210 METAPHYSICS. 
ten five utility, not limited merely to objebts of expe¬ 
rience. It was of this great problem that Hume fought 
the folution. His enquiry regarded merely the origin of 
the conception of Caufe, and not its indifpenfability in 
the application. Had its origin but once rightly been 
made out, the conditions of its ufe, and the extent of 
its validity would have become evident of themfelves. . 
“ But, in order to l'olve this problem, the opponents of 
this celebrated man would have been obliged to enter 
very deeply into the nature of Reafon, as it is occupied 
with pure thinking, which was not quite convenient to 
them. They therefore invented a more ready means of 
■attack and defiance, which required no fuch deep infight; 
they appealed to Common Senfe. Certainly it is a great 
gift of heaven to polfefs common fenfe, or, as it is fome- 
times termed, a plain underftanding. But we mull prove 
that we polfefs it by fabts, by the confiderate and rational 
things which we think and lay, not by the mere appeal 
to it as an oracle, while we can produce nothing in its 
junification. When our pliilofophy and fcience begin 
to fail, to appeal then, and not till then, to common 
fenfe, is one of the 1'ubtle inventions of modern times, 
by which the fhalloweft prater may boldly cope with and 
maintain himfelf againft the deepeft thinker. But, 
while the fmalleft fpark of true pliilofophy remains, I have 
no doubt that we lhall be cautious of taking refuge in 
this expedient. The appeal to common fenle is, after 
all, but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude; 
which the Philofopher mult blufh to make, but on 
which the popular witling gladly founds his momentary 
triumph. 
“ I fhould conceive, however, that Hume might lay 
claim to a found underftanding juft as well as Beattie; 
and, befides this, to fomething that the latter certainly 
did not polfefs ; namely, a critical Reafon, which knew 
how to keep common underftanding within its proper 
bounds, and to prevent its lofing itfelf in fpeculations ; 
for common fenfe does not underftand the principles on 
which it abls, and therefore cannot know when it is 
found and when not. A common hatchet may ferve very 
well to lhape timber, but a more delicate inftrument 
is required for fine engraving. Thus the common un¬ 
derftanding, and the fpeculative, are both ufeful in their 
way ; the one in judgments immediately applicable to 
experience, the other in general judgments, as in Me¬ 
taphyfics, where cofnmon fenfe cannot judge at all. 
“ I candidly own that this hint of David Hume was 
the circumftance that firft difturbed my dogmatical 
fiumbers, and gave a new direbfion to my refearches, in 
the field of Speculative Philol'ophy. I was far from lif- 
tening to his inferences, which proceeded merely from 
his not reprefenting to himfelf his problem in its whole 
extent, but inveftigating merely a part of it, the folution 
of which was impofiible without a compreheniive view of 
the whole. When we proceed upon a well-grounded, 
though not thoroughlv-digefted, thought, we may rea- 
ionably hope, by perfeverence, to carry it further than 
the acute genius to whom we are indebted for the firft 
fpark of this light. 
“ I firft examined whether Hume’s objection might not 
be rendered a general one; and foon found that the idea 
of Cause and Effect is by no means the only one in 
which the underftanding reprefents to itfelf a connexion 
of things a -priori, but that the whole of Metaphysics 
confifts of nothing elfe. I endeavoured to afcertain their 
number; and, having done this to my fatisfabtion upon 
a Jingle principle, I proceeded to the deduction of thele 
conceptions. I now law very clearly, that they were 
not derived, as Hume had fuppofed, from experience, 
but originated in the underftanding itfelf. This de¬ 
duction, which appeared impofiible to my acute prede- 
cefl'or, and which had never even entered the mind of 
any one elfe, (for although every body ufed thefe con¬ 
ceptions, no one thought of enquiring upon what their 
objective validity is founded ;)—this deduction, however. 
was the moft difficult talk that could be undertaken fbj; 
the eftabliftnnent of Metaphyfics; and to this, unfortu¬ 
nately, no exifting Metaphyfics could afford the fmalleft 
aid; for it is this very dedubtion which mull firft confti- 
tute the pofilbility of Metaphyfics itfelf. 
“ Having thus fucceeded in the folution of Hume’s 
problem, not merely in a partial view, but with refe¬ 
rence to the whole faculty of pure reafon ; I could now 
proceed, by fafe, though indeed flow, fteps, to determine 
completely, and upon general principles, the entire com- 
pafs of pure reafon ; to afcertain its limits, and the fphere 
of its exertion. This, indeed, was all that was required 
for erebting a fyftem of Metaphyfics upon a proper and 
folid foundation. But I am aware, that the folution of 
Hume’s problem in its entire extent (in other words, 
the Critic of Pure Reafon itfelf) may have the fame fate 
as the problem. It will be judged of incorrebtly, becaufe 
it is not underftood ; it will be mifunderftood, becaufe 
men are more difpofed to turn rapidly over the leaves 
of fuch a book than to ftudy it thoroughly. It will be 
thought dry and obfcure, and be found to contradibl all 
the received conceptions; and, befides this-, it will be 
confidered prolix. 
“ I freely confefs that I did not expebf to hear Philofo- 
phers complain of the want of popularity and entertain¬ 
ment in a work that treated of the exiftence of a valuable 
branch of knowledge, of a fcience indifpenfable to man¬ 
kind, and which can only be attained by an adherence 
to the ftribteft rules of fcholaftic preciiion. It may indeed 
hereafter become popular; but it muft not make its firft 
appearance in a popular ftiape. That oblcurity, however, 
which may have arifen from the extenfivenefs of the 
plan, rendering it difficult to feize and comprehend the 
chief moments upon which it refts, it is the objebt of 
the prefent Prolegomena to remove. 
“ The work which contains the fcience of the faculty 
of Pure Reafon, in its whole extent and boundary, muft 
always be confidered as the objebt to which thefe Prole¬ 
gomena refer, merely as previous exercifes. The “ Critic, 
of Pure Reafon ” muft Hand firm as a fyftem complete in 
all its parts before we can think of advancing one ftep in 
Metaphyfics, or even entertaining the moft diltant hope 
of fuch a fcience. 
“We have been fo, long accuftomed to fee old and 
hackneyed oblervations brought out with a new title, 
and drelfed in a fyftematic coftume, according to the fancy 
of authors, that nothing further will be expebted by 
the greater part of readers in the “ Critic of Pure 
Reason.” Thefe Prolegomena, however, will fhow, that 
it contains an entirely-new fcience, of which no one had 
previoully conceived the thought, and to which nothing 
hitherto known could at ail contribute, except the 
hint afforded by the doubts of Hume, who himfelf, how¬ 
ever, did not forel'ee the pofilbility of fuch a formal 
fcience ; but in his diftrefs, in order to lave his vefiel, 
ran her upon the fhore of fcepticifm, there to lie and rot; 
inftead of which it has been my bufinefs to provide her 
a pilot, furnilhed with a complete chart and compafs, 
who lhall be able to navigate her lately round the world. 
“ To enter upon a new leience which is entirely fie-, 
parated from all others, and indeed the only one of its 
kind, with this prejudice, that we are already able to de¬ 
cide upon it by means of knowledge elfewhere acquired, 
(though, in fact, the truth of this pretended knowledge 
is the very thing in queftion,) can tend to nothing elle 
than to make us imagine all we find in it has been pre- 
vioufly known to us, becaule, perhaps, fome of the expref- 
fions have been ufed before. The whole will, however, 
appear extremely disfigured, nonfenfical, and in fabt mere 
gibberilh, becaufe we do not take the thoughts of the 
author, as his foundation, but fubftitute our own in their 
Head, which in us have become a fecond nature through 
long habit. However, the very extenfivenefs of the work, 
even where it depends upon the nature of the fcience it¬ 
felf, and not upon mere ftyle; its unavoidable drynefs 
