230 METAPHYSICS, 
In the firft clafs of Antinomies (the Mathematical), 
the falfity of the prefuppofition confifted in this; that 
fomething completely nugatory, and which contradicts 
itfelf; namely, a phenomenon confidered as a thing in itfelf, 
was fuppofed to be conceivable. In the fecond clafs of 
Antinomies (the dynamical), the falfity of the prefuppo- 
fition will be found to cohfift in this; that what is really 
conceivable is reprefented as contradictory. As in the for¬ 
mer cafe, therefore, the oppofite affertions are both falfe ; 
here, on the contrary, they may both be true. 
The Mathematical connection, that of Quantity, necef- 
farily prefuppofes a uniformity in the nature of what is 
conneCted. The dynamical by no means requires this. In 
treating of the mere quantity of what is extended, all the 
parts mull be homogeneal; whereas, in the connection of 
cause and effect, this uniformity may indeed occur, 
but it is not neceffary. 
To confider the objeCts of the fenfible world as things 
in themfelves, has been fhown to be abfurd ; and to add 
further, that cause and effect is a law of the things 
in themfelves, would be (till more abfurd. In the fame 
manner, if a free being were reprefented like other objeCts 
as a mere phenomenon, a fimilar contradiction and abfur- 
dity would arife; for the fame thing would thus be af¬ 
firmed and denied of the fame identical objeCt in the very 
fame fignification; that is, we fhould generate another 
fquare circle. But, if the necefity of Nature is referred 
merely to the phenomena, and liberty merely to the things 
in themfelves, then no contradiction arifes, though we 
grant both kinds of Caufality, however difficult or even 
impoffible it may be to comprehend the latter. 
In the field of phenomena, every effeCt is an event, fome¬ 
thing occurring in Time ; and mult be preceded, agree¬ 
ably to the univerfal law of nature, by a certain fituation 
and condition of its Caufe, which it follows according to 
a conftant law. But this determination of its Caufe is an 
event alfo; and the Caufe mult have begun to aCt, for 
otherwife no fucceffion of time between it and the effeCt 
would be conceivable, and the EffeCt would always have 
exiited, as well as the Caufe. 
There is then a neceffity operating upon all the caufes of 
Nature, as their condition. If, on the other hand, Liberty 
is attributed to fome of the caufes of phenomena, it muff 
be a power to begin them fpontaneoufly, i. e. without its 
being neceffary that the caufality of the Caufe itfelf fhould 
begin, and confequently without its requiring any prior 
caufe to determine its beginning. But in that cafe it 
would be neceffary that the Caufe fhould be no phenomenon 
■in time, but a thing in itfelf, and its effeCts merely phe¬ 
nomena. 
The Idea of Liberty can only arife in the relation of 
an intellectual being as Caufe to phenomena as Effedls. 
We cannot, therefore, apply Liberty to matter in the in- 
cefi'ant aCiion by which it occupies fpace, although this 
aCtion fprings from an internal principle. Nor, on the 
other hand, is our Conception of Liberty applicable to 
pure intellectual beings ; for inftance, to God, fo far as 
we confider his aCtion as immanent. For, though he here 
aCts independently of external caufes, his aCtion is ftill 
determined by his eternal Reafon, confequently by his 
godly nature. It is only when fomething is to begin 
through an aCtion, that is, when the effeCt is to be fuch 
that it can occur in the l'eries of time, or in the fenfible 
world, as, for inftance, a beginning of the world; then only 
can the queftion arife, whether the Caufe itfelf muff alfo 
have had a beginning, or, could commence an EffeCt 
without itfelf commencing. If the Caufe had itfelf a 
Caufe, it belongs to the neceffity of Nature; if it had none, 
it is free. The reader will at once perceive, that this 
conception of Liberty, which I define as the quality of 
a power, to commence an event of itfelf, is the great ob¬ 
jeCt which Metaphylics has to inveftigate. 
If we can conceive, without contradiction, an intel¬ 
lectual being aCling upon the phenomena, ftill the' necef- 
fty of Nature will continue to conned under Cause and 
Effect the events in the fenfible world. And we may 
neverthelefs.attribute Lieerty to that intellectual caufe 
which is itfelf no phenomenon, although its effeCts [are 
phenomena; and in this way we may without contradic¬ 
tion apply Nature and Liberty to the very fame being, 
but viewed in two different lights ; in the one as a pheno¬ 
menon, in the other as thing in itfelf, or noumenon. 
We poffefs a Faculty whofe aCtions ftand in relation to 
natural caufes, and which fo far is the faculty of a being 
which itfelf is a phenomenon, but whofe aCtions alfo are 
influenced by Ideas, fmee they are able to determine 
this faculty. This determination is the necejfitation of 
Duty. This Faculty is called Reason ; and, while we 
confider Man folely as determinable by Reafon, we do 
not think of him as an objeCt of Senfe, but as a thing in 
itfelf ; the poffibility of which, namely, how Duty which 
has never yet been explained can determine the activity 
of Reafon, and how this can be the caufe of aCtions, 
whofe effeCts are phenomena in the fenfible world, can¬ 
not be conceived. The caufality of Reafon, or of Ideas, 
however, producing effeCts in the fenfible world, would 
be freedom. 
I may fay then, without contradiction, that all aCtions 
of Rational Beings, viewed as phenomena in experience, 
ftand under the necefity of nature; but that the very fame 
aCtions, confidered merely with refpeCt to the Faculty of 
Reafon, are free. The neceffity of Nature, however, re¬ 
mains, whether the rational being produce effeCts in the 
fenfible world from Reafon alone, or otherwife. In the 
former cafe, Reafon is the caufe of the necefity, and is 
therefore free; in the latter cafe, Reafon exercifes no 
power over the fenfible world. It is not however in itfelf 
on that account determined by Senfe, (which is impof¬ 
fible,) and therefore even in this cafe it is free. Liberty 
does not interfere with the Laws of Nature, any more 
than they detraCf from it. 
The caufality of Reafon may be confidered as a firft 
commencement of a feries of phenomena; but at the fame 
time merely as a fubordinate commencement, fince the 
event it produces is alfo connected with the chain of 
caufes. It may be confidered without contradiction there¬ 
fore in the former refpeCt as free, but in the latter, where 
it is merely phenomenon, as fubjeCt to the neceffity of 
Nature. 
With refpeCt to the Fourth Antinomy, it is removed in 
the fame way as the Third. For, when the caufe in the 
phenomenon is d’ftinguiffied only from the caufe of the 
phenomena, fo far as the latter can be confidered as a 
■ thing in itfelf, then both pofitions may be true ; that is 
to fay, we can never find in nature a caufe of the fenfible 
world, whofe exiftence is abfolutely necellary; but yet the 
■world, confidered as out of Time and Space, is neverthe¬ 
lefs connected with anecejfary being as its cause ; and the 
inconiiftency of tliefe two pofitions relts upon the miftake 
of attributing that which belongs merely to the phenomena 
to the things in themfelves, and confounding both in one 
conception, thus producing another fquare circle. 
Thus then I have exhibited and lolved the whole An¬ 
tinomy in which Realon finds itfelf entangled when it 
applies its principles to the fenfible world; and the mere 
expofure of this would of itfelf be highly important to 
the knowledge of human Reafon, though the folution of 
the contradiction ihould not have completely latisfied 
the Reader, who has to combat natural illufoh, which lie 
but juft begins to perceive as fuch. One confequence how¬ 
ever rnuft relult; namely, that, as it is quite impoffible to 
avoid this inconfiitency of Reafon, while the objeCts of 
the fenfible world are miftaken for things in themfelves, 
and not confidered as what they are in fuel, mere pheno¬ 
mena ; the reader will find himieif compelled to reconfider 
the deduction of all our knowledge a priori, and the exa¬ 
mination of that deduction, which I have given, in order 
to be able to come to a decifion. And more I do not at 
prelent require; for, if in this occupation he has pene¬ 
trated far enough into the nature of Pure Reafon, the 
criteria 
