305 
M E T A P 
alone he was enabled to ereft a fcience in point of fub- 
limity not to be equalled: this fcience he has named 
“Transcendental Philosophy.” 
Nothing now can be more eafy than to give a true defini¬ 
tion of Knowledge, which, till this difeovery of the Elements 
of the Mind, has baffled all attempts. Knowledge is the 
joining an Intuition to a Conception ; whereas thought 
merely joins Conceptions.' It mult greatly facilitate 
the analyfis of our reafonings, to be able to point out the 
very elements of which they are compofed ; and indeed 
there is no other genuine analyfis, but that which re- 
folves the thing to be examined into its elementary 
parts. It is however clear, that the refults of the two 
faculties, Sense and Understanding, by no means 
exhauft the (lock of objefts that can- be contemplated 
by the Mind. For, befides Intuitions, which immedi¬ 
ately refer to the aftual objefts of Senfe, and Concep¬ 
tions, which mediately refer to all poffible objects of fenle, 
or to experience in general, both of which are confined 
within the limits of Time and Space ; there are Hill other 
objefts of the highelt importance to human nature, and 
which never can enter the fphere of Tune or Space, and 
therefore never can become intuitive, nor indeed can we 
form even the llightelt conception of them. Thele ob¬ 
jefts, then, notwithftanding their abfolute importance to 
our welfare in this life, are for ever excluded from the pale 
of experience, and never can be known by us. I need not 
fay that the objefts here alluded to, are no other than 
God himfelf, the human Soul, the Moral Law, and a 
FUTURE STATE. _ • 
The quefticn now prefents itfelf, how the mind becomes 
poflefled of thele objefts ; for of their reality no one in 
his fenfes ever for a moment doubts. In the “ Aljtrad 
of the Critical Philofophy ” before alluded to, under the 
head Reason, article Kant, vol.xi. p. 617, I have endea¬ 
voured to explain in what manner the mind proceeds, in 
order to obtain thefe objefts which are termed Ideas. 
And here I mult not omit to remark, that the Faculty of 
Reason, which is the third or highelt of the Mental Fa¬ 
culties, is divilible into two parts, the one merely regu¬ 
lative, called Pure Speculative ReaJ'on, and the other con- 
ftitutive, called Pure Practical Reason. This latter 
part of the faculty of Reafon aftually conilitutes the very 
important objefts in queltion, which are free from Time 
and Space, and come under contemplation in Metaphyjics 
alone, and are pure mental objefts ; in contradiltinftion to 
objefts of Senfe, which are conllituted by the Under ft and- 
ing, and are ftriftly confined to Time and Space, or Expe¬ 
rience, and come under conlideration in Natural Philofo¬ 
phy, or Phylics. The latter objefts alone are fufceptible 
of a claffification under the Categories, while the former 
cannot admit of this claffification, but are lecured to us 
by being clafled under the Six Ideas of Reason. Here 
I beg to refer the reader to the Table of the “ Elements of 
Knowledge,” given in this work under the article Logic, 
vol. xiii. p. 18. where I have explained the lpecific dif¬ 
ferences of the Produfts of Sense, Understanding, and 
Reason ; namely, Intuition, Conception, and Idea. 
I am quite at a lol's to conceive why the produce of the 
joint exertion of the two firft faculties of mind, namely, 
of Sense and Understanding, which conftitute lenlible 
objefts, lliould have more validity than that which refults 
from the aftion of the third or highelt Faculty, namely, 
Reason, which conilitutes fuperfenlible objefts. But this 
error has really gained ground, and can only be correft'ed 
by a Critic of this Faculty. I ihould be glad to know 
who among us would be hardy enough to deny in his 
own confcience, the exiftence of the Moral Law, or that 
he'knew when he was aftuated by a good or a bad motive. 
And now let me afk whence proceeds this certainty of 
the validity of the Moral Law. I anfwer, from Practi¬ 
cal Reason alone; and I further Hate, that the indubi¬ 
table certainty of this law, or of our pofl'effing a Soul, 
depends entirely on the operations of this Faculty of Rea¬ 
J'on. For thefe very objefts themfelves are abl'olutely and 
Vol. XV. No. 1036. 
II Y S I C S. 
entirely confiituted by this Faculty by means of its Ideas, 
and are as l'ecurely and firmly fixed in our confcioufnefj 
as the Intuitions we have of the Senfible Phenomena are, 
by means of Senfe and Underfianding. Now, it is evident, 
that thefe objefts are not fenjible, that is, objefts in Time 
and Space-, out they are Japer-fenfible, that is, objefts 
without the fphere of Time and Space ; and yet they are 
Mental Phenomena, and, properly lpeaking, Ideas. No 
one, I may affirm, will fearch for his own Soui among the' 
Senfible Phenomena in Time and Space ; but he will not 
deny that he has a Soul, merely becaufe he cannot find it 
there. No ; he will rather fay, I am as clearly confcious 
that I have a Soul as that I perceive a Tree. 
Hence it follows, that Reason, by its Ideas, really 
conilitutes a certain fort of objefts, that are not to be 
met with in experience, and yet not to be difpenfifeT 
with in regard of our rational nature. And thefe objefts 
come under contemplation in Metaphysics. Therefore 
the Jhare which ReaJ'on has among the mental phenomena 
is this.- It produces the Idea of Cod, of Religion, of the 
Moral Law, of the immortality of the Soul, and of a future 
ftate. And we might as w r ell expeft to find in an animal 
totally void of Reafon, the qualities of a human being, 
as admit that any man poffeiles Reafon and yet is defiitute 
of thefe ideas : it is a contradiftion in terms. 
To eHabliih thefe truths was partly the aim of the 
work alluded to, entitled “ Abflraft of the Critical Philo¬ 
fophy ,” (fee vol. xi. p. 605.) which, although it has now 
been fome coniiderable time before the public, I have 
never yet been fortunate enough to meet with any cri- 
ticifm upon it, .except indeed in one particular inilance, 
where the learned author of “ Academical Quefiions” has 
been pleafed to lay (in a private communication), “ that 
he thinks the explanation of this philofophy,” as given 
in the above abflraft, is “ the befl and clearefl which he 
has yet feen.” 
In the introduftion to that “Abflraft” I ventured to 
make a prediftion regarding the labours of Mr. Dugald 
Stewart in the metaphyfical department of knowledge.' 
In the advertifement to his elegant quarto volume, pub- 
lifhed in 1810, entitled “ Phiiofophical Efflays,” he lays : 
“ I have not abandoned the defign, which I ventured to 
announce eighteen years ago; and in the execution of 
which I have already made confiderable progrefs 
namely, “ to complete the Analyfis of the Intelleftual 
Powers.” Thefe latter words occur in the advertifement 
to “ Elements of the Philofophy of the Human Mind, 
by Dugald Stewart, 1792.” More than four years ago I 
ventured to predict that, this author’s attempt to per¬ 
form the talk he had undertaken “ mull unavoidably 
terminate in his own diilatisfaftion, and in the difap- 
pointment of the w'orld, unlefs he could refute Kant's 
Theory of the Mind." I then Hated alfo, that “ there was 
no other path in which he could proceed with the hope 
of fuccels, but to inveftigate the Kante/inn Theory, and 
either to refute it altogether, or,to acknowledge its im¬ 
mutable truth. For that, until thele two great men 
could coincide in one unffiaken fentiment refpefting 
what is to be underllood by the Elements of the Mind, 
the fcience itfelf could not boaft of univerfal evidence.” 
Notwithllanding the numerous works that have proceeded 
from the pen of Mr. Dugald Stewart lince that period, 
Hill I have met with nothing to induce me to change my 
fentiments on this head ; nor have I obferved during 
thele laft fix years that any one Jingle mental element has 
undergone fuch a difeuffion as to eHabliih it beyond de¬ 
pute. Therefore, to fay the truth, I do not find the 
leaft occaiion to amend my prophecy, except it be to 
predift more llrongly the impojfibility of Mr. S.'s fuccrfs In 
his promijed undertaking, unlefs indeed he ihould happen to 
fall upon the precife dilcoveries made thirty-fix years a°o 
by the immortal Kant. And even this, allowing the pol- 
iibility of its taking place, would be a deplorable walls 
of time. Would it not be infinitely preferable, that the 
time loll in this futile undertaking Ihould rather have 
3 G been 
