730 ic r 
.and have right done them, according to the cuftoms and 
laws, and more efpecially of wrong done by the king, queen, 
or their children ;” to which Nat. Bacon adds this note: 
“ At this time the king might do wrong, Sic. and fo fay 
Brafton and Fleta of the kings in their time.” And ac¬ 
cordingly, in King John’s Magna Charta of Liberties, 
tliere was a claufe making it lawful for the barons of the 
realm to choofe twenty-live barons to fee the charter ob- 
ferved by the king ; with power, on any juftice or other 
miriifter of the king’s failing to do right, and acting- con¬ 
trary thereto, for four of the laid barons to addrefs the 
king, and pray that the fame might be remedied ; and, if 
the fame were not amended in forty days, upon the re¬ 
port of the four barons to the relt of the twenty-five, 
thofe twenty-five barons, with the commonalty of the 
whole land, were at liberty to diflrefs the king, take his caf- 
tles, lands, &c. until the evils complained of fhould be remedied, 
according to their judgment; faving the perfon of the 
king, queen, and their children. And, when the evils 
were redrefied, the people were to obey the king as before. 
But this claufe was omitted in King Henry Ill’s Magna 
Charta; though in a ftatute made at Oxford, anno42, Hen. 
III. to reform mifgovernment, it was enabled, that .twen¬ 
ty-four great men fhould be named, twelve by the king, 
and twelve by the parliament, to appoint jultices, chan¬ 
cellors, and other officers, to fee Magna Charta obferved. 
The barons’ wars feem to have proceeded in lb me mea- 
fure from a like power granted to them as by the charter 
of king John ; and probably the parliament’s wars in the 
time of king Charles I. from their examples. 
But, whatever attempts might have been previoufiy 
made, it cannot but be obferved, that moll: of the laws fc*r 
afeertaining, limiting, and reftraining, the prerogative of 
the crown, have been made within the compafs of little 
more than a century part, from the Petition of Right in 3 
Car. I. to the prefent time ; fo that the powers of the 
crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and di- 
miniffied fince the reign of king James I. particularly by 
the abolition of the Star Chamber and High Commilfion 
courts in the reign of Charles I. and by the difclaiming 
of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on thefub- 
jeft, by the fame prince; by the difufe of forelt-laws for 
a century palt; and by the many excellent provifions 
enafted under Charles II. efpecially by the abolition of 
military tenures, purveyance, and pre-emption ; the ha- 
beas-corpus aft, and the aft to prevent the difcontinuance 
of parliaments for above three years; and, fince the revo¬ 
lution, by the ftrong and emphatical words in which our 
liberties are afierted, in the Bill of Rights, and Aft of Set¬ 
tlement; by the aft for triennial (fince turned into fepten- 
nial) eleftions ; by the exclufion of certain officers from 
the houfe of conwnons ; by rendering the feats of the 
judges permanent, and their falaries liberal and indepen¬ 
dent; and by reftraining the king’s pardon from obfti lift¬ 
ing parliamentary impeachments. Befides all this, if we 
confider how the crown is impoverifhed and ftripped of 
all its ancient revenues, fo that it muft greatly rely on 
the liberality of parliament for its neceflary l'upport and 
maintenance, we rftay, perhaps, be led to think, that the 
balance is inclined, pretty ftrongly, to the popular fcale; 
and that the executive magiltrate has neither indepen¬ 
dence nor power enough left, to form that check upon 
the lords and commons which the founders of our confti- 
tution intended. 
On the other hand, however, it is to be confidered, that 
every prince, in the firft. parliament after his acceflion, 
has by long ufage a truly-royal addition to his hereditary 
revenue fettled upon him for his life; and has never any 
occafion to apply to parliament for fupplies, but upon 
fome public neceffity of the whole realm. This reftores 
to him that conftitutional independence, which at his firft 
acceffion feems, it muft be owned, to be wanting. And 
then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps, that 
the hands of government are at leaft fufficiently ftrength- 
CAed, and that an Englifii monarch is now in no danger 
3 
TsT a 
of being overborne either by the nobility or the people. 
The inftruments of power are not, perhaps, fo open and 
avowed, as they formerly were, and therefore are the lefs 
liable to jealous and invidious refleftions ; but they are 
not the weaker upon that account. In fhort, our national 
debt and taxes have, in their natural confequences, thrown 
fuch a weight of power into the executive fcale of go¬ 
vernment, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot 
anceftors ; who gloriouily ftruggled for the abolition of 
the then formidable parts of the prerogative,, and by an 
unaccountable want of forefight eftablifhed this fyftem in 
their ftead. The entire colleftion and management of fo 
vaft a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, 
have given rife to fuch a multitude of new officers cre¬ 
ated by, and removable at, the royal pleafure, that they 
have extended the influence'of government to every cor¬ 
ner of the nation. Witnefs the commiffioners, and the 
multitude of dependents on the cuftoms, in every port of 
the kingdom ; the commiffioners of excife, and their nu¬ 
merous fubalterns, in every inland diftrift ; the poftmaf- 
ters and their fervants, planted in every town, and upon 
every public road ; the commiffioners of the llamps, and 
uieir diftributors, which are fully as fcattered and fully as 
numerous ; the officers of the falt-duty, which, though a 
fpecies of excife, and condufted in the fame manner, are 
yet made a diftinft corps from the ordinary managers of 
that revenue ; the furveyors of lioufes and windows; the 
receivers of the land-tax ; the managers of lotteries ; and 
the commiffioners of hackney coaches ; all which are ei¬ 
ther mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, 
and removable at pleafure without any reafon affigned ; 
thefe, it requires but little penetration to fee, muft give 
that power, on which they depend for fubfiftence, an in¬ 
fluence moft amazingly extenfive. To this may be added 
the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obli¬ 
gations, by preference in loans, fubferiptions, tickets, 
remittances, and other money-tranfaftions, which will 
greatly increafe this influence; and that over tiiofe perfons 
whofe attachment, on account of their wealth, is fre¬ 
quently the moft definable. All this is the natural, though 
perhaps the unforefieen, confequence of ereftingour funds 
of credit, and, to fupport them, eftablifhing our perpetual 
taxes; the whole of which is entirely new fince the refto- 
ration in 1660, and by far the greateft part fince the re¬ 
volution in 1688. And the fame may be laid with regard 
to the officers in our numerous army, and the places 
w'hich the army has created. But, though this profufion of 
offices fhould have no effeft on individuals, there is ftilL 
another newly-acquired branch of power; and that is, 
not the influence only, but the force, of a difeiplined 
army ; paid indeed ultimately by the people, but imme¬ 
diately by the crown ; raifed by the crown, officered by 
the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on 
foot, it is true, only from year to year, and that by the 
power of parliament; but during that year they muft, by 
the nature of our conftitution, if raifed at all, be at the 
abfolute difpofal of the crown. Add to all this, that, be¬ 
fides the civil lift, the immenfe revenue of almoft feven 
millions fterling, which is annually paid to the creditors 
of the public, or carried to the finking fund, is firft de- 
pofited in the royal exchequer, and thence ilfued out to 
the refpeftive offices of payment. This revenue the peo¬ 
ple can never refufe to rail’e, becaufe it is made perpetual 
by aft of parliament; which alfo, when well confidered, 
will appear to be a truft of great delicacy and high impor¬ 
tance. Upon the whole, therefore, it feems clear, that 
whatever may have been become of the nominal, the real 
power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any 
tranfaftions in the laft century. Much is indeed given 
up ; but much is alfo acquired. The ftern commands of 
prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence-, 
the llavifli and exploded doftrine of non-refiftance has 
given .way to a military eftablilhment by law ; and to the 
difufe of parliaments has fucceeded a parliamentary truft 
of an immenfe perpetual revenue. All which, put tege- 
