M ETAPHYS1 C S. 201 
-‘that capacity is, That he alonefhould participate of IJappi- 
-j lefs who has rendered himfelf worthy of it. Nov/, in order 
that this law fliould be effe&ive, it is requifite that there 
iliould be a Sovereign in this Kingdom of Ends, that is, 
in the Moral World, to put the laws in force; but for 
this purpofe it is alfo neceflary that the fupreme power 
lhould be a Knower of Hearts, in order to be intimately 
acquainted with the moral worth of our mdft inward 
thoughts ; that is to fay, he mull be omnifcient and orn- 
niprefent, omnipotent and eternal, in order to apportion 
felicity to worthinefs in every member of the moral 
wo lid. But fuch a Being, thus reprefented as the Sove¬ 
reign in the Moral World, coincides exaftly with our 
Idea of God ! In faft we can have no idea of the Deity 
but that formed by our practical Reafon. The belief in 
God, therefore, in the immortality Of tee Soul, and 
in a future state, is not fuperftition, -but entirely 
conilitutes Religion, under the condition that the vir¬ 
tuous man can never lofe fight of the Moral Laws, nor 
ceafe his endeavours to give them effebt through the 
whole courfe of his life. This belief, thus grounded in 
Reafon, is Hill further favourable to morality; for it for¬ 
tifies the mind that is dilquieted by the appearance of 
this world, which does not proceed in conformity to the 
Moral World. Animated by this only true Religion, the 
virtuous man hopes to attain the great end of all his 
exertions in the world to come. And thus is man the 
final end and Scope of Creation. 
There can be no more doubt of the faff of the Moral 
Law than of the fa'iSt of our own exiftence ; for both thel’e 
objects are equally fecured to us by our confcioufnefs. 
Every man finds in his Reafon the idea of Duty; and, 
when his inclinations and defires tempt him to tranfgrefs, 
he trembles at her brazen voice, which reminds him of 
the facrednefs of the Moral Law. He is confcious that, 
fliould all his inclinations confpire together to induce 
him to a< 5 t contrary to his Duty, the majefty of the Law 
which his own Reafon prelcribes to him ought to out¬ 
weigh them all. He is alfo confcious that he pofl'efifes 
the ability to put the Law in force, that is, to obey the 
law under all circiimftances; and he feels this conviction 
molt powerfully when he queftions himfelf thus : What 
is that in me that enables me to facrifice the mod power¬ 
ful allurements of my inftinfts to a law that promifes me 
no advantage as an equivalent, and threatens no lefs by 
its tranfgrefiion; a Law which the moreJtriSily it com¬ 
mands, and the lefs it offers as a reward, the more fincerely 
do I reverence it ? 
The reflection, that fuch a law actually exifts in our 
Reafon, penetrates deeply into the foul; and, while it 
aftonilhes us by the greatnefs and fublimity of our moral 
predifpofitions, cannot fail to make us morally better. 
What can equal the magnitude of the thought, that, at 
this prefent moment of our exiftence, we are actually 
members of the moral world, the only laws of which are 
the immutable laws of Reafon! It is indeed true that we 
belong to this order of things, conformably to the higheft 
deftination of our Realon, only when we carefully con- 
dud: ourfelves agreeably to fhe Moral Law, as if it were, 
in fad, the univerlal Law of Nature. 
It mult certainly appear very extraordinary, that, fince 
an appeal to our own conicioulnefs fully eltablilhes 
all thefe important objeds, any arguments whatever 
fliould be required for their fupport, much more the 
eredion of a complete Science of Metaphyfics founded 
upon a minute and accurate Analyiis of the Mind. The 
fad is, that all thefe abftrufe invelligations, together 
with Metaphyfics itfelf, would not be required, were it 
not that Speculative Reason, fbr want of a Critic of 
this faculty, conitantly obtrudes itfelf on the decifions of 
Practical Reason ; and, by an illufion as natural to 
Reafon as are the iliufions of Senl’e, e. g. the bent Hick 
in the water, &c. allows of a Dialedic whole contradic¬ 
tions can never be terminated but by a fyftem of genuine 
Metaphyfics, which fliall feparate thefe important notions 
¥ol. XV. No. 1035. 
from every thing empirical, and thus crufli for ever 
Scepticifm, Atheifm, and Supcrllition. 
But it mull not be imagined, on account of this Dia- 
lcdic, that Speculative Reafon is a ul'elefs faculty, and 
only intended to confound our reafonings. No, it is 
given to 11s for the bell and wifell purpofe. It is by this 
faculty alone that we are enabled to bring ali our know¬ 
ledge under a few heads which it fuggells, or in other 
words to produce the greatell fyllematic unity of all- 
knowledge. Out of this faculty alfo ariie the Sciences 
of Pfycology, Colmology, and Theology. For an abide 
in the application of this faculty, the faculty itfeif mull 
not be condemned. Let us rather correct this abufe, and 
the faculty will hold its deferved anil important place 
among the mental faculties. By the happy dilcovery of 
Transcendental Philosophy, it can in future always 
be difcovered when this faculty is exercifing its unobferved 
influence on the Decifions of Pradtical Reafon, w hole ob- 
je£l is to produce the greatell lyllematical unity, or con- 
liftency among our dclires. 
On Practical Reason alone are the Moral Laws 
founded. It is this faculty which enables us to form the 
idea of our own Soul, of the Deity, and of a Future 
State. This faculty lecures to us the Freedom of the 
Will. In it originates the Idea of Duty, and the pure 
motive for the dilcharge of duties, a mere reverence for 
the law of which we are ourfelves the authors. It is this 
faculty alfo that renders us, even in this prefent life, 
members of the Moral World, which is out of Time 
and Space. And thus is Man the Final End or Scope 
of Creation. 
Now, then, it is evident that the grand aim and ulti¬ 
mate end of Philofophy is to render man Unfitly rational ; 
by conllantly fubordinating his paflions and inclinations 
to his Reafon; and it is alio evident that the Philofophy 
of Kant, and of Kant alone, is adapted to this end. But 
on this very account it follows that Philofophy is not a 
thing to be learned; our bulinefs is rather to learn by 
means of Philofophy how to philofophize. 
It is truly painful to obferve, that a learned and elegant 
wniter of our day, Mr. Dugald Stewart, is Hill far from 
perceiving the value of the new difcoveries made in thofe 
departments of knowledge in which he has laboured fo 
indefatigably for nearly his whole life. As a w r riter he 
Hands in the higheft eliimation ; as a fcholar there are few' 
to be compared with him in point of erudition; but what 
renders him ltill more an objeft of the higheft admira¬ 
tion is, his iincere love of genuine truth. It would be dif¬ 
ficult to explain how it could happen that fo well-in¬ 
formed a mind as Mr. Stewart’s lhould overlook the vaft 
and important difcoveries in the field of Metaphyfics, were 
it not well known that the mind once exerciled for a con- 
iiderable length of time in a uniform train of thoughts, 
will not allow itleif eafily to alter its bias. An individual 
educated from his infancy in the novz-obfolete aftronomy 
of Ptolomy or Tycho Brahe, would not like, at an ad¬ 
vanced period of life, to have all his folid learning lhakea, 
and a chimera lubllituted in its Head; and luch the Co- 
pernican hypothefis would certainly appear to be in the 
eyes of his prejudice. Allowing this to he a fair expla¬ 
nation of the cafe, it Hill cannot be too much lamented 
that this learned, elegant, and enlightened,fcholar, fliould 
fl.;y, in his Dissertation prefixed to the Supplemental 
Volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Note I. “ I 
have alluded, in the text, to the difference between the 
popular and the fcholallic notion of July lance. Accord¬ 
ing to the latter, the word Jubilance correiponds to the 
Greek word acnct, as employed by Ariilotle to denote the 
firft of the predicaments; in which technical lenfe it is 
laid, in the language of the lchools, to iignify that which 
iupports attributes, or which is Jubjcct to accidents. At 
a period when every perfon liberally educated was ac- 
cultomed to this barbarous jargon, it might not appear 
altogether abfurd to apply the term JubJlan'ce to the hu¬ 
man foul, or even to the Deity. But, in the prefent 
3 * timesj 
