214 
M ETAPHYSICS. 
however, be well to obferve alfo, that all Synthetical po/i- 
tions a priori, which refer to the pure intuitions Space and 
Time, are ftriflly Mathematical-, and that all Synthetical 
pojitions a priori which refer to the pure Conceptions of 
Underllanding (Categories), and to the pure Conceptions 
of Reafon (Ideas), are ftridtly Metaphysical. 
The ground being thus far cleared by thefe Prelimi¬ 
nary Remarks, we come to the Chief Queftion, 
Are Metaphysics at all possible ? 
If Metaphyfics had already attained the rank and liabi¬ 
lity of a fcience, we fh'ould be able to point out fome 
book that contained this fcience, and which need only 
be read to convince any one of its truth. The queftion 
as to the poflibility would then be unneceffary, and we 
fliould be inclined rather to put our penetration to the 
proof, than the exiilence of the thing itfelf; by alking. 
How are Metaphyfics pojfble? or How does Reafon proceed 
in order to attain them? But human reafon has not been 
fo fortunate in this particular. Philofophers can point 
out no fmgle book, as a Euclid, and fay, This is Meta¬ 
phyfics 5 here you will find the chief end of the fcience, 
namely, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of 
A FUTURE WORLD, PROVED FROM PRINCIPLES OF PURE 
reason. They may indeed (how many pofitions which 
are apodi£lically certain, and can never be dilputed; but 
thefe are either analytical, and concern rather the mate¬ 
rials and conftituents, than the original extenfion of 
metaphyfical knowledge; or, if they lometimes produce 
fynthetical pofitions alfo, as the principle of fufficient 
*reafon, they have not deduced them from pure reafon 
a priori, as it was their duty to have done. Befides, in 
attempting to apply them, they have commonly loft 
themlelves among fuch uncertain and unftable affertions, 
that one lyftem of Metaphyfics has always contradicted 
another, and all attempts to conftruft fuch a fcience have 
finally refolved themfelves into Scepticifm, a mode of 
thinking in which reafon proceeds with violence againft 
itfelf, in its defpair of ever fatisfying its molt important 
enquiries. Long before mankind began to confider nature 
methodically, they commenced a feparate examination of 
reafon, for this had been already exercifed in a certain 
degree by common experience, and was always prefent; 
whereas the laws of nature were to be fought with diffi¬ 
culty. Thus, Metaphyfics w'ere always found floating 
upon the furface like froth; and, when one coat was 
taken off and had vanilhed, another immediately ap¬ 
peared. Some perfons anxioully employed themlelves in 
collecting this froth, while others, inftead of fearching 
for the caufe of fo extraordinary a phenomenon, thought 
they gave a fufficient proof of their own wifdom by laugh¬ 
ing at the vain attempts of their neighbours. 
The effential diftinCtion between pure mathematical 
knowledge and all other knowledge a priori, is, that it 
does not flow as a confequence/iww conceptions, but arifes 
from the very conJtruSion of conceptions. Since mathema¬ 
tical judgments, therefore, mull always go beyond the 
conception to the very matter of the original intuition-, 
they can never arife from the mere analyfis of Concep¬ 
tions, but muft be Synthetical. 
I cannot forbear to notice the injury which the negleCl 
of this feemingly eafy and infignificant oblervation has 
done to Philolophy. When Hume felt himfelf called 
upon to examine the field of knowledge d priori, in which 
the human underllanding arrogates to itfelf fuch vail 
poffelfions, a call truly worthy of a philofopher, he un¬ 
fortunately excluded from this field an entire and moll 
important province, the Pure Mathematics, under the 
notion that they relied entirely upon the principle of con¬ 
tradiction; and, though he had not made his divlfton of 
the principles fo formally and univerfally, or under the 
fame denominations, as I have found it neceffary to do, 
yet his procedure implied that pure -mathematics were 
merely analytical, but that Metaphyfics contained fynthe- 
tical pofitions a priori. This error had a fatal influence 
upon his whole plvilolpphy. Had he not made this mil- 
take, he would have extended his queftion, with refpeCV 
to the origin of fynthetical judgments, far beyond the ine- 
taphyfical conception of canfality, and would have applied 
it equally to the polfibility of mathematics a priori, which 
he muft alfo have confidered as Synthetical. Then, how¬ 
ever, he would have found that lie could not ground his- 
metaphyfical principles upon experience, without alfo re¬ 
ferring the axioms of pure mathematics to the fame 
origin; but for this he was much too enlightened. The 
good company into which Metaphyfics would have been 
thus introduced, would have laved them from much idle 
abule, for the unjuft reproaches intended for them would 
have been found to fall upon the Mathematics alfo; and, 
to avoid fo great an abfurdity, this penetrating philofo¬ 
pher would doubtlefs have been led to the very fame re¬ 
flections with which we are at prefent engaged, but which 
would have gained infinitely in his hands, from the ini¬ 
mitable beauty of his llyle. 
StriClly Metaphyfical Judgments are always fynthetical 
and muit be diftiqguilhed from thofe judgments which 
are merely fubfervient to Metaphyfics. Among the lat- • 
ter many are analytical, but thefe are only ufed as means 
for arriving at the Jlridly metaphyfical, to the attainment 
of which the fcience is entirely direfted. For, when a 
conception is ftriftly metaphyfical, as that of Subjlance, 
the judgments which arife from the mere analyfis of that 
conception belong alfo to Metaphyfics. Thus we fay. 
Substance is that which exijls only as subject, but never 
as predicate; and, by a variety of fimilar analytical 
judgments, we endeavour to arrive at the definition of 
the conception of Subltance. But, fince the analyfis of 
a pure conception of Underfunding takes place exactly in 
the fame manner as that of an empirical conception, 
which does not belong to metaphyfics, (for inllance, air 
is an elaftic fluid, the elafticity of which is not annulled 
by any known degree of temperature;) it is the conception, 
and not the analytical judgment, which is properly me¬ 
taphyfical : for the peculiarity of this fcience lies in the 
production of its knowledge a priori, which muft there¬ 
fore be diftinguilhed from that in which it agrees with 
all other knowledge. 
After having collected, according to certain principles, 
the conceptions a priori which conllitute the material* 
of Metaphyfics, the analyfis of thefe conceptions become* 
of great importance, and may be confidered apart as a 
definitive philolophy, confiding of nothing but analytical 
judgments, which belong to Metaphyfics, without ad¬ 
mitting into it the fynthetical pofitions which conllitute 
Metaphyfics themfelves. For, in fa£t, this analyfis of the 
conceptions is chiefly ufeful on account of the fynthetical 
pojitions of Metaphyfics, which can be produced only by 
its means. 
Metaphyfics, therefore, properly fpeaking, refer folely 
to fynthetical pofitions a priori, for the fake of which 
they indeed require the analyfis of their conceptions, and 
of courle analytical judgments ; but In this they do not 
differ from any other fcience in which analyfis is ufed to 
render conceptions clear. The true objeCt of Metaphyfics 
is the production of Knowledge a priori, and of fyntheti¬ 
cal pofitions apriori; that is, it is Pliilofophical Knowledge. 
Tired therefore of Dogmatifm, which teaches us no¬ 
thing, as well as of Scepticifm, which promifes nothing, 
not even the repofe of undiiturbed ignorance, feeling 
the importance of that knowledge of which we Hand in. 
need, but yet rendered millrultful by long experience, 
even of that which we think we poffeis in pure Reafon; 
one critical quellion alone remains: Are Metaphysics- 
at all possible ? This queftion, however, is not to bs 
anfvvered by mere fceptical reproaches againft the exill- 
ing lyitems of Metaphyfics, (for we admit that not one of 
them deferves that name ;) but by examining the hi¬ 
therto problematical conception of fuch a fcience. 
In the Critic of Pure Reafon, I have confidered this 
queftion fynthetically; that is to fay, I have examined 
pure realon itfelf, in order to dilcover its elements, and 
3 fch® 
