M E T A 5MT Y S I C S'; 
of liis clafiiflcatiort 5 nd conception of the whole ; 
•ind never till now had he a fyftem. 
To feleft from the common mafs of Knowledge thofe 
conceptions which depend upon no particular experience 
for their foundation, but which occur in all our experience, 
conftituting as it were, the mere form of its connexion, 
prefuppofes no more reflection than is requilite to afcer- 
tain in language the real ufe of words, and thus to colleCt 
the elements fora grammar. Indeed thefe inveftigations 
are very nearly allied. But we are not able to affign a rea- 
fon why every language has juft this and no other formal 
conftruftion; and Itill lets are we able to fay that neither 
more nor Ids of luch formal determinations can be found 
in it. 
Ariftotle colleCred ten fuch pure elementary concep¬ 
tions (Subftrmtia, Qnalitas, Qieantitees, Relalio, A6iio, PaJJio, 
Queenelo, llbi. Situs, and Habitus), under the name of Ca¬ 
tegories. To thefe, which were alfo called predicaments, 
he found himfelf compelled to add five others named pofi- 
predicanients ; Oppojitum, Prius, Simvl,Mains, and Habere. 
They are however, partly implied in the former, as prius, 
fnnul, motits. This rhapfody, however, was better calcu¬ 
lated to ferve as a hint to lome future inveftigator, than 
to ftand for a regularly-executed plan; and in that view 
only did it deferve applaufe. As philofophy became more 
enlightened, it has lince been entirely rejected as ufelefs. 
In the inveftigation of the pure Elements ef Knowledge, 
I at length fucceeded, after long reflection, in leparating 
and diftinguifhing with certainty, the pure elementary 
conceptions of ScnJ’e, Time, and Space, from thofe of the 
Undeijianding. The 7th, 8th, and 9th, Categories, of the 
preceding lilt, were thus excluded. The reft could avail 
me nothing, becaule there was no principle extant by 
which the Underftanding could be completely mealured, 
and the functions from which its pure conceptions arile, 
precifely determined. 
In order to difeover fuch a principle, I fought for an 
ASian of the Understanding which comprehends all its 
actions, and which diftinguithes itlelf in them only by 
different modifications ; that is, I endeavoured to bring 
the various modes of reprefenting objeCts under the unity 
of thinking in genera/. And here I found that this aCtion 
of the underftanding coniifts in Judging. I could now, 
therefore, lay before me the already-completed work of 
the logician, though it was not entirely free from defeCts ; 
and, by means of this, I was enabled to furnilh a complete 
Table of the Functions of the Underftanding, undeter¬ 
mined, however, as to their reference to any object. I 
then applied thele functions of Judging to objects in gene¬ 
ral, or rather to the condition of determining Judgments 
as objectively-valid ; and now the pure conceptions of the uie- 
derfaneling Jprung up, and I became quite certain that only 
thefe, and neither more nor Ids, conftitute our entire 
knowledge of things, according to the very nature of 
Understanding itlelf. I called them, as might be ex¬ 
pected, by their ancient name Categories. I thus re¬ 
served to mylelf the power of adding the complete num¬ 
ber of conceptions derivable from thefe, either by a con¬ 
nexion among themfelves, or with the pure forms of the 
phenomena Time and Space, or with their matter fo far 
as it is not empirically determined ; namely, the objeCt 
-of Sensation in general, to which the name ot Prcelicabiha 
might be given, as foon as a fyfttSH of Transcendental 
Philosophy fhould be effected, for the purpole of which 
I had only confidered hitherto the Critic of Reafon itlelf. 
But the molt elfential part of this iyftem of the Catego¬ 
ries, and that which diltinguifhes it from the ancient rhap¬ 
fody which was fet up without any principle, and which 
■deferves to be confidered as a part of philofophy only, 
becaufe it led the way to the difcovery of the true Ca¬ 
tegories, is, that it determines the real nature of thefe 
pure conceptions of Underftanding, and points out their 
■right ufe. 
No fuch infight into the nature of the Categories ever 
entered into the mind of their original Author, or that 
Ycu*. XV. No, 1037. 
of any one fince his time'. Yet without it they are en¬ 
tirely ufelefs, and a mere catalogue of names, without ex¬ 
planation or any rule for their ufe. Had this ever oc¬ 
curred to the ancients, doubtlefs the whole fludy of Pure 
Rational Science, which for centuries paft has ruined f6 
many bright geniufes, would have come down to us in a 
quite different fhape, and would have enlightened the 
understandings of men, and prepared them for genuine 
Science, inftead of exhaufting their faculties in dark and 
fruitless refearches. 
This Spjlem of the Categories will now render ths 
treatment of every object of Pure Reafon fyfternatic. It 
furnishes an undoubted guide to direCt how, and through 
what points of inveftigation, every metaphyfical contem¬ 
plation mull be carried in order to become complete : fot 
it exhaufts all the modes of the underftanding under which 
every inferior conception muff be ranked. Thus has arilem 
the Table of Principles, of whole completenefs we car® 
only be certain by the System of the Categories ; and 
even in the division of Conceptions, which may go be¬ 
yond the physiological ufe of the underftanding, (fee- 
Critic, p. 344 and 415.)_we muff always refer to the fame 
guide, which, becaufe this division mult be carried through 
the fame fixed points determined in the human understand - 
ing a-priori, always forms a clofed circle, leaving no doubt- 
that the object of a pure conception of the Underftand¬ 
ing or of Reafon, fo far as it is to be weighed philofo- 
phically, and according to principles a priori, can be by 
Inch a method fully known. I have even been compelled 
to make ufe of this guide in one of the molt abftraCt on¬ 
tological divilions ; namely, in the various deftinCtions- 
between -die conceptions ot Something and Nothing ; and 
thus have produced a regular and necefiary Table, (’critic* 
p. 292.) 
Some appofite obfervations may be made on the Table 
of the Categories ; as, iftly, That the Third arifes front 
a union of the firit and lecond into one conception, 
zdly, That thofe of Quantity merely proceed from Unitj 
to Totality, and thole of Quality from Something to 
Nothing ; lb that thefe mult be arranged thus ; Reeility, 
J.imitation, and Complete Negation, without Corelata of 
Oppojitia ; whereas thole of Relation and Modality are 
accompanied by the.latter. 3dly. That as, in Logic, 
Catcgoriced Judgments form the foundation of all others, fo 
the C'ategbry of Saffiance j'ornes the foundation to all Con¬ 
ceptions of real things. 4thly, That, as Modality is no 
particular predicate in a judgment, fo the Conceptions of 
Modality aelel no determinations to the things. 
All thefe obfervations have their utility. If we pro¬ 
ceed to enumerate the prcelicabilia, which" we may take 
tolerably complete from any good Ontology, for instance, 
that of Baumgarten, and arrange them'in dalles under 
the Categories, in doing which, we mult not omit to 
analyze all thefe conceptions as completely as poilible j 
then a merely analytical part of Metaphyiies will arife, 
which does not contain any fynthettcal petitions. This 
might precede the fynthetical part of Metaphyiies ; and, 
by its determination and completeness, would not only be 
of utility, but, by means of the lyftematical part contain¬ 
ed in it, polfeis great beauty. 
This fyftem, like every other True System, founded 
upon a univerlal principle, has an advantage which can¬ 
not be Sufficiently prized ■, that of excluding all hetero¬ 
geneous conceptions which might otherwise creep in 
amongft the pure conceptions of th'e Underftanding, and 
of determining to every part of Knowledge its proper 
place. Thole conceptions, which I have arranged in a, 
Table under the name of Conceptions of Menecteon, and 
indeed, according to the guide turnilhed by the Catego¬ 
ries, mix themfelvesinOntology-j without any proper right, 
with the pure conceptions oi the underftanding, though, 
the latter are Conceptions of Connexion, and therefore 
conceptions of the objeCt itlelf ; whereas the former are 
merely comparilbns of given conceptions, and have a 
quite different nature and application. By a right di- 
3 M viiiojij, 
