509 
METAPHYSICS. 
Metaphysics eonfider the Categories, or original con¬ 
ceptions of underftanding, as the laft or higheft concep¬ 
tions to be found in the things, or as conceptions a priori 
of the things; and are diviiible into Metaphysics of 
Nature and Metaphysics of Morals. The former 
comprehend the complex of all knowledge a priori, of 
that which does exifl; and is theoretical. The latter 
comprehend the complex of all Moral Conceptions, or 
of all that which ought to exijl; and is practical. 
All Philofophy that is a priori may be termed pure, in 
contradiftindhon to Physics, or Natural Philofophy, 
which is a prfteriori, and may be termed empirical. 
The certainty and con vidtion that are found in the pure 
fciences of Transcendental Philosophy and Meta¬ 
physics, are obtained by the categorical mode of con- 
clulion : in the mathematics by conftru&ion of the con¬ 
ceptions, which therefore admits of demonftration ; while 
the certainty in the empirical fcience of Natural Philofophy 
can only be obtained by InditMion and Analogy; modes 
of conclufion which can never beget ftridt univerfality. 
But now let us fee what our patient and modelt Philo- 
fopher lays upon this fubjedt in his own words. In the 
preface to his Prolegomena to all future Metaphyfics, he 
{'peaks thus : 
“ My intention is to convince all thofe who think 
it worth their while to occupy themfelves with Meta- 
phylics, that it is indifpenfably necellary to lufpend their 
labours for the prel'ent; to eonfider every thing hi¬ 
therto done, as undone ; and firft of all to fettle the quef- 
tion ; Whether fitch a thing as Metaphyfics he pojj'ible? If 
there really be fuch a fcience, how comes it that it can¬ 
not obtain, like other fciences, a univerfal and perma¬ 
nent reputation ? If Metaphyfics be not a Science, how 
does it happen that it continually pretends to this cha- 
radler, and yet conftantly difappoints the human under- 
handing with perpetual but unaccomplilhed hopes ? Let 
us then demonftrate either our Knowledge or our Ig¬ 
norance on this fubjedl; fomething decilive ought to 
be determined with refpedt to the nature of this pretended 
fcience : for it mull not be fullered to remain any longer 
in its prefent ftate. It feems quite ridiculous that, while 
every other fcience conftantly advances, this fcience, 
which is univerfally appealed to as the oracle of wildom 
itfelf, has always turned round upon the fame fpot, and 
never really advanced a fingle ftep. The Patrons of 
Metaphyfics are indeed greatly decreafed in number ; 
and we do not find that thofe who feel themfelves ftrong 
in other fciences choofe to venture their reputation in 
this, where every one, no matter how ignorant in other 
things, boldly ventures upon a decilive judgment; con- 
feious as it Ihould feem, that no criterion has yet been 
difeovered to diltinguilh found fenfe from {hallow prating. 
“ However, it is not a thing fo very unheard-of, that 
after long cultivating a fcience, and while we are congra¬ 
tulating ourfelves on cur aftonifiiing advancement in it, 
fome one unexpeftedly ftarts the queftion, Whether fuck 
a fcience he really pojj'ible 1 For Human Realon is fo iond 
of building, that it has frequently erefted its caftle, 
and then had to take it to pieces again, in order to exa¬ 
mine the foundation. It is never too late to become ra¬ 
tional ; but it' is hard to have this talk to begin at an ad¬ 
vanced period of life. 
“ To alk if a Science be poflible, implies that one 
doubts of its reality; and fuch a doubt is highly offen- 
five to thofe whofe whole treafure confifts perhaps in this 
pretended knowledge. They will prepare, therefore, on 
all lides, to defend their ancient and legitimate pofleflions. 
“ I have, however, the confidence to predidf that fuch 
readers of thefe Prolegomena as think for themfelves, 
will not only be convinced that no fcience of Metaphy¬ 
fics exifts at prefent, but that there never can be fuch a 
fcience, unlefs the requifites here ftated, upon which its 
poflibility refts, be firft complied with. As, however, the 
enquiry refpefting this fcience can never be entirely 
laid afide, becaufe the intereft of human reafon is too 
Vol. XV. No. 1036. 
intimately connected with it, they will fee that a com¬ 
plete reform, or rather an entire regeneration, of Meta¬ 
phyfics, 011 a plan hitherto untried, mult unavoidably take 
place, however it may be for fome time ftruggled againft. 
“ Since the attempts of Locke and Leibnitz, or in¬ 
deed fince the origin of Metaphyfics, as far as its hiftory 
reaches, no event has occurred fo calculated to decide 
the fate of this fcience as the attack made upon it by 
Hume. He brought, it is true, no light into this depart¬ 
ment of knowledge; but he ftruck a fpark, which, had 
it fallen upon combuftible matter, and been carefully 
fanned, might have produced a flame. Hume took Up 
a Angle but important conception of Metaphyfics; 
namely, that of the connexion of Cause and Effect; 
(confequently the derived conceptions of Power, Action, 
&c.) and challenged Reafon, which holds it up as its own 
produce, to fay by what right it concludes, that one 
thing may be lo conftituted, that, if it be given, fome¬ 
thing elfe muft necefiarily be inferred ; for this is the 
meaning of the conception of a caufe. He proved be¬ 
yond contradiction, that it is quite impoflible for Reafon 
to difeover in the conceptions themfelves, any fuch nc- 
ceflary connexion, fince we cannot fee why, becaufe 
fomething is, fomething elfe muft alio necefiarily be ; 
and confequently we are at a lofs to know how the con¬ 
ception of fuch a connexion a priori can have arifen. 
Hence he concluded that Reafon entirely deluded itfelf 
with this conception, falfely Confidering it as its own 
offspring, while in fabt it is nothing more than a baftard 
of the imagination, which, being made pregnant by ex¬ 
perience, lias brought certain reprefentations under the 
law of afl'oeiation, and l'ubftituted a fort of fubje&ive 
necelfity, namely, Habit, for an objeftive one, founded 
upon real knowledge. He concluded, therefore, that 
Reafon had no faculty to think fuch connexions even 
generally, becaufe its conceptions would in that cafe be 
mere fidlions, and all its pretended knowledge a priori 
nothing but a falfe value given to common experience. 
In other words, that no fuch fcience as Metaphyfics is 
at all poflible. 
“ Notwithftanding this rafli conclufion, however, Hume 
Calls his very deftruCtive Philofophy by the name of 
Metaphyfics, and fets a great value upon it. ‘ Metaphy¬ 
fics and Morals (fays lie) are the moll important branches 
of Science; Mathematics and Natural Philolopliy are not 
of half the value.’ This acute rtfan, however, looked 
merely to the negative advantage, which would arife from 
lowering the pretenlions of fpeculative Realon, and 
quieting the dil'putes of men. But here he lofi light of 
the pofttive harm which would occur, were Reafon de¬ 
prived of its molt important profpefts, which alone hold 
out to the Will the higheft objeft of all its exertions. 
“ Yet, however hafty and incorreft bis inference was, 
it was grounded at lcaft upon inveftigation; and this 
inveftigation certainly deferved that the Philofophers of 
his day Ihould have united their endeavours to folve, if 
poflible, his problem in the fenle ill Which he delivered 
it; and, had they fucceeded in this, an entire reform of 
the fcience would have immediately followed. It was, 
however, the fate of Metaphyfics, ever unfortunate, that 
no one fliould underftand Hume’s intention. It is nain- 
ful, indeed, to obferve how entirely his opponents, lie id, 
Ofwald, Beatie, and Prieftley,milled the point of his quef¬ 
tion, always admitting, as a matter of courfe, the very 
thing which he doubted, and proving with vehemence, 
and mofily with great indil'Cretion, that which it never 
entered his mind to doubt. They thus overlooked his 
hint at improvement, and fuffered every thing to re¬ 
main in its original ftate, as if nothing had happened. 
The queftion was not, whether the conception of Cause 
be correct, ufeful, and indifpenlable, to all knowledge of 
Nature; for this Hume never doubted ; but whether 
this conception be thought by reafon a priori, and whe¬ 
ther it poflefs, on that account, an internal truth, inde¬ 
pendently of all experience, and therefore a more ex- 
3 H fenfire 
