M E T A P II Y S 1 C S. 227 
fcries of conditions; thirdly, the determination of all con¬ 
ceptions in the Idea of a complete aggregate of all that is 
poffible. The firft Idea is psychological, the fecond 
cosmological, the third theological ; and, fince all 
three occafion a Dialcfh'c, though each in its own way, a 
divifion of this* dialectic of pure reafon is grounded upon 
them; namely, the Paralogism, the Antinomy, and 
the Ideal, of the dialectic ; by which divifion, we become 
quite certain, that all claims of pure reafon are here com¬ 
pletely Hated, and that none can fail, becaufe the Rational- 
Faculty itfelf, whence they ail derive their origin, is 
thereby completely mealured. 
In this general conlideration, it is ffiil remarkable, that 
the Ideas of Reafon are not of any ufe with rel'peCt to ex¬ 
perience, as the Categories are; but, with regard to 
l'uch a ufe, may be di/benled with, nay, are even contrary 
and injurious to the maxims of the Rational Knowledge 
of Nature ; but they are llill neceffary in other refpefts, 
as will hereafter be fhown. Whether the Soul be a simple 
substance or not, is entirely indifferent to us, for the 
explanation of its phenomena; for we are not able to ren¬ 
der the conception of a fimple being by any poffible ex¬ 
perience intuitive, that is, intelligible in the concrete. 
Juft of as little ufe are the Cofmological Ideas of the be¬ 
ginning or of the eternity of the world, in order to explain 
any event in the world itfelf. Laffly, we mult refrain, 
according to a correct maxim of natural philofophy, from 
all elucidation of the conftruCtion of nature drawn from 
the will of a lfigheff Being, becaufe this is no longer na¬ 
tural philofophy ; but a confeffion that, with us at lealt, 
natural philofophy is nearly at an end. Thefe Ideas, 
therefore, have quite a different ufe from the Categories, 
by means of which, together with the principles founded 
upon them, Experience itfelf was firft rendered poffible. 
,Tn the mean time our troublefome analyfis of the under- 
ffanding would be quite fuperHuous, if our view were 
folely direCted to the Knowledge of Nature in Experience ; 
for Reafon purfues its courfe very fafely, both in the Ma¬ 
thematics and in Natural Philofophy, without all this 
fubtle deduction. Our Critic of the Underffanding, there¬ 
fore, unites itfelf with that of Pure Reafon, with a view 
to an objeCt which lies beyond the ufe of underffanding in 
experience, which however, we have already Hated to be 
totally without any meaning. Still there muff be an 
agreement between the nature of Reafon and that of 
the Undeiftanding; and the former muff contribute to 
the perfection of the latter, and cannot poffbly con¬ 
found it. 
To lhow how this is effedted, we muff obferve, that 
Pure Reason does not by its Ideas reprefent particular 
objedts which lie beyond the field of experience ; their 
objedt is to urge the underffanding to attain complete- 
nefs in the connedtion of experience. This completenefs, 
however, can only be that of the Principles, but not of 
Intuitions or objedts. Neverthelefs, Reason, in order to 
reprefent the completenefs of thefe principles, diftinftly 
confiders it as the knowledge of an objedt. This object, 
however, is only an Idea, for the purpofe of completing as 
much as poffible the knowledge of the underffanding, 
which that Idea denotes. 
We have already fhown, that the purity of the Cate¬ 
gories from any mixture of fenfible determination, may 
mislead Reafon to extend its ufe beyond all experience to 
the things in themfelves, though, as merely logical func¬ 
tions, and without any intuition to give them fignification 
and fenfe in the concrete, the Categories reprefent indeed 
a thing in general, but can give no determinate concep¬ 
tion of it whatever. Such hyperbolical objedts are thofe 
which we denominate Noumena, or pure beings of intel¬ 
lect, i. e. beings of thought ; as for inffance, Substance, 
without perdurability in Time, or a Cause which does not 
aft in time, See. in "which cafe we apply l'uch predicates to 
them as merely ferve to render the regulations of expe¬ 
rience poffible, and yet take away from them all their 
intuitive character, by which alone experience is poffible; and 
thus the conceptions loi'e ail fignification. 
There is no danger that underflanding, of its own ac¬ 
cord, would wantonly overffep its limits into the mere 
field of intellectual beings. Yet when Reafon, which can¬ 
not be completely fatished with any empirical ufe of the 
rules of underffanding, this ufe being always cc.adi- 
tional, demands the completion of the chain of condi¬ 
tions ; then the underffanding is expelled from its fphere, 
either in order to reprefent objedts of experience in a 
feries fo far extended that no experience can comprife then, 
or to leek entirely out of its limits Noumena to which it 
can unite its chain, and thereby at length, without any 
empirical conditions, render its work complete. Thefe 
then are the Transcendental Ideas, which, though, 
according to the true yet hidden defign of Reafon, they are 
not to be employed in forming tranjeendent conceptions, 
but merely for the unlimited extenlion of its emperical 
ufe, ftill millead the underffanding, by a natural illu- 
fion which cannot he avoided by the impradticable refo- 
lution to remain within the hounds of experience, but 
only by a careful and J’eientif c invejligalion of the Faculties 
ofR eason and Understanding. 
I. Psychological Ideas. (Critic of Pare Reafon, p. 341.J 
It has long been remarked, that in all fubftances the 
proper fabjefl, namely, that which remains after the repa¬ 
ration of all its properties as predicates, confequently the 
fubftance properly fo called, is unknown; and numerous 
indeed have been the complaints on account of the narrow 
limits of our underffanding. It is however to be re¬ 
marked, that the human underftanding*cannot be cen- 
lured, that it does not know the fubftance of the things 
in itfelf, but is rather to be cenfured for wifhing to know 
that which is a mere idea, as a given objeCt in a deter¬ 
minate manner. Pure speculative Reason requires, 
for every predicate a cori'efpondmg j'ubjcft ; this fubjeCt, 
however, which again neceffarily becomes a predicate, 
requires another J'uhjefl, and lb ort to infinity, or as far 
as we can reach. Hence it follows, that we can confider 
nothing that we are ever able to attain as the laft fub¬ 
jeCt, and that the fubftance itfelf can therefore never be 
thought by our underffanding, however deeply it may 
penetrate, even though all nature were laid open to it; 
for the very nature of underffanding confifts in this-, 
that we think difeurfively, i. e. by conceptions, which 
are nothing but predicates. An abjblute fabjefl, there¬ 
fore, muff always be wanting. All that we really know 
of bodies are their properties ; even impenetrability, 
which is always conceived as the effect of a power, 
wants its fubject. But in the confcioufnefs of ourfelves, 
it feems as if we had arrived at this fubftance, and indeed 
by an immediate intuition; for all predicates of inter¬ 
nal sense refer to our own 7 , as a J'ubje 61 , and which 
cannot be further thought as the predicate of any other 
fabjefl. And here the completenefs in the relation of 
the given conceptions as predicates to a iubject, feems. 
to hring us, not merely to an Idea, but to an abfolute 
j'ubjefl itfelf, given in experience. This expectation, 
however, is~ difuppointed ; for our own 7 , is no concep¬ 
tion, but only the mark of the object of internal fenfe ; fince 
we do not know it further by any predicate, therefore 
cannot certainly make it a predicate of any other thing ; 
but juft as little is it a determinate conception of an ab- 
folute Iubject ; it merely indicates the reference of internal 
Phenomena to the unknown J’ubjefl. This Idea of an ab¬ 
folute fubjeft, which lerves very well, as a regulative prin¬ 
ciple, to annihilate Materialifm, gives rife, by a very na¬ 
tural mil'underftanding, to a plaufible argument, which 
deduces from this pretended knowledge of the Jhbftancje 
of our thinking being, its nature ; lince our injiiuitive 
knowledge of it leems to reach beyond the fphere of ex¬ 
perience. If the reprefentation of confcioufnefs, i. e, of 
our own 7 , were a conception by which foinething were 
thought*. 
