212 
METAPHYSICS, 
In the prefent undertaking, ftiy objedt has been firft 
to give a fhort fketch of the Moral System, founded 
upon this fublime fcience; and to fliow that the efforts 
or the moil profound re a foiling and deepeft refearch have 
produced a fcience of Morals that perfectly harmonizes 
with the common Confcionfnefs, not only of the mofl un¬ 
cultivated reafon, but of that of the pliilofopher alfo, 
provided he is content to keep clear from fpeculation, 
and the fophiilry which engenders it. This happy coin¬ 
cidence mull very much prepoffefs the generality of man¬ 
kind in favour of the Truth of this lcience ; and they 
would no doubt naturally receive and abide by this in¬ 
ternal word of God, Cot fcience, provided the phi'lofopher 
did not puzzle them with his paradoxes. The happy fo- 
lution to all their difficulties, given in the “ Critic of 
Pure Reason,” mull in future make thofe philofophers 
blulh, who fliould attempt to Hide conscience by fpe¬ 
culation or fophiilry. 
My next objedt has been to lliow, that, notwithftand- 
ing this fcience is in itfelf complete and perfedt, the 
learned of this country, who in moll refpedts Hand un¬ 
rivalled, have never turned their ferious attention to the 
underllandingof it. The confequence has been, that we 
cannot boafl of a fingle tranflation of the Critic,” by 
which alone its merits could be fairly canvalfed : and, 
what is vvorfe, the imperfedt reprefentations given of it 
by its admirers have been completely mifunderltood, 
and, for want of connexion, have done harm inflead of 
good. 
It cannot be fufficiently lamented, that the country that 
can boall of a Locke, a Berkeley, a Hume, all highly emi¬ 
nent for their labours in the PhiloJ'ophy of Mind, Ihould be 
deficient in men who are willing to engage in the patient 
invelligation of a Science of Reafon that may vie with 
Geometry in the clearnefs of its arguments and the fuffi- 
ciency of its proofs. Does it not reflect a little upon the 
philofophic fpirit of Britain, that we Ihoftld luffer a Book 
to lie dormant between thirty and forty years, were it 
but rumoured only to contain a perfect Philosophy 
of Mind, without bringing its pretenfions to the tell of 
criticifm. Yet this is adtually the hard fate that has be¬ 
fallen the “ Critic of Pure Reason;” and this, not 
for want of excellent German tranflators, for Klopflock, 
Gefner, Kotzebue, See. have had ample jullice done to 
their excellent works, while the author of “ Critical Phi¬ 
lofophy ” remains in utter oblivion ; as if, with regard to 
Metaphyfics, we were actually enveloped in the ignorance 
of the dark ages. 
How to remedy all this became now the quellion. The 
bell plan that fuggelled itfelf to me was, that of laying be¬ 
fore the public the fpirit of “ Kant's Prolegomena to all 
future Metaphyfics whichJhall deferve the Name of a Science ;” 
for this work - was written with the precife intention of 
obviating hall)'- j udgments, and afiilling the Student in 
his progrefs in “ Critical PhiloJ'ophy." It divides its fub- 
jedt into enquiries refpedting the pofiibility of pure Ma¬ 
thematics, of pure Natural Philofophy, and, laftly, of 
Metaphysics as a Science. I have no doubt that this 
admirable work wall produce the etfedt intended by its 
immortal author; that is, prepare the mind for the accu¬ 
rate reafoning and deep inveltigations of the “ Critic,” 
which contains the only genuine Elements of the Phi¬ 
lofophy of Mind. 
' it is extremely pleafmg to fee with what fatisfadlion 
our author, here, reviews his former great produdtion 
the Critic itfelf, as well as the infinite pains he has be¬ 
llowed on this majler-piece of human Reafon ; declaring 
that he has not let down any thing lightly, but, on the 
contrary, has refledted for years upon a fingle principle 
befoie he incorporated it into his fyllem. We have here 
alfo the author’s exprefiion of his decided approbation of 
his work upon a calm review, not only of the matter, but 
even of the order and arrangement of the politions, which 
he has no delire to amend. 
Should I ever be fo fortunate as to fee the day when 
this “ Philofophy of Mind" fiiall begin to llrike root in 
my native foil, it will indeed be accounted among the 
happiell days of my exiftence. 
I beg now to take my leave of the reader, and to in¬ 
troduce him into far better company, the fociety of this 
inimitably-great man himlelf; with whom, I may ven¬ 
ture to predidl, he will never regret being acquainted. 
However moderately, upon a firft knowledge, he may rate 
his abilities, yet of this I am confident, that, upon a clofer 
and more intimate acquaintance, he will cement a friend*- 
Ihip with him, that will unite them in a bond that can 
only be difibived with life itfelf. 
21 ft Sept. 1816. 
No. 68, St. James's-ftreet, London. 
Thomas Wirgman. 
PROLEGOMENA 
to all future 
METAPHYSICS 
that lhall deferve the name of a SCIENCE. 
Preliminary Remarks on the peculiar Nature of 
Metaphysical Knowledge. 
i. Of the Source of Metaphysics. 
With refpedt to the fource of Metaphyfical Knowledge, 
its very name implies that it is not empirical. Its prin¬ 
ciples, including not only its elementary politions, but 
alfo its elementary conceptions, mull never be fought in 
experience. This knowledge is derived neither from ex¬ 
ternal experience, which is the fource of Phylics properly 
fo called; nor from internal experience, which is the 
foundation of empirical pfycology; it mull therefore be 
Knowledge a priori, andJ'pringfrompure Underfund¬ 
ing and Reafon. This, however, does not diltinguilh it 
from pure Mathematics; it mull therefore be termed pure 
P hilofophical Knowledge. 
2. Of the only Knowledge that can be termed 
Metaphysical. 
a. Of the Difference between Analytical and Synthetical 
Judgments in general. 
Though Metaphyfical Knowledge mull confill entirely 
of judgments a priori, yet, whatever origin Judgment* 
may have, or whatever may be their logical form, they 
may Hill be dillinguilhed according to their matter ; for 
either they merely explain without adding any thing new 
to our knowledge, or they extend it, that is, increafe its 
contents. In the former cafe they are Analytical, in the 
latter Synthetical. 
Analytical judgments exprefs nothing in the predicate 
that did not previoully lie in the conception of the fub- 
jedt, though not fo clearly conceived, nor known with 
fo much confcioufnefs. In the Judgment, all bodies are 
extended. I do not in the leaft enlarge my conception of 
body, but fimply refolve it; fince extenjion really formed 
a part of that conception previous to the judgment, and 
which the judgment only exprefies. On the other hand, 
the polition Some bodies are heavy, contains fomething oil 
the predicate that is by no means thought^ in the uni- 
verlal conception of body; it, therefore, increales my 
knowledge. 
b. The common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the 
Principle of Contradiction. 
All Analytical Judgments reft upon the principle of 
contradiction, and are, in their very nature, knowledge 
a priori, whether the conceptions they contain be empi¬ 
rical or not; for the predicate of an Analytical Judg¬ 
ment, 
