200 META P II Y S I C S. 
able for any undue indulgence that he allows them, and 
which the moral law forbids. 
It being then an eftablifhed fafl in our confcioufnefs, 
■that man is not only a Being of Nature, but a Moral 
Being- alio ; it cannot but be evident, that the laws by 
■which thefe two diftinft beings are governed, mult be 
capable of a complete reparation; and that the princi¬ 
ples, alfo, ariling from thele laws, mult be of a perfeflly 
diitindt nature. In the firft place, as a J'enfitive being-, Man 
is a part of Nature, and fubjedted to the necdlity of Na¬ 
ture, that is, to the law of the Category Cause and 
Effect; and this regards his animal part, by which he 
is endowed with padions, delircs, inltindts, and inclina¬ 
tions; and the principle which propofes the latisfadlion 
of all thefe is the principle of self-love, which fpurs 
him on in the fearch of Happiness, or the complete lk- 
tisfadtion of all his defires. In the fecond place, as a 
Moral Being or Perfon, he is out of Time and Space, and 
referred to the fphere of Reafon, where he is entirely 
-FREE from the laws of Nature, and fubjedt only to the 
Moral Law, of which he is liimfelf the author, by virtue 
of his Practical Reason ; and the principle which 
commands obedience to this law is Virtue, or the moral 
ltrength of Man in fulfilling his duty, which confifts in 
overcoming the inclinations when they tempt him to 
tranfgrefs; therefore Man is conltantly aftuated by two 
very diitindt principles, both inherent in his nature, and 
having very different objedts in view. The former aims 
at producing the fatisfadtion of his defires and inclina¬ 
tions, that is, to accomplilh his Happiness. But the 
latter afpires to fatisfy his Reafon, and his ConJ'cience 
whifpers to him, not to gratify his defires at the expenfe 
of his peace of Mind, and thus make it his chief aim to 
be happy; but firlt to enquire whether his defires do not 
militate againft the Moral Law; fince it is impoffible 
for him to be in all refpedts happy when he offends againll 
that Law. In order to be completely happy, it is abfo- 
lutely neceflkry that all his defires ihould be previoufly 
examined by Reafon, and that they fliould be rejedted if 
they offend againft Reafon. 
Thele two diitindt and effential principles of Man’s na¬ 
ture conftantly excite in him two diitindt, but effential, 
defires. He not only defires to be happy, but good, or 
virtuous. For the moral law fays, Lotus, on all octa¬ 
gons, be morally good, whatever may be the confequence. In 
order to fulfil one of thefe defires, that is to* fay, in order 
to be ftridtly virtuous, he finds that many of thofe de¬ 
fires that would contribute to his happinefs mufl be re- 
ftrained. But what does this mean ? It means that Rea¬ 
fon commands, in the molt abfolute manner, that the 
Homo phenomenon fliould in all his adlions be judged by 
and fubjedted to the Homo noumenon-, that is, that man, 
as a perfon or moral being, has views and ends of fo 
fublime a nature, that they infinitely furpafs in value 
the fulfilment and perfedt enjoyment of all his animal 
defires. For, as a moral being, he is out of Time and 
Space, and even at this prefent moment of his exiftence a€tu- 
ally amember of another World, namely, the Moral World, 
where the Laws of Reafon are the foie laws; and wherein he 
himfelf is legiflative, by virtue of his Practical Reason. 
So far as regards his animal nature, he is merely a pheno¬ 
menon, which is by no means a thing in itfelf, but a mere 
appearance; and, viewed in this light, he can only conli- 
der himfelf as a part of the great fyftem of nature which 
is fubjedt to continual changes, to decay, and to renova¬ 
tion. Here he mufl be carried by the torrent, where 
time fweeps .all before him. But, as the whole of Nature 
confifts merely of Intuitions, that is, of fenlible repre- 
ientations, which are nothing but phenomena or appear¬ 
ances ; we muff naturally be very much in the dark as 
to what the things may be in themfelves. It does not 
therefore appear very furprifing that Man, confidered as 
a mere phenomenon, ihould be fubjecled to a faculty, than 
which nothing higher can be conceived ; namely, Reason, 
from which fprings not only the Moral Law, but alfo the 
Idea of our own Soul, of the Deity, and of a future 
State. What is it but this faculty which elevates man* 
above every creature in the vaft fyftem of Nature, nay* 
even above himfelf, confidered as a part of Nature, and 
takes him out of Time and Space into the fphere of Reafon, 
where he contemplates himfelf as an abfolute being in 
itfelf, that is fubjedted to the laws of his own Reafon ? 
and thus he not only becomes a perfon, but a member 
of the Moral World, in which he alone allows himfelf 
felicity who from his adtions has become worthy of it. 
Hence it follows, that Man is by himfelf bound to 
fulfil the Laws which he himfelf makes by his Practical 
Reason. He is reftridted therefore by no power but that, 
which he himfelf conllitutes, and conlequently he mult 
be free; that is to fay, the Homo Noumenon gives Jaws 
to the Homo Phenomenon which it is bound to obey : 
therefore, the Senfttive Being, in its fearch after Happi¬ 
ness, mult not offend againft the laws preferibed by the 
Rational Being, in fulfilling which confifts Morality. 
Man is alfo the natural judge of himfelf, for he either 
acquits or condemns himfelf in his own Conscience; 
and, having adted conformably to its didtates, nothing 
more can be required of him. But he is diftindtly con- 
feious that he ought to difeharge his duty purely for the 
fake of duty; and, with this view, he mull entirely fepa- 
rate his defire for Happinefs from his idea of Duty, in 
order to difeharge his duty quite difintereftedly. Thus 
does Reafon command Morality, and in obeying it 
Man obtains the dominion over himfelf. 
It is perfedtly right to ftrive after pleafing fenfations,- 
or Happinefs; for the defire of happinefs is efiential to 
human nature, and can only be deftroyed with the de- 
ftrudtion of human nature. The only thing here to be 
guarded againft is the confidering happinefs as the chief 
objedt and ultimate end of our exiftence. It is evident 
that man defires not only to be happy, but alfo to be 
virtuous. Every man has therefore two great ends tO' 
which all his exertions and defires finally tend; Happi¬ 
ness and Virtue. Thefe two ends taken together form 
the great and entire objedt of all human defires, or the 
Highest Good; and every man muft necefiarily defire 
both virtue and happinefs, fo long as he retains the na¬ 
ture of his mind and of his body. 
The higheft good does not coniift in mere virtue, as the 
Stoics believed, nor in mere happinefs, as the Epicureans 
affirmed, but in the union of both; and can only be 
brought about by iubjedting our paflions and inclinations 
to the guidance of Reafon, which has already been ftiowu 
to be completely within our power. Therefore Virtue 
must be the cause of happiness. And Man, before 
he ltrives to procure pleafurable fenlktions, muft afk him¬ 
felf this queition, Docs the moral Law allow me the enjoy¬ 
ment of them, or does it prohibit that enjoyment ? 
Happinefs, as already ftated, confifts in the gratifica¬ 
tions of all our defires, appetites, and inclinations. But, 
when our defires are determined by Speculative Reafon, 
they then become infinite. Thus all the wealth and 
power of this globe can never fatisfy the ambition of man. 
Therefore it is evident that in this world complete Hap¬ 
pinefs is impoffible! But, from the very conftitution of 
our mental faculties, we never can ceafe from defiring it. 
The virtuous man is, therefore, compelled to look for it 
in another, that is, in the Moral world: nor is the proof 
of this attended with any difficulty in point of argument; 
as the immortality of the foul has been already eftablifhed 
beyond coutradidtion, the Soul at the prefent moment of 
our exiftence being out of Time and Space, and occupy¬ 
ing a different ftation from the Body, which is a part of 
Nature, fubjedt to mechanical laws, and ftridtly within 
Time and Space. 
Now, in the moral world, where the foul alone refutes, 
Man is not only free, that is, independent of every de¬ 
terminative of Nature, but he is alfo a legiflative member 
of the Kingdom of Ends in themfelves, by virtue of his 
practical reafon j and one of thp laws which lie frames in 
that 
