K A 
•which on that account alone we are neceffitated to obey. 
In other words, the confcioufnefs of Duty is the ground 
for performing it. 
But it appears at firft fight as if it involved a contra- 
didion to-fay that “ I am bound to myfelf;” for I might 
then releafe myfelf from the obligation. The faff is, that 
man adually contemplates himfelf in this refped under 
two diftind points of view. Firft, as a Being of Nature; 
fecondly, as a Perfon or Being of Reafcn. This apparent 
■contradiction is thus convincingly removed. For there is 
no real contradiction in the pofition, that man, as a ra¬ 
tional being of nature, {homo phenomenon ,) having wants 
and inclinations which are regulated by laws of nature, 
and in whofe gratification Happiness confifts, fhould be 
bound to obey the laws of the very fame man, confidered 
as a perfon {homo noumenon) endowed with internal liberty, 
that is, perfeft freedom from all the laws of nature, and 
thus bound to no other laws but thofe which fpring from 
himfelf by virtue of Practical Reafon, the fulfilling of 
which conftitutes Morality. Thus does man become con- 
feiovs of Duties to himfelf. 
Thofe aftions are right which are ftriCtly conforma¬ 
ble to Duty ; and thofe actions which are contrary to the 
-confcioufnefs of Duty are decidedly wrong. 
Man is the natural judge of himfelf, for he feels the 
confcioufnefs of an internal court in his own breaft, before 
•which he either acquits or condemns himfelf, as having aCted 
conformably to the law of his own legiflative reafon, or 
•contrary to it. This internal court is Conscience. That 
every perfon has a confcience is a faCt. He finds himfelf 
obferved by an internal judge, threatened and even kept in 
awe by a power within him that watches over his aCtions. 
This power is PraClical Reafon, which reprefents that which 
is duty in every occurring cafe, and requires the perform¬ 
ance of this Duty, from a motive of Duty, that is, from mere 
reverence for the law. Thus, when a man is conlcious to 
himfelf of having aded agreeably to his Confcience, no¬ 
thing more can be required of him. We cannot conceive 
n man to be without a Confcience ; for he would then be 
morally dead. He may by pleafure and diffipation ftu- 
■pify himfelf or lay himfelf afleep ; but he cannot avoid 
fometimes recovering himfelf and awaking, when he im¬ 
mediately hears the tremendous voice of Confcience ! He 
may be fo abandoned at laft as not to regard it at all ; 
but he cannot avoid hearing it. 
Though Confcience is evidently an affair of man with 
himfelf, yet he cannot avoid confidering it as if it were 
carried on by the orders of another perfon. For it is an ab- 
furd reprefentation of a court of judicature to conceive 
the judge and the accufe^-as the fame perfon ; as in that 
cafe the accufer would be certain to lofe his caufe. This 
therefore requires dome explanation, in order that Reafon 
fhould not appear to fall into contradiction with itfelf. 
Here then arifes a twofold view of Man, otherwife we 
could not conceive that the very fame man fhould ftand 
trembling at the bar of a court which is entrufted to him¬ 
felf in his own breaft. For, if the very fame perfon exe¬ 
cuted the office of Judge, and was at the fame time the ac- 
cufed, there could be no doubt of the iflue. The Caufe 
that is to be tried before this internal Court is an affair be¬ 
tween the homo Noumenon and the homo Phenomenon ; or, in 
other words, between man, confidered as a being of the 
Senfes, whofe chief principle is Happiness ; and man, con¬ 
templated as a being of pure P.eafon, whofe higheft princi¬ 
ple is Virtue. Whatever intention we may have in view 
for the accompliftiment of any end, we mult firft carefully 
obferve that it does not offend againft the univerfal law of 
our PraClical Reafon, before we venture to determine 
upon executing it ; that is, we mujl be corfciovs that we do 
not acl contrary to our Duty. Tills would be decidedly 
wrong ; for our reafon can never approve of that which 
contradicts the laws of which itfelf is the author, or why 
fhould it have made them ? Therefore, even fuppofe the 
end we have in view ftiould he our own happinefs, which 
is the natural end of all mankind, this mult be limited to 
* 
N'T. 6:s 
the condition, that in promoting even this end we muft 
never offend againft the Moral Law. It is undoubtedly 
true, that we are not accountable for having Inftinds and 
Inclinations, which, in a neceffary manner, determine us to 
certain ends; the accomplilliment of which entirely con¬ 
ftitutes our happinefs under the principle of Self Love, as 
the chief principle of our Serfible Nature ; hut we are moft 
certainly accountable for the Indulgence we grant to thefe in- 
findls and inclinations, to the detriment of the Moral Law. 
It muft now be perfectly clear, that, in this double view 
of man, we evidently place him in another order of things, 
when we contemplate him as a being of Reafon or an In¬ 
telligence, than that in which we conlider him a being of 
the lenlible world and as part of nature; that is to fay, 
that the homo noumenon does not occupy the fame ftation as 
the homo phenomenon ; confequently, that Man confidered as 
part of nature is a mere phenomenon, and is in Time and 
Space ; but Man confidered as a moral being is out of Time 
and Space, and mult alfo be out of Nature, that is, he is a. 
thing in itfelf, and not a mere appearance. Hence it fol- 
lows, that, at this prefent inftant of our exiftence, we ac¬ 
tually do belong to another (intelligibilis) World when we 
ad conformably to the laws of our pradical reafon, which 
are the univerfal laws of all rational beings, of which 
there may perhaps be lacred ones. Man is conlcious to 
himfelf, with the greatelt diftindnefs, that he ought to dif 
charge his duty quite difulerefedly ; and, with this view, ho 
muft entirely feparate his natural delire for Happinefs from 
the Idea of his Duty, in order to have it quite pure. For 
the real intrinfic value of Morality conlilts exadly in this 
point, to difeharge one’s duty from no other inducement 
than for the fake of duty. The man who difeharges all 
his duties is an objed of reverence ; but the man who tranf- 
greffes bis Duty is, even in his own eyes, not only culpa¬ 
ble, but punishable. Thus Reafon entirely of itfelf, and 
independently of all phenomena, adually commands Mo¬ 
rality. It cannot therefore be left to us as a matter of 
choice, whether we will be Morally good or not. We afs 
by our legiflative reafon ftridly enjoined to be Virtuous, 
whatever arguments the inclinations and wants of man 
may plead to the contrary. And thus are the inferior 
powers of Man fuborciinated to the fuperior ; that is, the 
homo phenomenon to the homo noumenon. 
Exadly at this point Conscience interpofes, and un¬ 
dertakes to decide, in all occurring cafes, whether we have 
confcientioufly dilcharged our Duty or not. And now the 
apparent contradidion is completely removed ; for it is 
our morally-lcgif alive Reafon that pronounces fentence upon 
the homo phenomenon, and either acquits or condemns him, 
according as theadion merits. But Confcience never can 
decree a reward. Its fentence of acquittal excites only a 
gladnefs at our having efcaped the danger of being found 
guilty. Confequently this ftate is not that of poftive felici¬ 
ty, as joy ; but only of negative, as compofure after anxiety. 
That moral Being, who is reprefented as the authorized 
Judge of Confcience, muft be a Knower of Hearts; for 
his Court is held within the breaft of man. He muft, 
however, abfolutely exercife univerfal and fupreme power, 
not only in heaven, but likewife upon earth ; otherwile 
he could not procure e-ffed to his laws ; all moral duties 
therefore can only be conceived as Commandments if- 
filing from him. But fitch a Moral Being, who is Om¬ 
nipotent and Eternal, Omnifcient and Individual, is the So¬ 
vereign in the Kingdom of Ends; that is to fay, he is 
God. Therefore Confcience muft be explained as tire 
fubjedive principle of an account of our deeds to be ren¬ 
dered to God. 
It Purely muft animate the Soul even to extacy, to find 
that the ever-vig'ilant internal Judge, who is always pre¬ 
fent, and unremittingly watching over our aitions, and 
who is clothed with all the Dignity, Majefty, and Sacred- 
nefs, of the Divine Being himfelf, is an Idea formed by 
bur Practical Reason, which indeed is intimately ac¬ 
quainted with our molt inward thoughts; for it relides in 
tire very Soul itfelf. But how can we ever contemplate 
with 
