240 
METAPHYSICS. 
under another. Therefore there are no other concluding 
alts but the Categorical, Hypothetical, and Dis¬ 
junctive. 
4. Reafon arranges the Categories of Quantity one 
under another, thus: Unity under Multitude, and thefe 
under Totality; and thereby produces the Idea of Abfolute 
Totality. 
Proof. —Every thing connected by the underllanding 
is ItriCtly limited. But we really have the Idea of fome- 
thing which goes far beyond the limited things of Na¬ 
ture ; and the only way in which this Idea is obtained 
is by a Conclufion of Reafon; for it is evident that the 
Categories Unity, Multitude, and Totality, are themfelves 
unconditioned things, and that, being connected into a 
Unity by Reafon, this unity mult alfo be abfolute or un¬ 
conditioned. Thus Realon will have abfolute com- 
pletenefs; and, when this mode of aCtion is applied to 
the other Categories, the following Ideas refult. 
5. Reafon conneCts the Categories of Quality ; which 
are Reality, Negation, and Limitation, into the Idea of 
Absolute Limitation. 
Proof.— For every reality in Time and Space is limited 
by negations. It is a variety whofe parts can be meafured 
by Degrees only, and thefe by other degrees Hill fmaller; 
and this without end. But Reafon will have abfolute 
completenefs, and thus forms the Idea of Absolute Li¬ 
mitation. 
6. Reafon conneCts the Categories ^Relation, which 
are each of them already compound notions into the fol¬ 
lowing Ideas. 
Firft, Sub/lance and Accident into the Idea of Abso¬ 
lute Substance. 
Proof. —For all the Subftances in the world are no¬ 
thing more than a collection of properties exilling in 
Time and Space ; and every Analyfis of thefe fubftances 
only produces another fet of properties without end ; but 
Reafon, which adts free from Time and Space, and will 
have abfolute completenefs from the Category of Sub/lance 
and Accident, raifes the Idea of an Absolute Sub¬ 
stance, which can never again become a predicate of 
any other fubftance. 
Secondly, CauJ'c and Effcdt into the Idea of an Abso¬ 
lute Cause. 
Proof.' —For all Caufes in Time and Space are nothing 
more than EffeCts from preceding caufes, and thefe caufes 
are again effedts of other caufes ad infinitum. But Rea¬ 
fon, which will have abfolute completenefs in a feries of 
Caufes and Effeils, raifes to itfelf an Idea of an Absolute 
Cause which cannot be the Effedt of any other Caufe. 
Thirdly, Attion and Re-adion into the Idea of Abso¬ 
lute Concurrence. 
Proof. —For all the fubftances in the world are en¬ 
dowed with caufes which work upon other fubftances, 
and thus mutually determine each other’s place in fpace. 
All thefe fubftances are themfelves only effedts of other 
fubftances, and l'o on ad infinitum. But Reafon, which 
adts free from Time and Space, will have an abfolutely- 
complete feries of Caufes and Effedts, and thus raifes the 
Idea of Absolute Concurrence. 
Remark. —The molt important notions that concern 
ns as accountable beings, depend entirely upon this pe¬ 
culiar faculty of Reafon in railing thefe Ideas. For how 
otherwife could we obtain the Idea of our own Soul, a 
firfi Caufe, or the Deity ? and without thefe notions we 
lliould not differ from the brute creation, and mult for 
ever give up our claim tp the rank of rational beings. 
It may further be remarked, that the fciences of Psy¬ 
chology, Cosmology, and Theology, have their roots 
in thefe important Ideas of Realon. For the Idea of ab¬ 
folute fubftance leads to Pfychology, the Idea of a firft 
Caufe leads to Colinology, and the Idea of an abfolute 
mutual concurrence leads to the fcience of Theology. 
7. Reafon connedts the Categories (^Modality, which 
are Pofibility, Exifience, and Necefity , into the Idea of 
Absolute Necessity. 
Proof. —For in Time every change is determined by a 
preceding change, and confequently there is no abfolute 
neceffity. But Reafon, which adts free from Time, forms 
an Idea of fomething which does not depend on a pre¬ 
ceding change, and which is exempt from the conditions 
of Time ; that is, an Idea of Absolute Necessity. 
Conclufion. —Thus we have Ihown that Reason, or the 
liighrfi degree of Spontaneity, is an Adtive Faculty of fo 
pure a nature as to be able to connedt parts which are 
already out of Time and Space into wholes called Ideas. 
For what are the Categories of Underllanding, but parts 
of this defeription ? On thefe Ideas is founded the er¬ 
roneous notion, that we can know immaterial exiftences; 
whereas we can only have Ideas of them. Hence Rea¬ 
son, or the third degree of Spontaneity, is the power «f 
forming Ideas. 
It is evident that thefe Ideas of Reason are not de¬ 
rived from Experience; for the furrounding world can 
offer no lhadow of any thing to what they can in any way 
refer; they are therefore a priori, and fpring entirely 
from Pure Reafon. But thefe Ideas can give us no know¬ 
ledge of any objedt whatever; for, in order to know a 
thing, we mull be able to inftance a particular intuition, 
and place it under a determinate conception of Under- 
ftanding. Reafon has no intuitive faculty, for that be¬ 
longs to the department of Senfe. But, though we can¬ 
not by means of thefe Ideas obtain the knowledge of 
any objedt, yet they are indifpenfably neceffary to bring 
the knowledge we have acquired into fyftematic order, 
and to affift us in forming the belt plans for enquiring 
into furrounding nature. 
It mull now be obvious that thefe Ideas are merely of 
a Regulative Use ; for without them we lliould be 
loft in a crowd of particulars, whereas all our knowledge 
by means of them is brought into the greateft fyftematic 
unity. But this is by no means their greateft merit; for, 
from the difeoveries revealed to us by this fublime Phi- 
lofophy, we are enabled to trace the molt complete di- 
vifion of Reafon into Theoretical and Practical. 
The former, as we have already explained, conftantly 
ftrives to produce the greateft unity in our knowledge 
by collecting it under a few heads which it fuggefts, and 
which are the Six Ideas of Reafon ; while the latter never 
ceafes to procure the greatelt unity among our defires. 
It is indeed upon Practical Reason that true Religion 
and Morality are engrafted. The belief in God, the im¬ 
mortality of the Soul, and a future ftate, are here fecured 
to the rational being in the molt fatisfaCtory and conclu- 
five manner. But we mult not enlarge here on thefe 
important points, but beg to refer the Reader to the Ar¬ 
ticle Moral Philosophy, where thefe fubjeCts will be 
treated more at large. 
It is to be hoped that the preceding concife explana¬ 
tion of the Elements of Metapkyfics will have the effect to 
prove that they are neither redundant nor deficient. 
Nothing can be more evident than that hitherto Meta- 
phyfics could not in the leaft pretend to be a Science; 
for they had no principles upon which they could in any 
manner rely ; they confequently became mere fpeculation, 
and were fait falling into defer ved difrepu te. But may we not 
now predict their regeneration under the aufpices of the 
Britilh nation, which has already diftinguilhed itfelf fo 
eminently in this department of Science ? May we not 
confidently hope to fee them form an effential part of the 
education of our Youth, as the fciences of Geometry and 
Aftronomy do at prefent; and thus free the mind from 
the dark clouds of Superftition, Atheifm, and Scepticifm, 
which have fo long held their baneful influence over us ? 
Happy, thrice happy, does the writer elteem himfelf to 
exilt at a period of tne world when the brilliant lights of 
pure fcience break in upon the mind, and dilpel the 
gloomy forebodings of untutored ignorance. Filled with 
the molt enthufiaftic defire for the fuccefs of true Meta- 
phyfics, he configns this new Science to the protection of 
an enlightened Public.— T. W. Od. 5, x8i6. 
