K I 
"head and fup rente governor of the national church. 26 Hen. 
VIII. c. i. i Eliz. c. i. In virtue of this authority, he 
convenes, prorogues, retrains, regulates, and dilfolves, 
all eccleliaftical lynods or convocations. He has the fu- 
preme right of patronage, called patronage paramount, 
over all the eccleliaftical benefices in England. From this 
prerogative of being the head of the church arifes the 
king’s right of nomination to vacant bifhoprics, and cer¬ 
tain other ecclefiailical preferments. As head of the 
church, the king is likewife the dernier refort in all eccle- 
fiaftical caufes ; an appeal lying ultimately to him in chan¬ 
cery from the fentence of every eccleliaftical judge; which 
right was reftored to the crown by flat. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 
19. The king can unite, feparate, enlarge, or contract, 
the limits of bifhoprics, or eccleliaftical benefices; and by 
his letters ereft new bifhoprics, colleges, &c. He can dil- 
penfe with the rigour of the ecclefiaftical laws, except 
ihofe which have been confirmed by aft of parliament, or 
declared by the bill of rights; as, fora baftard to be a 
prielt, for abifhop to hold a benefice in commendam, &c. 
He has alfo power to difpenfe with feveral afts of parlia¬ 
ment and penal ltatutes, by a non-obftante, where himfelf 
alone is concerned ; to moderate the rigour of the law, 
according to equity; to pardon a man condemned by 
law ; except in appeals of murder, and in cafe of impeach¬ 
ments by the houfe of commons; and to interpret by his 
judges, in ftatutes and cafes not defined by law. 
The maxim, that the king can do no wrong, can think 
770 wrong, has been expofed as ridiculous and abfurd, by 
lord Abingdon, in his Dedication to the colleblive Body of the 
People of England. “ Let us fee (fays he) how thefe max¬ 
ims and their comments agree with the conflitution, with 
nature, with reafon, with common fenfe, with experience, 
with faft, with precedent, and with fir William Black- 
ltone himfelf; and whether, by the application of thefe 
rules of evidence thereto, it will not be found, that (from 
the want of attention to that important line of diftinftion 
which the conflitution has drawn between the king of 
England and the crown of England) what was attributed 
to the monarchy has not been given to the monarch, what 
meant for the king [hip conveyed to the king, what defign- 
ed for the thing transferred to the perfon, what intended 
for theory applied to praElicc-, and fo in confequence, that, 
whilft the premifes (of the perfeftion of the monarchy) 
be true, the conclufion (that the king can do no wrong) 
be not falfe. 
“ And, firft, in reference to the conflitution : to which 
if this matter be applied, it is fubverfive of a principle in 
the conftitution, upon which the prefervation of the con- 
llitution depends ; I mean the principle of refjlance ; a 
principle which, whilft no man will now venture to gain- 
fay, fir William Blackflone himfelf admits ‘ is jitjlifiable to 
the perfon of the prince, when the being of the Hate is 
endangered, and the public voice proclaims fuch refillance 
neceflary;’ and thus, by fuch admiffion, both difproves 
the maxim, and overfets his own comment thereupon ; 
for, to fay that ‘ the king can do no wrong,’ and that c he 
is incapable even of thinking wrong,’ and then to admit 
that ‘ refiftance to his perfon is jullifiable,’ are fuch jarring 
contradiftions in themfelves, that, until reconciled, the 
neceflity of argument is fufpended. 
“ With refpeft then, in the next place, to the agree¬ 
ment of this maxim, and its comment, wdth nature, with 
reafon, ami with common fenfe, I fhould have thought 
myfelf fufliciently juftified in appealing to every man’s 
own refleftion for decifion, if I had not been made to un¬ 
der (land that nature, reafon, and common fenfe, had no¬ 
thing to do with either. Sir William Blackftone ftys, 
* That though a philofophical mind will confiderthe royal 
perfon^merely as one man appointed by mutual confent 
to prefide over others, and will pay him that reverence and 
duty which the principles of fociety demand, yet the mafs 
of mankind will be apt to grow infolent and refractory if 
taught to confider their prince as a man of no greater per¬ 
fection than themfelves ; and therefore the law alcribes to 
N G r 735 
the king, in his high political eharafter, certain attri¬ 
butes of a great and tranlcendent nature, by which the 
people are led to confider him in the light of a fuperior 
being, and to pay him that awful refpeft which may ena¬ 
ble him with greater eafe to carry on the bufinefs of go¬ 
vernment.’ So that, in order to govern with greater eafe 
(which by the bye is mere alfertion without any proof), it 
is neceffary to deceive the mafs of mankind, by making 
them believe, not only what a philofophical mind cannot 
believe, but what it is impoflible for any mind to believe; 
and therefore, in the inveftigation of this lubjeft, accord¬ 
ing to fir William, neither nature, reafon, nor common 
fenfe, can have any concern. 
“ It remains to examine in how much this maxim and 
its comment agree with experience, with faft, with prece¬ 
dent, and with fir William Blackftone himfelf. And here 
it is matter of mod curious lpeculation, to obferve a max¬ 
im laid down, and which is intended for a rule of govern¬ 
ment, not only without a fingle cafe in fupport of it, but 
with a firing of cafes, that might be carried back to Eg¬ 
bert the firft monarch of England, in direft oppolition ter 
the doftrine. Who is the man, that, reading the paft hif- 
tory of this country, will fliow us any king that has not 
done wrong ? Who is the reader that will not find that 
all the wrongs and injuries which the free conftitution of 
this country has hitherto fuffered, have been folely derived 
from the arbitrary meafures of our kings ? And yet the 
mafs of mankind are to look upon the king as a fuperior 
being ; and the maxim, that ‘the king can do no wrong,’ 
is to remain as an article of belief. But, without pufhing 
this inquiry any farther, let us fee what encouragement 
fir William Blackftone himfelf has given us for our credu¬ 
lity. After Hating the maxim, and prefenting us with a 
moll lively pi£lure, ‘ of our fovereign lord thus all-perfeft 
and immortal,’ what does he make this all-perfeftion and 
immortality in the end to come to ? His words are thefe: 
‘For, when king Charles’s deluded brother attempted to 
enflave the nation’ (no wrong this, to be fure), ‘ he found it 
was beyond his power •. the people both could, and did, re¬ 
fill him ; and, in confequence of fuch refillance, obliged 
him to quit his enterprife and his throne together.’ Comm. 
4 - 433 - 
“The fum of all is this: That the crown of England 
and the king of England are diltinguifhable, and not fy- 
iionymous terms ; that allegiance is due to the crown, and, 
through the crown, to the king : that the attributes of the 
crown are fovereignty, perfeftion, and perpetuity; but 
that it does not therefore follow that the king can do no 
wrong. It is indeed to be admitted, that, in high refpeft 
for the crown, high refpeft is alfo due to the wearer of that 
crown ; that is, to the king: but the crown is to be pre¬ 
ferred to the king, for the firft veneration is due to the 
conftitution. It is likewife to be fuppofed that the king 
will do no wrong : and as, to prevent this, a privy coun¬ 
cil is appointed by the conftitution to aiiift the king in 
the execution of the government ; fo, if any wrong be 
done, ‘ thefe men,’ as Montefquieu exprelfes it, ‘ rnay be 
examined and punilhed.’ 
“ But, if any future king fhall think to fereen thefe evil 
counfellors from the juft vengeance of the people, by be¬ 
coming his own minijler ; and, in fo doing, (hall take for 
his fanftion the attribute of perfection, fhali trull to the de¬ 
ception of his being a fuperior being, and cloak himfelf un¬ 
der the maxim that the king can do no wrong ; I fay, in fuch 
a'cafe, let the appeal already made to the conftitution, to 
nature, to reafon, to common fenfe, to experience, to faft, 
to precedent, and to fir William Blackftone himfelf, fuf- 
fice ; and preclude the neceflity of any further remarks 
from me.” 
For experience, faft, and precedent, fee the reigns of 
king John, Henry III. Edward II. Bichard II. Charles I. 
and James II. See alfo Mirror of Juftices; where it is 
laid, “that this grand aflembly (meaning the wittena-ge- 
motte, or parliament) is to confer the government of God’s 
people, how they may be kept from fin, live in quiet, 
and 
