202 
METAPHYSICS. 
times, a writer who Ihould fo employ it may be allured, 
that, to a great majority of his readers, it will be no lefs 
puzzling than it was to Crambe, in Martinus Scriblerus, 
when he firft heard it thus defined by his mailer Corne¬ 
lius. ‘ When he was told, a fvbjiance was that which 
was J'ubjett to accidents, then foldiers, quoth Crambe, are 
the molt lubftantial people in the world.’ How extraor¬ 
dinary does the following fentence now found even to a 
philofophical ear! and yet it is copied from a work pub- 
lifhed little more than feventy years ago, by the learned 
and judicious Gravefande: Siib/lantiecfunt aut cogitantes, 
aut non cogitantes; cogitantes dims novimus, Deum et me ti¬ 
tan nojlram. Dace etiam Jubjiantiee, quce nun cogitant, nobis 
notce fmt, fpatium et corpus. The Greek word naix (de¬ 
rived from the participle of npi) is not liable to thefe 
objections. It obtrudes no fenfible image on the fancy; 
and, in this refpeCt, has a great advantage over the Latin 
word fwjtantia. The former, in its logical acceptation, is 
an exteniion to Matter, of an idea originally derived from 
Mind. The latter is an exteniion to Mind, of an idea 
originally derived from Matter. Inltead of defining mind 
to be a thinking J'ubJlance, it feems much more logically 
correCt to define it a thinking being. Perhaps it would 
be better Hill, to avoid, by the ufe of the pronoun that, 
any fubllantive whatever; * Mind is that which thinks, 
wills,’ &c. The foregoing remarks afford me an oppor¬ 
tunity of exemplifying what I have ellewliere obferved 
concerning the effeCts which the fcholaftic philofophy has 
left on the prefent habits of thinking, even of thofe who 
never cultivated that branch of learning. In confe- 
quence of the llrefs laid on the predicaments, men became 
accuftomed in their youth to imagine, that, in order to 
know the nature of anything, it was fufficient to know 
under what predicament or category it ought to be ar¬ 
ranged; and that, till this was done, it remained to our 
faculties a fubject merely of ignorant wonder. Hence 
the impotent attempt to comprehend under fome com¬ 
mon name (fuclvas that of fab/i mice) the heterogeneous 
exiflences of matter, of mind, and even of empty /pace; and 
hence the endlefs difputes to which the lall of thefe words 
has given rife in the Schools. In our own times, Kant 
and his followers feem to have thought, that they had 
thrown a new and ftrong light on the nature of /pace and 
alfo of time, when they introduced the word form (forms 
of the intellect) as a common term applicable to both. Is 
not this to revert to the fcholaftic folly of verbal gene¬ 
ralization? And is it not evident, that of things which 
are unique (fuch as matter, mind, Jpace, time,) no claflifi- 
cation is practicable ? Indeed, to lpeak of claflifying what 
has nothing in common with anything elfe, is a contra¬ 
diction in terms. It was thus that St. Augultine felt, 
when he faid, Quid fit tempos, fi nemo pitapat a me, J'cio ; 
f quis interroget, nefeio. His idea evidently was, that, 
although he annexed as clear and precise a notion to 
the word time as he could do to any objeCl of human 
thought, he was unable to find any term more general, 
under which it could be comprehended; and, conlequent- 
Iy, unable to give any definition, by which it might be 
explained.” Firit Dili', note I. p.159. 
This palfage evidently indicates that no improvement 
has been made, or can be made, in Metaphyiics. Now 
I do affirm, that a molt aftonifhing improvement in this 
abftrufe Science has actually been effected by Immanuel 
Kant, and offered to the world in his Critic of Pure 
Reason, publifhed in the year 1781. This affirmation 
need not be taken for granted : the book is in exiftence 
in the original German (Kritik der reinen Vernuft), and 
is alfo tranflated into the Latin language by Frederic 
Gottlob Born. It is indeed very extraordinary, that, al¬ 
though a period of full five-and-thirty years has elapled 
fince the publication of this immutable Work, no tranlla- 
tion of it has yet appeared in Englifli. Does not this 
refleCt a little on the philolophic fpirit of the Britifh na¬ 
tion ? Let it undergo a ltriCt, a fevere, and an impartial, 
examination; and, inltead of pronouncing generally upon 
the whole work, L would recommend fome one of its 
fundamental pofitions to be attacked; and either efta- 
b'ifhed or refuted. Such, for inftancc, as, that Time is 
the Form of internal Senfe; or, that the Human Mind con- 
JiJts of three original faculties, Sense, Understanding, 
and Reason; and let it be determined whether the dif- 
tinCfion of thefe faculties has its ground in the aCtual 
nature of the mind itfelf, as afl'erted and profeffed to be 
proved by Kant. Let fome ftep of this kind be taken; and 
then the queftion at iffue, -whether a great and beneficial 
reform, and aCtual dilcovery of the Elements of Meta- 
phyfics, has really taken place or not, may be decided. I 
flatter myfelf, that Mr. D. S. himfelf will not in the leaft 
difapprove of this mode of procedure, and from it may 
refult an eflential good to mankind. 
From the above quotation alfo may be collected the 
ftate of the common metaphyfics of the prefent day, 
wherein it is aflerted, “ that of things which are unique , 
Inch as Matter, Mind, Space, Time, &c. no clafiification 
is practicable, nor can any definition be given by which 
they may be explained.” If this be true, it is in vain that 
we attempt to philofophize on thefe fubjeCls: the bare 
mention of the name, it feems, is to give us all the infor¬ 
mation that we are to expeCl. It does not however ap¬ 
pear, that applying the French word unique to the 
words Mind, Matter, Space, Time, See. does in the leaft: 
clear them up. I do perfectly agree with the learned 
author of this Differtation, that, if Kant and his followers 
have only added the words “ form of the Mind" to the 
word Time, without dilcovering any new faCts relative 
to Time itself, fo as to enable them to give a complete 
definition of thefe notions, they do not merit much 
praife. But, on the other hand, if Kant has aCtuallv, 
by the deepelt refearches and the moft correCt and con¬ 
vincing deductions, penetrated into the nature of Time 
itself, in fuch a manner as to give the fulleft account 
of this remarkable, eflential, and component, part of the 
Human Mind; he then merits every praife that can be 
bellowed upon him, as a fuccefsful inveitigator of the 
Mind. For even the determining completely this one 
mental element, is of more confequence to the founding of 
a Philofophy of the Mind, than volumes of the moft ele¬ 
gant and ingenious commentaries upon all the metaphy- 
lical works of antiquity. 
It is greatly to be regretted that this elegant writer 
ftiould have fo completely mifunderllood the labours of 
Kant and his followers. The truth is, that that great 
philofopher has fo thoroughly dilfeCted the human mind, 
and fo completely dilcovered all its Elements, that in this 
department of Science the labours of his fucceftors mull 
for ever ceafe. He has Hated, in the moft precife man¬ 
ner, what thofe elements are ; and defies future ages to 
add one more to his catalogue of them, or to take one 
away, without in either caie deltroying the confiltency 
and truth of the whole: in the fame manner it would 
be impoifible to conllruCt a triangle in any other way 
than that deferibed by Euclid. Do we here look for fur¬ 
ther improvements ? No! we ftate the abfolute impofli- 
bility of them; the thing as it Hands is perfeCt. Kant’s 
Catalogue of thefe notable Elements of the Human Mind 
is then as follows : 
1. The Mind confifts of three Original Faculties, which 
perform diftinCt functions, and are capable of being com¬ 
pletely feparated from one another: they are, Sense, Un¬ 
derstanding, and Reason, adly, Sense is fufceptible 
of a complete definition, whereby it can never be con¬ 
founded either with Underftanding or Reafon : it is the 
pa five faculty of the Mind, which receives impreifions 
either from external objeCts or from the ACtion of the 
Mind upon itfelf, and is properly enough defignated by 
Kant Receptivity, which is again divifible into two 
parts ariiing from the original difference in the functions 
of thefe parts : the one Receptivity being ccnftruCted to 
receive parts following one another in Jirict ficcefon. 
