228 MET APHYSI C S. 
thought, it would "be poflible to apply it as a predicate to 
other things, or it would contain fuch predicates in it. 
Now it is nothing more than a feeling of an exiftence with¬ 
out the lead conception, and only a reprefentation of that 
to which all feeling refers (relatione acciclentis.) 
But this thinking being, the Soul, may now, as the 
daft fubjeft of thinking, which cannot be any more re- 
prefented as the predicate of any other thing, be called 
. .Substance ; yet this conception is entirely empty, and 
without all confequences, if per durability, as that which 
renders the conception of fubftance in experience fruitful, 
cannot be aflerted of it. 
But perdurability can never be inferred from the con¬ 
ception of fubftance as a thing in itfelf, but only as a 
thing in experience. This has been fufficiently explained 
in the firft Analogy of Experience, (fee Critic, p. 182.) 
and, if we do not admit this demonftration, we may try 
to dexnonftrate from the conception of a fubjedt which is 
not itlelf a predicate of another, that its exiftence is 
therefore abl'olutely lading. Such Jynthetical pojitions 
a priori can never be proved of things in themfelves, but 
are valid only of the objedis of a poflible experience. 
If we infer the perdurability of the Soul from the con¬ 
ception of it as a fubftance, then this can only be valid 
of it for the fake of poflible experience. Now the fub- 
jedlive condition of all poftible experience is life ; the 
pel-durability of the Soul during life therefore can only be 
inferred ; for the death of man is the end of all know¬ 
ledge of the foul as an objeft of experience ; unlels it 
could be proved that death does not terminate experience. 
It is indeed very remarkable that Metaphyficians have al¬ 
ways palled over lb carelefsly the principle of the Perdtua- 
bility ofSubftance,without ever attempting its proof: doubt- 
lefs this proceeded from theirperceiving themfelves totally 
' at a lofs for its demonftration. Common Senle told them 
that, unlefs the fubftances lofted, no union of apprehen- 
fions in experience could take place, yet from experience 
itfelf it never could infer this principle, fince it cannot 
purfue fulfiances through all their alterations and folu- 
tions, in order to difeover their matter, which always re¬ 
mains undiminifhed, and becaufe the principle contains 
necejjity, which is the true mark of a principle a priori. 
Philofophers, however, boldly applied this principle to 
the conception of the Soul, as a fubftance, and inferred 
a necejfary duration of it after the death of Man, princi¬ 
pally becaufe the Jimplicity of this fubftance, which is 
inferred from the indivifibility of confcioufnefs, fecured 
it from deftru&icn byfolution. Had they difeovered the 
genuine lource of this principle, which however required a 
deeper refearch than they were difpofed to enter into, 
they would have feen that the law of the Perdurability f 
Srdfutr.ee is valid only for the fake of experience, and there¬ 
fore applies only to things as they are known and con- 
■nedled with others in experience; confequently cannot 
be valid of the foul after d ath. 
That fomething real without us not only actually but 
necefiarily ccrrefponds to our external apprehenfion, may 
be eafily proved, but only in an empirical manner ; that 
is, of the things as phenomena in fpace. I am juft 
as confcicus, by means of external experience, of the 
reality of body', as externa!phenomena in Space, as I am 
by means of internal experience of the exiftence of 
my own Scul in Time, which I can only know as an 
object of internal Jenfe, through the phenomena which 
ccnftituie my internal ftate, though the being in itfelf 
which forms the foundation of thefe phenomena be un¬ 
known to me. The Cartifan Idealifm, therefore diftin- 
guifhes external experience from dreams only by its 
greater regularity, which it takes as a criterion of its 
Truth. It preluppofes, in both, Time and Space as 
conditions of the exiftence of objects, and only alks 
whether the obje&s of External Senle are really in Space 
which we place there when awake ; juft as the objeift of 
jpternal fenfe, the Soul, really is in- Time ; i. e. whether 
external experience carries fufficiently-fure criteria to dif- 
tinguilh it from fancy. This doubt is eafily removed; and 
indeed we do it continually by examining the connexion 
of the phenomena, both in dreams and in experience, 
according to the general laws ol experience ; and cannot 
doubt, when the reprefentation of external things tho¬ 
roughly agrees with thofe laws, that the experience is 
genuine. Material Idealifm, therefore, by which pheno¬ 
mena as phenomena are only confidered according to 
their connexion in experience, is eafily refuted, fince it 
is juft as certain an experience that bodies exift without 
us in Space, as that I myfelf exift in Time, according to 
the reprefentations of external and internal fenfe; for the 
Conception, without us, only Jignift.es exiftence in Space ; 
but lince our own I, in the poiition I am, lignifies not 
merely the objeft of internal intuition in Time, but the 
Jubject of confcioufnefs alio ; juft as body not only figni- 
iies the external intuition in Space, but alfo the thing in 
itfelf, which lies as a foundation to this phenomena. 
Now, that the things in nature, as phenomena of external 
fenfe, are bodies exifting independent of my mind, can be 
denied without heiitation ; butthat I myleif exift in Time 
as a phenomenon of internal fenle, ( Soul ,) according to 
empirical Plychology, indepedently of my reprefentvngfa¬ 
culty, this mult equally be denied. And thus every thing, 
when reduced to its true lignification, is decided and 
certain. Format Idealifm, which I have called Trans¬ 
cendental, really annihilates the Material, or Carte/.an.. 
For, if Space be nothing but the form of Senfe, it is a re- 
prelentation in me juft as real as that of myleif; and 
all that is requilite in either cale is the empirical truth of 
the phenomena. But if this doftrine be rejected, and if 
Space and the Phenomena in it be things exilting inde¬ 
pendently of us, ftill our mode of apprehending them 
can never prove the reality of thefe objects, nor how they 
exift; independently of the Mind. 
II. C osmological Ideas. (Critic of Pure Rcnfvn, p.4.05.) 
Thele products of Pure Reafon in its tranfeendent ul’e, 
are its moft remarkable phenomena, and tend moft pow¬ 
erfully to awaken Reafon from its dogmatical / lumbers , 
and induce it to undertake the difficult talk of criticizing 
itfelf. 
I call thefe Ideas Cofmological, becaufe their object is 
always confined to the fenfibie world ; and fo far indeed 
it is common, and not tranfeendent. It is not therefore 
abfolutely an Idea, like foul, for inftance, confidersd as a 
Jhnplcfubftance, fince this objedt (theJimple) is luch a-one 
as can never be reprefented to the fenfes. Notwithftand- 
ing this, the Cofmological Idea of the connexion of the 
Conditioned with its Condition is fo much extended, that 
experience can never equal it, and is therefore, on this 
account, properly termed an Idea. 
The advantage derived from a Syftem of the Cate¬ 
gories is here fo clear and evident, that, even were tilers 
no other proof of it, this one alone would fufficiently 
(how how indifpenfable they are in a Syftem of Pure 
Reason. There are of thefe tranfeendent Ideas no more 
than fevr, that is, juft as many as there are clajjis of the 
Categories ; each of thefe ideas refers to the abioliite 
completenefs of the leries of conditions to a given condi¬ 
tioned. According to thefe Ccfrolcgical Ideas, there 
are but four kinds of Dialcflical Afferttons of Pure Reafon, 
each of which has oppofed to it a counter-alfercion of 
equal validity, which Antinomy cannot be reconciled by 
the moft fubtile metaphyficai diltindlions, and therefore 
muft compel the philolopher to go back to the very fources 
-of Pure Reafon itlelf. This extraordinary cciitradilHov, 
by no means invented at pieafure, but really grounded 
in the nature of Speculative Reason itlelf, and confe¬ 
quently unavoidable and never to be terminated, con¬ 
tains the four following politions together with their 
oppofites. 
4 - 
"TABLE. 
