U D G E. 
giftrates; that is, he had the power of the Chief Juftice 
of the Common Pleas, of the Chief Baron of the Exche¬ 
quer, and the Malter of the Court of Wards ; and he com¬ 
monly fat in the king's palace, and there executed that au¬ 
thority which was formerly performed per comitem palatii, 
in determining differences which happened between the 
barons and other great perfons of the kingdom, as well as 
caufes criminal and civil between other men ; but king 
Richard I. firft diminilhed his power, by appointing two 
other jultices, to each whereof he afhgned a diitinft juril- 
diCtion ; viz. to one the North parts of England, to the 
other the South ; and in the reign of Edward I. they 
were reduced to one court, with a farther abridgment of 
their authority, both as to the dignity of their perfons 
and extent of their jurifdiflion; for no more were chofen 
out of the nobility, as anciently, but out of the commons, 
who were men of integrity, and ikilful in the laws of the 
land ; whence, it is laid, the lludy of the law dates its 
beginning. Orig. Jud. In the time of king John, and 
other of our ancient kings, it often occurs in charters of 
privilege, Quod non ponatur refpondere, nifi coram nobis , vel 
capitali jujlitia nojlra \ and this high officer hath, at this 
time, a very extenlive power and jurifdiCtion in pleas of 
the crown, and is particularly intruffed, not only with 
the prerogative of the king, but the liberty of the fubjeft. 
The Chief Juftice of the Common Pleas hath alfo the 
title of Lord, whilft he is in office, and is called Dominus 
JuJHciarius Communium Placitorum ; vel Dominvs Jvjliciarius 
de Banco-, who, with his alfiftants, did originally, and doth 
yet, hear and determine common pleas in civil caules, as 
diftinguiffied from the king's pleas, or pleas of the crown. 
Brail, lib. 3. The chief jultices are inftalled or placed on 
the bench by the lord chancellor; and the other judges by 
the lord chancellor and the chief juftices. 
Befides the Lords Chief Juftices, and the other Judges 
of the courts at Weftminfter, there are many other juftices 
commilfioned by the king to execute the laws; as Juftices 
of Affife ; of the Foreft ; of Nifi Prius ; Oyer and Termi¬ 
ner; Juftices of the Peace, See. See Justice. 
In Great Britain the king is confidered as the fountain 
of juftice, and general confervator of the peace of the 
kingdom. The original power of judicature, by the fun¬ 
damental principles of fociety, is lodged in the fociety at 
large; btit, as it would be impracticable to render com¬ 
plete juftice to every individual by the pdople in their 
collective capacity, therefore, every nation has committed 
that power to certain feleCt magiftrates, who, with more 
eafe and expedition, can hear and determine complaints ; 
and, in this kingdom, this authority has immemorially 
been exercifed by the king or his l'ubftitutes. He, there¬ 
fore, has alone the right of ereCting courts of judicature ; 
for, though the cpnftitution of the kingdom hath intruded 
him with the whole executive power of the laws, it is im- 
poffible, as well as improper, that he ftiould perfonally 
carry into execution this great and extenfive truft; it is 
conlequently neceflary, that courts ftiould be ereCted, to 
affilt him in executing this power; and equally necefiary, 
that, if ereCted, they ftiould be ereCted by his authority. 
And hence it is, that all jurifdiCtions of courts are either 
mediately or immediately 7 derived from the crown, their 
proceedings run generally in the king’s name, they pals 
under his leal, and are executed by his officers. 
It is probable, and almoft certain, that, in very early 
times, before our conftitution arrived at its full perfection, 
our kings, in perfon, often heard and determined caufes 
between party and party. But, at prefent, by the long 
and uniform ufiige of many ages, our kings have dele¬ 
gated their whole judicial power to the judges of their fe- 
Veral courts; which are the grand depolitaries of the fun¬ 
damental law's of the kingdom, and have gained a known 
and ftated jurifdiction, regulated by certain and eftablilhed 
rules, which the crown itfelf cannot now alter, but by act 
cf parliament. 2 Hawk. P.€. 1. § 3. 
In order to maintain both the dignity and independence 
®f the judges in the fuperior courts, jt is enacted by the 
flat. 13 Will. III. c. 2, that their commiffions fiiall be 
made (not, as formerly, durante bene p/acito, but) quamdiu 
fe bene gejfcrint, and their falaries afeertained and eltablilh- 
ed; but that it may be-lawful to remove them on the ad- 
drefsof both houfes of parliament. And now, by the no¬ 
ble improvements of that law in the ftatute of 1 Geo. III. 
c. 23, enabled at the earned: recommendation of his pre¬ 
fent majefty, the judges are continued in their offices dur¬ 
ing their good behaviour, notwithftanding any demile of 
the croum, (which was formerly held immediately to va¬ 
cate their feats ;) and their full falaries are abfolutely fe- 
cured to them during the continuance of their commif¬ 
fions; by which means the judges are rendered completely 
independent of the king, his minifters, and his fucceilbrs; 
his majefty having been pleafed to declare, that “ he 
looked upon the independence and uprightnefs of judges 
as eflential to the impartial adminiftration of juftice, as 
one of the belt fecurities of the rights and liberties of his 
fubjeCls, and as molt conducive to the honour of the 
crown.” Com. Jourti. 3 March, 1761. See Ld. Raym. 747. 
and 1 Ann. 1. c. 8, which continued the commiffions of 
the judges for fix months after the demife of the crown. 
In criminal proceedings, or prolecutions for offences, 
it would be ltill a higher ablurdity, if the king, perfonally, 
fit in judgment ; becaufe, in regard to thele, he appears 
in another capacity, that of prolecutor. All offences are 
either againft the “ king’s peace,” or “ his crown and 
dignity;” and are fo laid in every indictment. For, though 
in their confequences they generally feem (except in the 
cafe of treafon and a very few others) to be rather of¬ 
fences againft the kingdom than againft the king, yet as 
the public, which is an invifible body, has delegated all 
its power and rights, with regard to the execution of the 
laws, to one vifible magiftrate, all affronts to that power, 
and breaches of thofe rights, are immediately offences 
againft him, to whom they are fo delegated by the public. 
He is, therefore, the proper perfon to profecute for all 
public offences and breaches of the peace, being the per¬ 
fon injured in the eye of the law. And hence alfo arifes 
the mod mild and equitable branch of the prerogative, 
One of the molt diftinguifliing features in a monarchy, 
that of pardoning offences ; for it is reafonable that he 
only who is injured ftiould have the power of forgiving. 
In this diftinCt and feparate exiftence of the judicial 
power in a peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but 
not removable at pleafure, by the crown, confifts one 
main prefervative of the public liberty; which cannot 
iubfift long in any ftate, unlefs the adminiftration of com¬ 
mon juftice be, in fome degree, leparated both from the 
legiflative and alio from the executive power. Were it 
joined with the legiflative, the life, liberty, and property, 
of the fubjeCt, would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, 
whofe decifions would be then regulated only by their 
own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of 
law ; which, though legiflators may depart from, yet judges 
are bound to cbferve. Were it joined with the executive, 
this union might loon be an over-balance for the legilla- 
tive. For which reafon, by ftat. 16 Car. I. c. 10, which 
aboliftied the Court of Star-chamber, effectual care is 
taken to remove all judicial power out of the hands' of 
the king’s privy council. See 1 Comm. 266-9. c. 7. 
The perfonal fafety of the judges, and the refpcCt due 
to them, being alio of eflential confequence towards the 
prefervation of their independence and integrity, which 
is no lefs in danger from the ardor civium prava jubentiuni , 
than from the vultus injlantis tyranni-, many provilions have 
been made by law to reftrain and punifn affronts and in¬ 
juries, to them perfonally, and to the courts of juftice 
over which they prefide. One lpecies of treafon under 
ftat. 25 Edvv. III. c. 2, (fee the article Treason,) is, “If 
a man flay the Chancellor, Treafurer, or the King’s Juf¬ 
tices of the one Bench or the other, Juftices in Eyre, or 
Juftices of Affife, and all other Juftices affigned to hear 
and determine, being in their places doing their offices.” 
Rut this ftatute extends only to-the actually killing of 
them* 
