M E T A P II Y S I C S 
234 
world, nor yet disgracing itfelf by idly wandering about 
without it, but flri&ly limiting itfelf and in its highelt 
ufe, Steadily refting upon its boundary, namely, upon the 
relation which it has itfelf eftablifhed between what lies 
without the field of knowledge, and that which is con¬ 
tained within it. 
Thus, the pofition which is the re Suit of the whole 
“ Critic,” is eftablifhed ; namely, “ that Reafon, by all 
its principles a priori, informs us of nothing more than 
merely objects of poflible experience, and even of thefe 
no more than can be known by experience itfelf; but 
this limitation does not prevent Reafon from lending us 
to the boundary of experience, namely, the reference to 
that, which, though not itfelf an objeft of experience, 
is yet the ground of all experience. 
Thus we have clearly exhibited Metaphyfics, according 
to their fubjedtive poflibility, as they really arife out of 
the natural conftitution of human Reafon, and confif- 
tently with the effential objedt of their cultivation. As 
however, we have feen, that a natural and undifeiplined 
Metaphyfics entangles itfelf in tranfeendent and dialectical 
conclufions, which are either illufory or contradidtory ; 
and, as thefe reafonings do not aid the progrefs of natural 
Philqfophy, nay, are even prejudicial to it, it becomes a 
queftion of great importance, for what good purpofe 
nature can have planted in human Reafon the germ of 
thefe tranfeendent Conceptions, fince every thing that lies in 
nature muft originally have been placed there for fome 
good end. 
Such an inveftigation is indeed dangerous ; and I con- 
fefs that what I have to fay about it is like every thing 
that concerns the firft purpofes of Nature, mere fuppofi- 
tjon. In this cafe, however, it may be allowed, fince the 
queftion does not concern the validity of the metaphy- 
fical judgments themfelves, but merely the intention of 
nature in giving occalion to them ; and therefore lies 
without the fyftem of Metaphysics, in Anthropology, 
When I coniider the Tranfcendental Ideas which urge 
the pure but uninftrudted Reafon to forfake the mere 
contemplation of nature ; to afeend beyond all poflible 
experience, and by 1'uch efforts to bring about the thing- 
called Metaphyfics, whether it be Knowledge or Reafon- 
ing; I think I perceive at once, that this gift of Nature 
is intended to free our conceptions from the fetters of 
experience, and from the limits of the mere contem¬ 
plation of nature, fince it is evident that thefe Ideas lay 
open at leaft the profpedt of a field that contains objedts 
or pure underftanding, to which Sense never can attain ; 
not indeed that Nature intends to employ us in fpecu- 
lations upon thefe objects, fince we have no firm ground 
tb ftand upon, but in order that practical principles may 
have a field for hope and expedlation open before them, 
without which they might not be able to extend them- 
fclves to that unirerfality which reafon in a moral view re¬ 
quires them to poilefts. • 
Thus the Psychological Idea, however little it may 
inform me of the nature of the human foul, which is 
elevated above all conceptions of experience, (hows at 
leaft clearly enough the infufiiciency of experience, and 
leads me off from Matcriulifn as from a pfychological 
conception unfit for any explanation of nature, and 
which at the fame time narrows Reafon in a practical 
view. In like manner the Cgsmological Ideas, by 
(flowing that the knowledge of nature is infufiicient for 
the fatisfadtion of reafon in its lawful enquiries, ferve to 
iecure us from Naturu/ijhi, which gives out nature as 
felf-fufficient. Finally, as the neceffity of nature in the 
fenfible world is always conditioned, and prefuppofes the 
dependence of things upon others, and as an uncondi¬ 
tioned neceffity can only be looked for in a (ingle Cause 
diftiqdt from the fenfibie world, Reafon frees itfelf, by 
means of the Theological Idea, from FataliJm, that 
is, from a blind neceffity, either in nature without a firft 
principle, or in this principle itfelf; and therefore con¬ 
ceives a Cauj'e that is free, consequently.a highc/i Intel¬ 
ligence. Thus the Transcendental Ideas, though 
they give us no pojitivc knowledge, yet ferve completely 
to annihilate the bold afl'ertions of Materialifm, Natu¬ 
ral! jin, and FataliJm, which tend to narrow the field of 
Reafon, and thereby procure a/pace for the Moral Ideas, 
without trefpafling upon the dangerous ground of Spe¬ 
culation; and this, I fliould think, explains in fome mea- 
fure the defign of Nature in the gift of Reafon. 
Fourth and laft Tranfcendental Queftion. 
llow arc Metuphyfics, as a Science, pofible? 
Metaphysics, as a gift of Nature, are found in eveiy 
human mind; but we have feen that, fo long as they 
remain in a ftate of nature, they are dialedtical and de¬ 
ceitful. Principles, therefore, derived from this merely- 
natural fource, and entangled in this illufion, can ne¬ 
ver produce a Science, but only a vain dtaleflical Art; 
in which one fchool may indeed excel another for a 
time, but can never hope to attain a permanent efta- 
bliflnnent. 
Now, in order that Metaphyfics may no longer be con- 
fidered as a mere fyftem of plaufible opinions, but main¬ 
tain its rank as a fciencc, polfeffing JcIf-evident truth, and 
carrying with it unvarying convidlion, a Critic of Rea¬ 
son itfelf muft lay the foundation of it by Conceptions 
d priori, feparating them according to their different 
fources, Sense, Understanding, and Reason. It muft 
prefen t a Complete Table, and an Analyfis of thefe Con¬ 
ceptions, together with ail that can be inferred from 
them ; and, above all, it muft eftablifti by their deduction 
the poflibility of Synthetical Knowledge d priori. It muft 
fix the principles and the boundary of their ufe. All this 
the “ Critic” muft furnifli in a complete fyftem. It fol¬ 
lows then that the Critic, and it alone, comprifes the 
whole well-examined and well-attefted plan, pointing out 
at the fame time all the means for its execution, accord¬ 
ing to which Metaphysics as,aJ'cience can be produced: 
by any other means they are utterly impracticable. 
The queition, therefore, is not now how this Science is • 
poflible, but merely how it is to be brought into ufe, and 
how men of talents are to be induced to profit by its dif- 
covery, and to unite their efforts for its advancement,. 
Thus much is certain, that whoever has once tailed the 
“ Critic” loaths for ever all the dogmatical trafh which 
he only endured before from neceffity, becaufe his Rea¬ 
fon flood in need of fomething, and could find no better 
entertainment. The “ Critic” Hands in the fame rela¬ 
tion to the Metaphyfics of the fchools, as Chemiftry to 
Alchemy, or Aftronomy to prognofticating Aftroiogy. I 
will anfwer for it, that whoever has once penetrated and 
comprehended the principles of the “Critic,” though 
no farther than they are exhibited in thefe Prolegomena, 
will never return to the old fophifticated fcience of illu- 
fions; he will rather look forward with confidence and 
with delight to the Metaphysics which are now moft cer¬ 
tainly in his power; which admit of no further difeoveries, 
and which alone can procure lafting fatisfadion to Reason. 
For this preference Metaphysics may confidently claim, 
above all other poflible fciences,' that it can be brought 
to abfvlute eompletenefs and into a permanent Jiate. For 
Reafon muft difeover the fources and the nature of its 
own knowledge; and, when it has reprefented in a deter¬ 
minate manner the fundamental laws of its own powers, 
nothing more remains that it can know -a priori. The 
certain profpedt of a knowledge l'o determined and con- 
clufive carries with it a peculiar charm, even independ¬ 
ently of all advantage that may accrue from it. 
All falfe Art, all vain Wifdom, lafts its time, far at 
length it de/lroys itfelf; and the point of its higheft cul¬ 
tivation is at the lame time the moment of its deltmction. 
That this period is now arrived with relpedt to Meta¬ 
physics, is proved by the ftate of decay into which they 
have fallen among all enlightened nations, notwithstand¬ 
ing.the zeal with which all other fciences are cultivated. 
The whole arrangement of the courfie of academical ftu- 
2 dies 
