. 
Contemplated by Reafon, he is not a phenomenon, but a 
being in itfelf, namely, an Intelligence, that is free from 
Time and Space, confequently independent of the laws of 
Nature ; yet fubjeft to other and immutable lazus, the laws 
of Reafon. Hence Morality. From the above reafoning 
it is evident that the Human Soul is an Idea formed by our 
Reafon by carrying the Category Subjlance to the abfolute, 
and has complete objective validity in our confcioufnefs, 
which is fecured to it by the original ule of Practical 
Reafon. The matter of an Idea of Reafon is given matter. 
It is the Categories themfelves that conftitute the variety 
or matter in an Idea, and which cannot pofiibly be in 
Time and Space. The unity or form of an Idea is the 
Connection of this matter into a unity by Reafon, which 
unity cannot pofiibly be in Time and Space, fince the very 
matter of which it is compofed is out of Time and Space. 
Hence it is clear that the Soul does not exilt in Time and 
Space, and is therefore free from the mechanifm of Na¬ 
ture. It muft hence be remarked that the operations of 
Reafon produce a different refult from the operations of 
Senfe and Underftanding in our confcioufnefs. Under¬ 
ftanding, by connecting an Intuition under a Conception, 
according to the Original ufe of Underftanding in the Ca¬ 
tegories, produces Knowledge when accompanied with clear 
confcioufnefs. Reafon, by comprehending the Categories 
under an Idea, according to the original ufe of Practical 
Reafon in the Category Moral Liberty , produces Belief 
when accompanied with clear confcioufnefs. Therefore 
Knowledge is applicable to the Phenomena, and Belief is ap¬ 
plicable to the Noumena, or things in themfelves. The Be¬ 
lief here fpoken of is Rational Belief, in contradiftin&ion to 
hijiorical belief, which may become Knowledge by procur¬ 
ing the intuition from which it was formed; whereas Ra¬ 
tional Belief is quite riiftinct from all knowledge ; and, 
although it never can become Knowledge, yet it is not 
inferior to any Knowledge. For Eelief^is a fubjeftively- 
liifficient holding for true, and marks the confcioufnefs of 
Vol. XI. No. 781. 
N T. <5(11 
the Operations of our Practical Reafon. Knowledge is an 
objeCtively-fufficient holding for true, and denotes the con¬ 
fcioufnefs of the ufe of Underftanding. Why the opera¬ 
tions of the one Faculty ihould have more validity in them 
than the operations of the other, is not at all to be con¬ 
ceived. The Certainty that is obtained from Knowledge 
implies only that our fenles have been imprefted by given 
matter-, and that the underftanding has been at work, and 
has given a form to the received matter; that is, has pro¬ 
duced a phenomenon , or that an externalfad has occurred in 
our confcioufnefs. The Conviction that arifes from Belief 
denotes merely that our Reafon has been occupied in con¬ 
necting given matter, that is, the Categories into a Unity, 
namely, producing a Noumenon, or that an internal fad ha^ 
taken place in our confcioufnefs. 
Thefe arguments apply as well to an Intelligent Firft 
Caufe, namely, the Deity, as to the Human Soul; both of 
which are fuperfenfible Objects that have their ground in 
the Original ufe of Practical Reafon \ that is to fay, they are. 
both objects out of the iphere of Nature; in other words, 
which exift out of Time and Space, and therefore never 
can become objects of Knowledge, but muft for ever re¬ 
main objecls of Belief. The belief in God, ar.d even the 
conviction of his exiftence, can only be met with in our 
Reafon, from whence alone it muft originate. Now I 
may be fully certain that no body can refute the pofition 
There is a God ! for where lhall he obtain his argu¬ 
ments ? To the firmnefs of- Belief therefore belongs alio 
the confcioufnefs of its immutability . Since it muft be for 
ever acknowledged that Reafon is the laft teft of Truth. 
Having proved that there is no contradiction in ccnfi- 
dering rational beings as occupying two Jlations at cnce ; 
namely, that, although they are beings of Nature, yet they 
muft be confidered at the lame time as beings of Reafon, 
by which they muft evidently belong to another order of 
things, that is, as ends in themfelves, and not barely as 
means to fomething elfe ;—hence arifes a fyftematical con¬ 
nection of rational beings under common objective laws, 
which may be denominated a Kingdom of Ends. A rational 
being belongs to the Kingdom of Ends as a member when- 
he is univerlally legillative therein, though at the fame 
time fubjecled to the law; but he belongs to it as a Sove¬ 
reign when he is not fubjeCted to the law, that is, a per¬ 
fectly independent Being. 
Morality confifts in referring all aCtions to that legifia- 
tion only by which a Kingdom of Ends is poftible. This 
legiflation however muft take place in every rational beins 
himfelf, and muft arile from his will. It may be thu9 ex- 
prefted : AEl in fuck a manner that the maxim of thy will cart 
be at the fame time a principle of univerfal legifation ; or, in 
other words, that The maxim of thy adion ought to be a uni¬ 
verfal law for all reafonable beings. Every rational beinp- 
muft aCt as if he were always by his maxims a legillative- 
member of this univerfal Kingdom of Ends, that is, with 
regard to all the laws of nature. Free, and obedient to rio 
other laws but thofe which he impofes upon himfelf by 
his own practical Reafon ; and thus he belongs to the' pofi- 
fible Kingdom of Ends. Therefore Rational Beings are 
univerfally legillative, and bound to no other laws but 
what they give to themfelves by their own Reafon. But, 
as man is alio a being of nature, and, as fuch, is afieCtcd by 
natural inltinCts and inclinations, he does not always ful¬ 
fil the law of his reafon, yet he is fully aware, that, in or¬ 
der to remain confiltent with himfelf, he ought to fulfil it. 
The laws of Reafon therefore can never be reprefented in 
any other light than as Imperatives. Fora perfectly good 
will would correfpond exaCtly with the objective laws of 
pure Reafon, that is, of Morality, without requiring any 
necejfitation. But Man, who is at once a being of the fen- 
fible and of the moral world, finds his will aCted upon by 
inclinations ; and thus, what his Reafon determines as 
objectively necessary, (that is, good,) is, by his Incli¬ 
nations and Wants, confidered as subjectively contin¬ 
gent. In a word, he finds that his Will is not always 
7 T fully 
