K A 
fpring; and that the nations be performed, not merely in 
conformity to duty, but Jlriblly for the Jake of Duly. The 
Commandment of Reafon here fays, Be holy*— Objectively 
it coniifts in the attainment of a man’s whole moral end, 
which regards perfeftion ; that is, in the performance of 
all his duties, for the full accomplifhment of his moral 
end, with relpedt to himfelf. And here Reafon fays, Be 
pcrfeEl. The Itriving after perfection is with man always 
a progreffion from one perfection to another. “ If there 
are fuch things as ‘ Virtue ’ and ‘ Praife', think upon thefe 
things.” 
This duty of increafing our moral perfection is, ac¬ 
cording to its quality, ftriCt and perfect, though, accord¬ 
ing to its degree, it is only a large and imperfeCt duty, on 
account of the frailty of human nature. 
The perpetual Itriving after perfection is duty. Although 
it never can be completely attained (in this life), we may 
neverthelefs conftantly make approaches towards it. This 
duty is, with regard to the objeCt, (the Idea of abfolute per- 
feblion to which we ought to attain,) a ftriCt and perfeCt 
Duty •, but, with regard to the fubjeCt, it is a large and 
imperfeCt Duty of man to himfelf. 
What man knows himfelf fufficiently to be able to fay, 
when he feels the fpring to the obfervance of his. Duty, 
whether it arifes purely from the reprefentations of the 
law, or whether fome fenfible incentives which aim at ad¬ 
vantage, (or at leaft at the obviating difad vantage,) and 
which on another occafion might be ready to lerve vice 
alfo, do not co-operate? The Depths of the human heart 
are unfathomable. 
According to the laws of Duty, (not the laws of Na¬ 
ture,) that is, according to the laws of practical Reafon, 
which conneCt all rational beings into a whole, we contem¬ 
plate ourfelves as compofing a Moral World; and by ana¬ 
logy with the Phyfical World, which is fupported as a 
whole by the principles of altrablion and repulfion, difeover, 
that in the moral world the principle of mutual love con- 
Itantly directs the approach of one to another, and that 
the principle of reverence , which is due to everyone, keeps 
them at a di/lance. It is thus that the Moral World is 
connected as a whole. And, Ihould one of thefe great mo¬ 
ral powers fink, then would Immorality “ with a diftend- 
ed Throat drink up the whole Kingdom of Moral Beings 
like a drop of water.” 
Man has a Faculty of desiring. This is a felf- 
evident pofition that requires no proof; for what are his 
appetites and inclinations but defires, which can only 
be fatisfied by the polfeffion of the objeCts deiired ? Now 
\vhat objects can man polfibly defire ? As we have al¬ 
ready proved, under the head “Judgment,” that all ob¬ 
jects mult be clalfed under the only poflible wholes that 
exiit in the world, namely, under Intuitions, Concep¬ 
tions, or Ideas ; it is clear that, when man defires an ob¬ 
jeCt, it mult belong to one or other of thefe claffes. All 
thefe wholes are reprefentations ; therefore man can only 
defire reprefentations. But in all reprefentations we dil- 
tinguilh two parts; firft, their Matter, which mujl be given', 
fecondly, their form, which mult be produced by the mind. 
We muft here remark, that, as the matter in all reprefen¬ 
tations mult be given; and as, in order to become confci- 
ous of this given matter, the receptivity mult be affeCted, 
and we mult form a reprefentation of this affection of the 
receptivity, which, as it has a reference to the Itate of our 
exiltence, is named feeling ; and, as we never can become 
confcious of a reprefentation without fuch an affedtion, 
all reprefentations mult confequently have an influence 
on the Itate of our exiftence; that is, either produce plea- 
fure, pain, or indifference. This evinces in us a Sense of 
pleasure and displeasure. The Itriving after the 
form of our reprefentations is inlelleElual ; that after the 
matter is fcnfual. The former is fatisfied by aCiion, and 
may be called dilinterelted; the latter, which can only be 
fatisfied by fomething given, is interelted. When the fa¬ 
culty of defiring is determined to aCtion by fenfations ex¬ 
cited by an external intuition, it is grofsly fenfual; when 
N T. 027 
determined to aCtion by tirofe fenfations which arc caufed 
by internal intuitions, it is a refined fenfual faculty of de* 
firing. All our intuitions mull be connected by the un- 
derltanding into conceptions, or we never can become 
confcious of them ; and thus they become ultimately com¬ 
bined w ith the twelve Categories. Hence it follows, that, 
as our intuitions of external and interna! objects are mo¬ 
dified anew by the Underllanding, fo the fenfation excited 
by them will alfo receive fome new modification. 
When the faculty of defiring is determined by fenfa¬ 
tions excited by intuitions that are modified by the Ca¬ 
tegories of Quantity, it Itrives after fenfible perfeblion ; when 
by thole of Quality, after agreeable lenfations, or pleafure. 
When the faculty of defiring is determined by the Catego¬ 
ries of Relation, it produces three dillindt defires: Firf, by 
Subjlance, a defire for the continuance of thofe pleafing 
fenlations, and therewith the prefervation of life ; fecond¬ 
ly, by Caufe and FJfebt, a defire for an interelted adtion ; 
thirdly, by Ablion and lie-aclion, a define for interelted fo- 
ciety; this is alfo the l'ource of the defire of propagation. 
The Categories of Modality do not modify our defires. 
It was proved under the head of “ Underllanding,” that 
they have no (hare in conftituting the objects of our know¬ 
ledge or our Intuition; they confequently cannot modify 
Senfations produced by the objects in our Intuitions. 
They ferve, however, to reprefent the defiring faculty un¬ 
der three points of view ; firft, under PoJJibility, that it can 
define at all ; fecondly under Exiftence, we confider it in 
an actual Itate of define ; and, laltly, under NcceJJity, as de¬ 
firing inftindtively. 
Having thus completely conlidered all thole objects of 
our defires which are modified by tire Undemanding, it rev 
mains now for us to examine what (hare Reafon basin de¬ 
termining our faculty of defiring. 
As the Categories modify our intuitions, it follows that 
Reafon muft do the fame. Every thing reprefe.nted by the 
Underllanding is completely limited and determined in all 
refpedls. But Reafon, by excluding all limits from the 
objects reprefented in our intuitions, renders our defires., 
which are determined by them, boundlefs ; and thus it is, 
that all the treafures of this globe, and all the contrivances 
and arts of man, can never latisfy all our delires ; for Rea¬ 
fon aims at abfolute Totality. 
When our defiring faculty is determined to action by a 
reprefentation of the pleafure which the objedt excites in 
us, it is directed towards fatisfyingourappetites; or, what 
is the fame thing, to our Happiness. But, when it is de¬ 
termined by a reprefentation of law's of Reafon, or a Itriv¬ 
ing to realize the mode in which Reafon adts, it is direct¬ 
ed to Virtue. Every man has therefore two great ends 
to which all his exertions and defires ultimately tend ; 
and thefe are Happinefs and Virtue. Both thefe ends taken 
together form the great and complete objedt of all the hu¬ 
man defires, or the highef good ; and every man mult ne- 
celfarily delire both Virtue and Happinefs as long as he 
retains the nature of his mind and body. 
The highell good does not confill, as the Stoics affirm,, 
in mere Virtue, nor, as the Epicureans alfert, in mere 
Happinefs ; but in a union of both, in which Virtue 
must be the cause of Happiness ; and which requires 
that man, before he Itrives after any particular let of 
pleafing Senfations, mult always refiedt, firft, whether the 
moral law permits him the enjoyment of them or not. 
The aim of the morally-good man is die order of the 
moral world : he wills accordingly, that only he who lias- 
made himfelf worthy of Happinefs ought to partake of it. 
But whoever makes his Happinefs the chief end of his ac¬ 
tions renders himfelf unworthy of it. Happinefs alone can 
never conftitute the liighell good ; for Reafon cannot ap¬ 
prove of its polfelfion, unlefs he who partakes of it is wor¬ 
thy of it. And Virtue alone is as little to be confidered 
the highell good, although it is the only condition under 
which the participation of Happinefs can be approved by 
Practical Reafon. The highell good conflits in Virtue 
being the caufe of Happinels. 
i Tha 
