M ETAP H Y SICS. 
beyond experience, for repofe and fatisfaCtion in the Idea 
of a Being whofe poffibility cannot indeed be compre¬ 
hended, and whofe exiftence therefore cannot be proved, 
{hough it can as little be refuted ? 
Bounds (in extended things) always fuppofe, beyond 
a. given place or fpace, another fpace which enclofes it, 
and upon which it cannot encroach ; Limits do not re¬ 
quire this, but are mere negations, which determine a 
quantity as not having abfolute completenefs. Reafon 
confiders around itfelf, as it were, a fpace comprifing the 
knowledge of the things in themfelves, though it has no 
determinate conception of them. So long as the know¬ 
ledge furniftied by Reafon is uniform, no determinate 
bounds can be fuppofed of it. In the Mathematics and 
In Natural Philofophy, human reafon has indeed limits, 
but no bounds ; that is to fay, there is fomething external 
to thefe fciences to which they can never attain, though 
There is no ground to conclude that their internal pro¬ 
g-refs will any-where terminate or be completed. New 
inventions in the Mathematics may go on to infinity, as 
well as the difcovery of new properties and of new pow¬ 
ers and laws in nature: yet in thefe fciences limits muft 
be admitted; for the Mathematics apply only to the 
phenomena; and whatever cannot become an object of 
lenfible intuition, as for inftance the conceptions of Me¬ 
taphysics and of Morals, lies entirely out of their fphere, 
and thither the Mathematics can never lead. There is 
confequently no continued progrefs from one of thefe 
fciences to the other, nor have they any point of contaCt. 
Natural philofophy' will never difcover to us the internal 
nature of things, or that which is not phenomenon, but 
which ferves as the chief ground of explanation to the 
phenomena. Yet this transcendent knowledge is not re- 
quifite to phyfics; nay, could it be added to Natural Phi- 
lolophy from any extraneous fource, as from the infpira- 
tion of immaterial beings, this fcience mull rejeCt it, and 
not fuffer it to mix in its explanations. 
Metaphyfics, in their dialeClical invelligations, lead to 
the bounds of Pure Reafon ; namely, to the Tranfcenden- 
tal Ideas-, and at the fame time difcover to us how thefe 
bounds are determinable. And this is indeed the real end 
and ufe of this extraordinary conflict of Reafon, which 
has produced Metaphyfics as its favourite though young- 
eft offspring ; which production, like evqry other, is to be 
attributed not to mere chance, but to an original germ, 
wifely organized for important ends. Metaphyfics, in 
their original outlines, are perhaps more than any other 
fcience implanted in us by nature itfelf, and cannot at 
all be confidered as a voluntary production, or as an ac¬ 
cidental attainment of experience, from which they are 
entirely feparate. 
The conceptions and laws of the underftanding are 
indeed l'ufficient for the empirical ufe of Reafon ; that is, 
within the lenfible world ; but this is not fufficient to 
fatisfy Reafon itfelf. Queftions continually' recur to 
which it can never hope to find a complete folution. 
The transcendental Ideas are the fource from which 
thefe extraordinary problems of Reafon fpring. Now, 
Reafon clearly lees that the fenlible world cannot contain 
completenefs ; in other words, that Time and Space, with 
the twelve Categories of underftanding, which merely lerve 
to elucidate this completenefs, can by no pofilbility rea¬ 
lize it. The Senfille World is merely a chain of pheno¬ 
mena connected according to univerfal laws; it has 
therefore no exiftence out of the mind, and is, properly 
fpeaking, not the thing in itfelf, to which however it ne- 
ceffarily refers. It is here that Reafon can alone hope 
that its defire of completenefs, in the progrefs from the 
conditioned to its conditions, lhall be fulfilled. 
We have already mentioned the limits of Reafon with 
refpeCt to all knowledge of mere intellectual beings ; but, 
as the trarfcendental Ideas have ftill the power to compel 
us to attempt a progrefs towards them, and therefore lead 
. us to the point of contact between what may be termed 
i 
filled fpace (Experience), and empty (the field of nbu- 
mena), we are now alfo able to determine the bounds of 
pure Reafon ; Lor in all bounds there is fomething pofitive -. 
for inftance, furface is the bound of body, yet this furface 
is itfelf a fpace; a line, the bound of a furface, is alfo a fpace ; 
a point, the bound of a line, is ftill a place in fpace ; whereas 
limits contain mere negations. It is not enough that 
Reafon has limits, fince we have found that there ftill lies 
fomething beyond them, (though unknown.) For the 
queftion naturally arifes, What relation is there between 
that which is known and that which never can be known > 
Here is a real connection of the known with the abfolutely 
unknown-, and it is necelfary that this connection thou id 
be clearly defined. 
We muft now, therefore, reprefent to ourfelves an im¬ 
material being, an intellectual world, and a higheft of all be¬ 
ings-, becaul'e reafon finds only in thefe, as things in 
themfelves, completenefs and fatisfaCtion. Though we 
can never know thefe intellectual beings, we are ftill 
compelled by Reafon to adopt them, and to conneCt them 
with the fenlible world. We are certainly able therefore to 
conceive this connection at leaft. But, when we attempt 
to conceive the intellectual beings themfelves,if we do this 
by pure conceptions of Underftanding, we think nothing 
determinately of them, and our conception is without 
meaning. On the other hand, if we think thefe beings 
by properties borrowed from the fenfible world, they are 
no longer intellectual beings. Let us take an example 
from the conception of the higheft Being. 
The Deistical conception is a pure Idea of Reafon., 
one being poffefl'ed of all reality, though we are not able 
to determine it; fince for this purpofe we muft borrow 
an example from the fenfible world, which would convert 
him into an objeCl of Sense. Were I, for inftance, to 
attribute to him Underftanding, I have no conception of 
any other than my own ; namely, one which requires in¬ 
tuitions to be given to it through the lenfes, and which oc¬ 
cupies itfelf in bringing them under the unity of conjciouj- 
nefs. But, if I feparate Underftanding from Senfe, and 
take pure Underftanding, that is, the mere form of think¬ 
ing, void of intuition, and attribute this to the higheft Be¬ 
ing—it is evident that by this faculty nothing determi¬ 
nate, that is to fay, no objeCt at all, can be known. I 
am compelled then to imagine another underftanding, 
with another kind of intuition, of which I have not however 
the leaf conception. The lame thing occurs when I attri¬ 
bute a will to the higheft Being. This conception alfo I 
muft derive from my internal experience, and from exift- 
ing ObjeCls of Senfe, which entirely contradicts the Idea 
of the higheft Being. 
Hume’s arguments, as directed againft Deifm, are 
weak ; fince they apply only to the mode of Demonftra- 
tion, but not to the Dciftical pofition itfelf. With re- 
fpeCt to TheiJ'ni, however, whofe objeCl is a nearer deter¬ 
mination of our conception of the higheft Being, his ob¬ 
jections are very ftrong; and indeed, as they affeCt the 
ordinary conception of that Being, they are irrefutible. 
Hume always refts upon this ; that in the mere concep¬ 
tion of an original Being, to whom we attribute only onto¬ 
logical predicates, Eternity, Omniprefence, Omnipotence, 
we really think nothing determinately, for this would re¬ 
quire additional properties to furnilh a conception in the 
concrete. It is not enough, he tells us, to fay that this ori¬ 
ginal Being is a Cause ; we muft lhow how its caulality 
is qualified, either by undetfianding or by will ; and here 
his attacks upon TheiJ'm itfelf commence ; whereas, be¬ 
fore, he had only made an affault upon the proofs of 
Deifm, which was of little importance. His dangerous 
arguments refer altogether to Anthropomorphii'm, (the 
attributing human properties to the Deity,) which he 
confidered as infeparable fromTheifm; thus making it 
contradift itfelf. But if, on the contrary, we attempt to 
difpenfe with the former, the latter falls to the ground 
with it, and there remains nothing but a Deifm totally 
unintelligible 
