20:i M E T A P H 'Y S ICS. 
oumftance adds great value to the fcience itfelf; fince no other part of knowledge never does co-exilt, hut is al- 
"pofition can be admitted into it, that is not immediately 
deduced from what has preceded ; and thus does this 
fcience form one chain of clofely-connedted arguments, 
which do not admit of being fmgly comprehended, but 
each one mult be taken in connexion with thole immedi¬ 
ately preceding, in order that it may be completely and 
fully underiiood. 
And now I may venture to predict, that he who feri- 
ouily undertakes this ftudy with a firm refolution to per- 
ievere in it, in the way here pointed out, will never have 
occaiion to complain, that his “ labour has ended in a Jcu- 
timent of regret, at the time and attention which he has mif- 
t employed in a hopelej's and ungrateful tajlc .” No, he will 
rather acknowledge that lie has received the fweet reward 
nf his labour in the actual poffeflion of the only “ True 
Philosophy of the Human Mind;” a jewel fo inefti- 
mabie, that, had he bellowed infinitely more pains to at¬ 
tain it, he would never have felt a moment’s regret at hav¬ 
ing engaged in fo arduous a Purfuit. The confcioufnefs 
-of being fully mailer of this fublime fcience would amply 
j-eward him, and fill his foul with an inward fatisfadtion, 
which is indeed to be felt, but can never be deferibed. 
For confirmation of what has been here laid of this 
.new philofophy, I could refer the reader to innumerable 
commentators on the works of its immortal author, all 
tending to confirm the truth of this fyltem, and endea¬ 
vouring to point it out more clearly on the principles 
laid down in Kant’s three great works; i. Critic of 
Pure Speculative Reason ; 2. Critic of Judgment ; 
3. Critic of Pure Practical Reason ; but this would 
rather feem to infer, that pure truth fo far differs from 
pure water, that it is not to be obtained from the foun¬ 
tain head, but only at a diftance from it in the llream ; 
which would do great injuffice to the merit of Kant’s 
original works. And here I cannot omit to remark, that 
it will be of the higheft importance to try to point out 
, even a Jingle injlance wherein thisfyjlem is found to contradict 
itfelf; and, if this cannot be done, it muff be granted 
that Kant has, in this ltupendous fcience, eredted an 
everlafting monument to his imperilhable name. Handing 
upon the bails of immutable truth ! And it wiil not be 
very long before it is univerfally acknowledged, that the 
name of Kant not only Iheds a glory upon the eigh¬ 
teenth century, but confers an honour upon the human 
race ; and that all fucceeding ages will have reafon to con- 
fider him as che great benefadtor of the world. 
In a former part of this work, under the article Kant, 
vol. xi. p. 605, I have endeavoured, in an Ahfiradl of the 
Critical Pkilojbphy, to point out the neceffity there is for 
diftinguilhing the Three Original and Primitive Faculties 
of the Mind, Sense, Understanding, and Reason ; and 
tire propriety of feparating them diftindtly from each 
other, fhowing the limits and extent of the powers of each, 
in order that whatever comes under the contemplation of 
the Mind may be clearly determined to be the refult, 
either of this or that particular faculty, or of the com¬ 
bined effects of two or of all the mental faculties. If 
this be done, there can be no longer any thing vague or 
uncertain j but all our realoning will be convincingly 
clear. 
I have ,alfo endeavoured to fliow that the only /hare 
which the Faculty of Sense has in the production of Know¬ 
ledge, is no other than the receiving the matter, or variety, 
of which Knowledge con/j'ts ; arid for this reafon, it is pro¬ 
perly enough termed Receptivity in General, which is 
again divided into two parts, as the matter or variety of 
‘our knowledge is found to differ. Firft, the matter in 
forne part of our knowledge co-exifts ; and this depart¬ 
ment of our Receptivity deftined to receive this fort of 
rnattcr, is called External Sense, or Receptivity. For 
all the objects of nature which are external to the mind, 
.are ftamped by this faculty with the particular feature of 
fo-cxiftcHce, or Space. Secondly, tire matter in lbme 
ways fucceffive ; and this arifes from the adtion of the 
mind upon itfelf; for all adtions, paffions, and emotions., 
in us, are evidently compofed of parts that do no.t form 
a plane, or co-exift, but all their- parts, do ftridtiy follow 
one another; and that department of the Receptivity 
deftined to receive this kind of matter is called Internal 
Sense or Receptivity. For all the c/fcCls of the objedts 
of Nature that are not co-exijtent, reveal themfelves to 
the mind, and are flumped by the particular feature of 
Succefjion or Time. But thele two forms of the matter 
of all our knowledge comprehend, in an entire whole, all 
pofiible matter of knowledge in general. And this dif- 
tindlly marks out the bufinefs of the faculty of Sense ; 
namely, to be pafjlve and receive impreifions in one or 
other of its receiving fundtions. 
My next objedh was to point out, that the Understand¬ 
ing, which is a completely-adft'ye faculty, and therefore 
called Spontaneity, by virtue of its twelve primary and 
original adtivities, or Categories, does give a form, or 
unity, to the matter received by fenfe. And this is the 
Jhare which this faculty has in the produdlion of Knowledge. 
But to give a form to matter or to raw materials, may 
furely be termed to conftitute the objedt; as, when an artilfc 
produces from a mafs of fliapelefs clay the form of Apollo, 
he may be laid to have conftituted his objedt from given 
matter. So does the Underllanding imprint the forms of 
its Twelve Unities on the matter furnilhed by fenfe, and 
thus does it conftitute the very objedts themlelves ; for 
no objedt whatever can be known by the mind, until it 
has been impreftea by thele Twelve Unities, or Categories 
of the Underllanding. And therefore the unity which 
is the joint produce of thefe Twelve Unities, may well be 
called objective unity, as it is by means of this unity alone, 
that any objedt whatever can even be thought: and thus 
is experience generated. 
The produce of the firft faculty, or of Sense, is termed 
Intuition, and is either internal or external, according as 
its matter has been received either in Time or in Space. 
It will now appear extremely ablurd to talk of an Intui¬ 
tion without the matter being prelent; for the true mark 
of an Intuition is, that we are adtually in the ftate of being 
affected or imprefled ; and there can be no difficulty in 
determining whether it be an internal or an external In¬ 
tuition by which we are imprefled. For, if its matter be 
in Time only; then it is internal, as for example, a 
thought; but, if it be not only in Time, but in Space 
alfo ; then it is an external intuition. It will ailo be evi¬ 
dent, that intuition or matter alone, without form, 
mull be perfedtly unintelligible, and a mere lhapelefs 
chaos ; and that, until it has received a form from the 
Underftandrng, it mult remain totally unknown to us. 
The produce of the fecond Faculty, or of Understand¬ 
ing, is termed Conception, arifmg from its twelve primary 
and original conceiving-alls, or Categories. Now the 
inllant that an intuition is ciaffed under the conceptions 
of underllanding, it becomes an intelligible object: we 
fay, “ Now, I underjland it: the object before me is a Horj'c, 
or a Man, &c.” and hence it is that, on arialyfing the Con¬ 
ception of Horfe, of Man, &c. we find ttiat they really 
confiit of nothing more than a combination of the Twelve 
Categories by way of form, and fomething given in Time 
and Space by way of matter; and thus is the objedt Horle, 
Man, &c. produced. 
Now, as the refult of Sense is merely to produce in¬ 
tuitions, which are perfedtly unintelligible untii they are 
ranked under conceptions, which is the work of Under¬ 
standing ; it will be clearly evident, that intuitions with¬ 
out conceptions are blind, and that conceptions without 
intuitions are empty; but that a union of both not only 
produces objedts, but ailo knowledge. And here may it be 
leen how Kant, by this wonderful dilcovery, found out 
the true meaning of Judgment in general, namely, the 
placing an Intuition under a Conception, by means of which 
alone 
