318 METAPHYSICS. 
ccmpofed not of geometrical, but of phyfical, points; and 
confequently, that the real Jpace in nature confifted of 
Jhnple parts, though thefpace which the geometrician has 
in his mind is infinitely divifible. They never fufpefted 
that this fpace of the geometrician is the very thing 
which renders phyfical Ipace, that is to fay, the exten- 
fion of matter itfelf, poifible ; and that of courfe this ex¬ 
tension is no quality of the things in-t/iemJ’eWes, but merely 
a form of oitr fenf ble reprefenting faculty ; that all objects 
in ipace are mere phenomena; that is, not the things in 
themfelves, but reprefentations in our fenfible intuition. 
Since ipace then, as the geometrician thinks it, is merely the 
form of cur JhJib/e intuition, which we find a priori in 
ourfelves, and which contains the ground of the poffibi- 
lity of all external phenomena, as to their form, they mull 
necefiarily conform to the pofitions of the geometrician, 
which he draws from no ficticious conception, but from 
the fubjcdive foundation of all external phenomena ; that 
is, from fenfe itfelf. In this and in no other way, can the 
geometrican eftablifh, again ft all the chicanery of ihallow 
metaphyiics, the objective reality of his pofitions ; how¬ 
ever, they may puzzle metaphyiicians who do not revert 
to the iource of their conceptions. 
Whatever is to be given to us as an objeCt muft be 
given us in the intuition. But all our intuitions take 
place by means of Sense. Understanding forms no 
intuition, but only reflects ; as then SeiiJ'e, according to 
what has juft been proved, never makes us in the leaft 
acquainted with the things in themfelves, but only with 
the phenomena, which are mere reprefentations in the 
fenfitive faculty, it follows that all bodies, together with 
the fpace they occupy, muft be confidered as nothing but 
mere reprefentations in us. But is not this complete 
Jdealifm ? 
Idealism confifts in the aflertion that there exift no 
other than thinking beings; that all other things which 
we fancy we perceive by the intuition, are merely repre¬ 
fentations in us as thinking beings, and refer to no ob¬ 
jeft exifting in itfelf. I, on the contrary, affirm, that 
there are things given to us, as cbjeCts of our fenfes, 
•which exift without us, but that what they may be in 
themfelves we know not, fince we can know r only their ap¬ 
pearance, i. e. the reprefentations which they occafion in 
us while affeCting our fenfes. I diftinCtly acknowledge 
that there are things without us which we know by the 
reprefentation which their influence upon our fenfitive 
faculty occaiions us to form, and to wdiicli we give the 
appellation of body. This word fignifies therefore the 
real appearance of an objeft wdiich Itill (in itfelf ) remains 
un/een and unknown. Surely this cannot be called 
Idealifm ! 
Without injury to the real exiftence of external 
things, we fay of a multitude of their properties that they 
do not belong to thefe things in themfelves, but only to 
their appearance, and that, except in our reprefentation, 
fuch properties have no exiftence. This language was 
ufecl long before the time of Locke, but has been more 
generally received fince. Among thefe properties may be 
enumerated heat, colour , Utjie, lye. and, if I add to their 
number thofe aifo which are called primary, namely, 
extenfion, relative fituation, and in general Jpace itfelf, 
together 'with all that is dependent upon it, as impene¬ 
trability, materiality, form, &c. confidering them alfo as 
mere appearances, why ffiould this be inadmiffible ? As 
he cannot juftly be called an Idealift who affirms that 
colour is not a property inherent in the .objefts them- 
l'eives, but only a modification of the fenfe of feeing 5 
why ffiould I be termed an Idealift for affirming that all 
the properties which conftitute the intuition of a body 
belong only to its appearance ? The exiftence of the things 
which appear to us is not here denied, as it is by Ideal¬ 
ifm - r we merely fhow that we cannot know by our fenfes 
h.ow the things exift in themfelves. 
I would gladly know how I am to qualify this pofition 
in order not to incur the charge of Idealiiin, Doubtlgfs 
I fliall be expefted to fay that our reprefentation of Jpace 
not only accords with external objefts in their relation 
to our fenfitive faculty, for that I have admitted j but 
that it refembles thefe objefts in themfjlves ; an afier- 
tion in my opinion totally void of meaning. 
The objeftion then, that by thus idealijing Space and 
Time, I convert the whole fenfible world into mere 
appearances, is perfeftly futile. All philofophical inlight 
into the nature of fenfible knowledge had been cor¬ 
rupted by the lhppofition that the fenfitive faculty forms 
a confufed reprefentation of the things as they exift in 
themfelves ; but yet l'o that we are unable to bring this to 
a clear confcioufnefs. We have however fliown, that 
Sense has nothing to do with clearnefs or obfeurity, 
but with the original produftion of knowledge itfelf, 
by reprefenting things not as they are in themfelves, but 
in a mode of its own. It furnilhes therefore mere phe¬ 
nomena for the underftanding to refleft upon, and not 
things in themfelves. The phenomena originate in Sense ; 
the judgment concerning them depends upon the Under¬ 
standing. The only queftion is, whether or not thefe 
phenomena refer to real objefts. But the difference be¬ 
tween a real thing and a dream does not depend on the 
quality of the reprefentations which are attributed to 
objefts, for thefe are in both cafes the fame ; but on their 
combination with reference to thofe laws which deter¬ 
mine the conception of an objeft; i. e. on the poflibility 
or impoffibility of their co-ex fling in experience. It is 
not the fault of the appearance when we erroneoufly take 
it for truth ; i. e. when the intuition by which an objeft is 
given to us is taken for the conception of the objeft as 
it exifts, which it is the bufinefs of the underftanding 
to judge of. The fenfes reprefent to us the courfe of the 
planets, now as direft, now as retrogade : and there is 
neither fallehood nor truth in this, becaufe, as long as we 
confider it as an appearance only, we do not at all 
judge of the objeftive quality of the motion. But, as’a 
falfe judgment may eafiiy arife if the underftanding does 
not take care to prevent this fubjedive mode of reprefen¬ 
tation from being confidered as objective, we are cautious, 
and fay the ftars appear to go back. This fort of illu- 
iion, however, mujt not be attributed to Sense, but to Un¬ 
derstanding, to which alone it belongs, to form an ob¬ 
jeftive judgment from the fenfible appearance. 
In this manner, when we do not refleft upon the 
origin of our reprefentations, and merely conneft our 
lenlible intuitions as they happen to occur in time and 
J'pace, according to the laws of experience, we are liable 
to take a deceitful appearance for truth. This concerns 
merely the application of fenfible reprefentations by the 
Underftanding, and not their origin. Juft'in the lame 
manner, when I confider all the reprefentations of the 
fenfes, together with their forms, time and Jpace, as no¬ 
thing but phenomena, and thefe indeed as mere forms of 
theJ'enfitive faculty, which are not to be found in any 
objeft independent of that faculty ; and when I employ 
the reprefentations only in reference to polllble expe¬ 
rience i no error can arife, fince the phenomena ftriftly ac¬ 
cord with the genuine law's of experience. Thus, all po- 
fitions of geometry are not only valid of Jpace itfelf, but 
of every objeft of the fenfes; and they equally accord with 
all poifible experience, whether I confider J'pace as a 
mere form ofSenJe, or as fomething inherent in the things 
themfelves ; though in the former cafe alone is the poJli- ‘ 
bility of their application a priori to objefts of external 
intuition at all conceivable. In other rel'pefts, every 
thing remains, as to all poflible experience, precifeiy as if 
I had not adopted this deviation from common opinion. 
But, if I venture to carry my conceptions of tune and 
Jpace beyond all poflible experience, which I do when I 
confider them as properties inherent in the things them¬ 
felves, then indeed an important error arifes, fince I give 
out that which is merely a condition of the intuition of 
things inherent in me only, and applicable to objefts of 
Senie alone, as abfolutely valid of the things in them¬ 
felves. 
