METAPHYSICS. 
« I am Well "aware,” fays he", e{ that many Geometricians 
confound the boundaries of the fciences, and attempt to 
philofophize in. the Mathematics.” This learned So¬ 
ciety awarded all the honors to our author that he had 
i'o meritoriouflv won by the deepeft inveftigation of the 
molt abftrufe fubje.dt that had ever yet been offered for 
public difcuhion. 
Here our Metaphyfician feems to have anticipated that 
he was dcltined to become the author, original inventor, 
and founder, of the molt fubiime fcience that was ever 
offered: to the confideration of man, or that it is poifible 
for the human mind to conceive. In the midft of the 
molt interefcing confiderations regarding the nature and 
conltitution of the mind ; referring every thing to diltinc- 
live elementary conceptions for a bafis ; our author burfts 
forth with this remarkable exclamation : “ I fhould like 
to fee a Table drawn up of all the indemonftrable pofitions, 
which form the balls of the fciences through their whole 
extent ! It would no doubt form a plan that would be 
immenle. However, in the inveftigation of thefe great 
fundamental truths confifts the molt important part of 
the higher philofophy. And, when thefe great truths are 
afcertained, then indeed may the higher fciences boafl of 
a certainty and liability, that will render them fully de- 
ferving our ftudy.” 
But how can language do juflice to the talents and ex¬ 
traordinary merit of this aftonifliing genius, when, after 
a lapfe of only eighteen years, during w'hich period we 
find him clofely occupied in the deepelt mental refearch, 
he actually prel’ents to the world this very Table, difco- 
vered by himfelf. And fo much more prolific is it in its 
refults than even he could have anticipated, that it actually 
comprifes all the Elements of the Mind. The reader will 
find this remarkable Table in vol. xi. p. 609. of this work, 
entitled a “ Map of the Human Mind according to Kant.” 
This patient and perfevering difledlor of the mental phe¬ 
nomena, difcovered that the Mind confifts of three Ori¬ 
ginal and Primitive Faculties, Reason, Understanding, 
and Sense, which can be moll decidedly feparated from 
each other, as their refults. Intuition, Conception, and 
Idea, are capable of the eafieft and mod accurate diftinc- 
tion. In fhort, a concife explanation of this invaluable 
Table would run thus : Sense, or Receptivity , which is di- 
vifible into two parts, named Time and Space, receives 
the Matter of all Knowledge. Understanding, or Spon¬ 
taneity, confifts of twelve Adlivities, called Categories, 
which gives a form to the matter received ; and laftly, 
Reason, or a fpontaneity free from Time and Space, which 
confifts of fix Ideas, and is deftined for two very diftindl 
purpofes, as it is both Theoretical and Practical. 
In the former ufeits objedt is to colledt all our knowledge 
into the greateft poftible unity. This ufe of Reafon is 
alfo denominated fpeculative. But in its Practical use, 
which is alfo termed conjiitutive, it is the very foundation 
of the moral laics, of the Ideas of the Soul, of the Deity, 
and of a.future Jtate ; and produces the greateft confiftency 
and unity among all our defires. It alfo makes Man the 
Scope of Creation, and points,out to us the real im¬ 
portance of our moral deftination. 
The intention of the Abftradt with which this Table is 
accompanied, is to aid the ftudent who engages in Tranf- 
cendental Philofophy, and to afford him a Key or Epitome 
of the whole .fcience, as it is laid down by Kant in his 
great work, entitled the “ Critic of Pure Reason.” It 
is to be hoped that this concife “ Abftradt,” giving a ge¬ 
neral view of all the important points of this vaft and 
comprehenfive fyftem, will greatly abridge the labour, and 
ultimately facilitate the operations, of thofe who enter 
upon fo glorious an undertaking as the comprehending 
and promulgating of this fixed and determined Science, 
upon which permanent Metaphysics is engrafted. 
The bent of Kant’s mind was every-where inclining 
towards his favourite fubjedt, Metaphysics. And in his 
fortieth year, he gave to the world his “ De Mundi Senji- 
lilis atipie IntelligibiUs , Forma et Prindpiis, 1770.” In 
207 
this excellent work it may plainly be traced, that this 
great man could never reft until he had accomplilhed the 
talk he had fet himfelf; namely, the complete difeovery of 
the Elements of the Mind, which was eventually to im¬ 
mortalize him. It is extremely pleafing to fee how mo- 
deftly he attributes to Hume his being firit routed from 
his dogmatical (lumbers, and thence urged to the eredtion 
of his vaft and profound fyftem. There certainly is great 
credit due to Hume for the novelty and depth of the 
thought, which had indeed occurred to no one except 
himfelf; namely, to challenge Reafon fatisfadforily to an- 
fwer the queftion, “ By what right do we conftantly apply 
the Concept ion of Cause and Effect to the objects of Ex¬ 
perience, Jince the notion is not derived from Experience l" 
It is well known that, as Hume failed in obtaining a fatif- 
fadtory anfwer to this queftion, he became a confirmed 
Sceptic. It may indeed be granted that this hint might 
have furnifhed a clue to the inveftigations of our indefa¬ 
tigable Metaphyfician, and thus have haftened his pro¬ 
ceedings ; but in juftice to his memory, and confidering 
his wonderful dilplay of early metaphyfical talent, and 
the advancement he had already made on the high road 
of difeovery, we may affirm, that, had Hume never exilted, 
Kant would not have arrelted his courle until he had 
been crowned with complete fuccefs. 
Ever intent upon the accomplifhment of his great de- 
fign, in his fifty-feventh year, our author’s refledtive and 
capacious mind, out-did all its ordinary out-doings. Now 
indeed do we find him at the very fummit of Metaphyfical 
Science. He has elaborated for pofterity, a work that 
will long make his name refound as that of the greateft 
fpeculative philolopher the world ever produced. And 
here, in juftice to the moft furpriling effort of true genius, 
we may alfert, that his labours, like pure truth, will not 
flirink from inveftigation, but will fhine with redoubled 
luftre the more minutely they are examined. 
This great work is the “ Critic of Pure Reason” it- 
felf, which adtually refolves and for ever puts at reft all 
the difficulties of Speculative Philofophy. This elemen¬ 
tary work confifts of one chain of clofely-connedted rea- 
foning, and mult therefore be wholly comprehended, or 
no part of it can be underftood. It will be highly im¬ 
portant to point out one Angle inftance wherein this 
fyftem contradidts itfelf; for, lhould this be poftible, it 
will moft decidedly prove that the True System fti.ll re¬ 
mains to be difcovered ; and that the efforts of Kant, 
like thofe of all former Metaphyficians, fooner or later 
will be buried in oblivion. But, fhould the fadt be other- 
wile, then indeed it will appear that he has eredted to his 
memory a lafting monument, Handing upon the bafis of 
immutable and ever-during Truth ! 
It is extremely” interelting to fee the author of this 
Glorious Book, in the decline of life, reviewing his 
former labours, and to obferve with what fatisfadtion he 
fays ; “ There has not been a Jingle pojition Jet down lightly 
in this work. Indeed many of them have required much re¬ 
flection, and I have devoted years to the perfection of fame 
of the propojitious previous to their being inferted in my 
Critic. I am thereforeJ'atisfled, not only with the prin¬ 
ciples themjelves, but alfo with the arrangement of them; and 
do not defire to alter either." 
The hiftory of Altronomy affords a ftriking inftance of 
ancient and celebrated fyftems giving way to the pure 
truth of modem difcoveries. And indeed they have not 
only given way, but their abfurdities have been rendered 
fo glaring by the difeovery of the True System, that 
they have adtually become obfblete, and their names are 
now almoft forgotten. 
A Jimilar fate awaits all the Metaphysics prior to 
Kant : they mult for ever dij appear f And to fay the 
truth, (to ule the words of Cowper,) “ were it poifible that 
mere Man could entitle himfelf by pre-eminence of any 
kind to divine honours,” Kant’s “ aftonifhing powers; 
feem to have given him the belt pretenfions.” For, by his 
happy talent, and fubiime genius, he has rejoined the mojt 
difficult 
