206 M F, T A P 
"been devoted to the inveftigation of the fyftem itfelf 
already extant; and, when this wax, found to contain 
pure truth alone, that this elegant writer Ihould have 
employed his uncommon abilities in the promulgation 
and application of the true Philolophy ? Thus might 
Mr. Stewart have affifted in naturalizing 5. plant of fo¬ 
reign growth indeed, but the cultivation of which would, 
I have no doubt, be carried to higher perfection in this 
favoured fpot than in the climate w'hich gave it birth. For 
the freedom of this country, like the falubrity of pure air, 
■would enable it to produce fuch healthy and vigorous 
fhoots, as to aftonifh even the inhabitants of its native 
foil. 
What an opportunity now occurs for this eminent 
writer to immortalife himfelf! It is certainly a great 
glory to England, that Hume ftruck the firlt fpark of 
that jight which has blazed out with fo much briiriamcy 
in Germany, from this new Philofophy ! And, Ihould 
Mr. Dugald Stewart fo far lend his high authority as 
merely to recommend its inveftigation with the view of 
afcertaining its merits, and not to induce the blind 
adoption of it; what benefit might not arife to man¬ 
kind, and what additional glory to Britain ! For of this 
I am pofitively certain, that Kant’s great work, the “Cri¬ 
tic of Pure Reason,” needs only to be ftudied in order 
to be completely underftood and finally adopted. And I 
can alio affirm, with fincere truth, that no more fkill, 
application, or ability, is requifite to effeCt this pur- 
pofe, than is neceffary for an ordinary courfe of the ma¬ 
thematics. 
I mull confefs that a ray of hope darts on my mind, 
at theperufal of the following paffage of the elaborate and 
arduous undertaking of this refined i’cholar, the “ Dif- 
lertation” before alluded to, page 128. “ And fo much 
for the French philofophy of the feventeenth century. 
The extra&s laft quoted forewarn us, that we are faff: ap¬ 
proaching to a new era in the hiftory of the Human Mind. 
'The glow-worm 'gins to pale his ineffectual fire; and we 
Jeent the morning air of the coming day. This era I pro- 
pole to date from the publications of Locke and of Leib¬ 
nitz ; but the remarks which I have to offer on their 
writings, and on thole of thair moll diftinguilhed fuc- 
ceffors, I referve for the Second Part of this Difcourle.” 
Who can pretend to predict what influence this bright 
flar of the north of Britain may not filed upon the phi¬ 
lofophy of Kant, the moll enlightened, diftinguilhed, and 
illullrious, fucceflor of Locke and Leibnitz ; and the great 
luminary of the eighteenth century, whole labours, like 
thofe of Copernicus, have rifen never again to fet ! 
The molt fanguine well-wilher to the Iciences of Me¬ 
taphysics and Ethics, knowing the wavering and 
uncertain Hate in which they have been from the days 
of Plato and Arillotle down to the prefent time, could 
not have anticipated the happy termination of this agita¬ 
tion, and the production of, indeed, “ a new era in the 
hiftory of the Human Mind” by the difcovery of Tran¬ 
scendental Philosophy -. a lcience which vies with 
Geometry in the purity of its elements, as well as in the 
convi&ion of its arguments. A fcience indeed which 
may well be faid to be the proudell boaft of human 
Reafon. 
It is extremely interefting to trace the mind of this 
truly-great man through the labyrinth of his early 
thoughts and the prejudices of the age with which he 
had to contend. In his twenty-fecond year we find our 
young metaphyfician fuccefsfully oppoled to Leibnitz, 
“ the great glory of the continent towards the end of the 
feventeenth century,” in his “ Refections upon the true 
computation of living powers." After having paid hand- 
iome and deierved compliments to his meritorious coun¬ 
trymen, Leibnitz, Wolf, Henman, Bernouilli, Bullfinger, 
and many other eminent philolophers, Kant proceeds 
to examine the different theories and proofs advanced, 
and endeavours to Ihow that their notions on this intri¬ 
cate lubjeCt are far from being correct. In one place he 
fays, “ I am inclined to think that fo great a man as Leib- 
z I 
H Y S I C S. 
nitz could not err without gaining reputation by t be 
very idea that led him into the error. I cannot upon 
this occafion forget the words of Heftor in Virgil: 
---—Si Pergama dextra 
Defendi poflent, etiam hac defenla fuiflent. JEneid.” 
At the age of thirty, Kant acquired confiderable repu¬ 
tation by his examination of a Prize-Queftion propofed' 
by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin ; “ Whether 
the Earth in turning round its axis had undergone am/ 
change Juice its origin?” Upon this occafion he difplayed 
great ability and deep refearch ; indeed, he was now con- 
lidered as a very promifing mathematician and natural 
philofopher. About, this time he aftonilhed the world 
with his •“ New Theorj) of the Mechanical Conjiruflion of the 
Heavenly Bodies, upon the Principles of Newton.” And 
what is here remarkable, and certainly evinces extraor¬ 
dinary efforts of accurate thinking, is, that the celebrated 
Herfchel acknowledged the correftnefs of this theory, 
which he confirmed by his own difcovery of the Georgium 
Sidus. This circumftance did not take place until thirty 
years after our author had compofed his treatife ; on the 
publication of w'hich, he fhone among his countrymen as 
an altronomer of no mean luftre. 
We may now with truth affirm, that in our patient 
metaphyfician we have found the man that Bacon 
complained was not to be met with in his time : that is, 
“a man of fo conflant and fevere a mind, as to have de¬ 
termined, and talked himfelf, utterly to abolifh theories 
and common notions, and to apply his intellect, altoge¬ 
ther fmoothed and even, to particulars anew.” Our au¬ 
thor, at the age of thirty-eight years, publifhed a “ De- 
nionj’tratiou of the fophijtical Jubtilty of the four JyllogiJlie 
fgures.” This work appeared in 1762. It not only con¬ 
tains what its title indicates, but fo clear and preciie were 
Kant’s conceptions of Logic at that period, that in this 
little work is to be met with the defideratum to. Arifto- 
tle’s Logic, namely a complete and accurate definition of 
Judgment in general, and the perfect eftablilhment of the 
categorical mode of coneluJion as the only legitimate one. 
The reader will find, under the article Logic, vol. xiii. 
p. 26. a full account of the Categorical form of Conclu- 
lion, elucidated by a diagram ; together with a concife 
expofition of the fubtilties contained in the three other 
figures. We may fay here with Mr. Dugald Stewart, “ So 
flow, however, is the progrefs of good lenfe when it has 
to ftruggle againft the prejudices of the learned,” that 
more than half a century has elapfed without any of our 
univerlities or public femiuaries having availed them- 
felves of the advantages and improvements contained in 
this little treatife. They have rather gone on blindfold, 
as it were, in their old beaten track ; but it is this lupine- 
nefs that is fo detrimental to true fcience. 
It is worthy of remark, that the mode, of thinking of 
this very great man, nearly twenty years before the pub¬ 
lication of the Critic of Pure Reason, was fo correft, 
that all his future reflections, nay, indeed, the very com¬ 
pletion of his lyftem of Tranfcendental Philojbphy, has not 
been able to mend what then paffed in his mind. Upon 
this occafion I cannot omit to notice what our author 
lays in this treatife on the lubjeft of Judgment: “My 
prefent opinion is, that the Judging Faculty is nothing 
but the faculty of Internal Sense : that is, the power 
to make our own reprefentations the objefts of our 
thoughts. This faculty cannot be deduced from any 
other; it is therefore a fundamental faculty in the Uriel 
fignification of the word, and, according to my appre- 
henlion, can belong to rational beings alone.” 
About this period our philofopher attracted the notice 
of the learned world, by his admirable anfwer to another 
Prize-Queftion propofed by the Academy of Sciences in 
Berlin, “ On the Nature of Metaphyfical Certainty.” His 
mode of treating this lubjeCl refietls the higheft credit 
on his underftanding ; his admirable feparatio.n of the 
Mathematics from Philofophy indicates a mind already 
inured to the moll fevere and ftridt mode of thinking. 
“ I am* 
