292 M E X 
and as he had not yet received the reinforcement which 
he expedled from Hifpaniola, he was not in a condition 
to turn his arms dire&ly againft the capital. To have 
attacked a city fo populous, fo well prepared for defence, 
and in a fituation of luch peculiar flrength, mull have ex- 
pofed his troops to inevitable deftrudlion. Three months 
elapfed before the materials for conftru&ing the brigan¬ 
tines were finifhed, and before he heard any thing with 
refpeft to the luccefs of his negociation in Hifpaniola. 
This, however, was not a fieafon of inadlion to Cortes. 
He attacked fucceiTively feveral of the towns lituated 
around the lake; and, though all the Mexican power 
was exerted to obftrudt his operations, he either com¬ 
pelled them to fubmit to the Spanilh crown, or reduced 
them to ruins. Other towns he endeavoured to conci¬ 
liate by more gentle means; and, though he could not 
hold any intercourfe with the inhabitants but by the in¬ 
tervention of interpreters, yet, under all the difadvan- 
tages of that tedious and imperfect mode of communica¬ 
tion, he had acquired fuch thorough knowledge of the 
ftate of the country, as well as of the difpoiitions of the 
people, that he conduced his negociations and intrigues 
with aftonifhing dexterity and fuccefs. Moll of the cities 
adjacent to Mexico were originally the capitals of fmall 
independent Hates ; and fome of them, having been but 
lately annexed to the Mexican empire, Hill retained the 
remembrance of their ancient liberty, and bore with im¬ 
patience the rigorous yoke of their new' mailers. Cortes, 
having early obferved fymptoms of their difaffedlion, 
availed himfelf of this knowledge to gain their confi¬ 
dence and friendlhip. By hypocritically offering to de¬ 
liver them from the odious dominion of the Mexicans, 
and by liberal promiles of more indulgent treatment if 
they w'ould unite with him againft their oppreflors, he 
prevailed on the people of feveral confiderable dillridts, 
not only to acknowledge the king of Caftile as their fove- 
reign, but to fupply the Spanilh camp with provilions, 
and to ftrengthen his army with auxiliary troops. Gua¬ 
timozin, on the firft appearance of defection among his 
fubjefts, exerted himfelf with vigour to prevent or to 
punilli their revolt; but, in finite of his efforts, the fpirit 
continued to fipread. The Spaniards gradually acquired 
new allies ; and with deep concern he beheld Cortes arm¬ 
ing againft his empire thole very hands which ought to 
have been a£tive in his defence, and ready to advance 
againft the capital at the head of a numerous body of his 
own fubjedts. 
While, by thefe various methods, Cortes was gradually 
circumfcribing the Mexican power within fiuch narrow 
limits that his profpeCc of overturning it feemed neither 
to be uncertain nor remote, all his fchemes were well 
nigh defeated by a confpiracy againft his own perfon, and 
which was difcovered only a Ihort time before it w'as 
to have been executed.. Though many w'ere concerned, 
Cortes did not think proper to punilh any more than the 
principal ringleader, whom he caufied immediately to be 
hanged : and then, without allowing them leifiure to ru¬ 
minate on what had happened, and as the moll effectual 
means of preventing the return of a mutinous fpirit, he 
determined to call forth his troops immediately into 
adlion. Fortunately a proper occafion for this occurred, 
without his feeming to court it. He received intelligence, 
that the materials for building the brigantines were at 
length completely finilhed, and waited only for a body of 
Spaniards to conduct them to Tezcuco. The command 
of this convoy, confifting of two hundred, foot-fioidiers, 
fifteen horfemen, and two field-pieces, he gave to San¬ 
doval, who by the vigilance, activity, and courage, which 
he manifefted on every occafion, was grovring daily in his 
confidence, and in the eftimation of his fellow-ioldiers. 
•The Tlafcalans furnillied 8000 tamenes, an inferior order 
of men deftined for fervile talks, to carry the materials 
on their fhoulders, and appointed 15,000 warriors to ac¬ 
company and defend them. Sandoval made the difpofi- 
tipn for their progrefs with great propriety, placing the 
I c o. 
tamenes in the centre, one body of warriors in the front, 
another in the rear, with confiderable parties to cover th* 
flanks. To each of thefe he joined fome Spaniards, not 
only to aflill them in danger, but to accullom them to 
regularity and fubordination. Parties of Mexicans fre¬ 
quently appeared hovering around them on the high 
grounds: but, perceiving no profpedl of fuccefs in at¬ 
tacking an enemy continually on his guard, they did not 
venture to moleft him; and Sandoval had the glory of 
condudling fafely to Tezcuco a convoy on which all the 
future operations of his countrymen depended. 
Cortes determined to attack the city from three diffe¬ 
rent quarters ; from Tezcuco on the eaft fide of the lake, 
fromTacuba on the weft, and fromCuayocan towards the 
fouth. Thole towns were lituated on the principal caufe- 
ways which led to the capita], and intended for their 
defence. I-Ie appointed Sandoval to command in the 
firft, Pedro de Alvarado in the fecond, and Chriftoval de 
Olid in the third; allotting to each a numerous body of 
Indian auxiliaries, together with an equal divifion of 
Spaniards, who, by the junftion of the troops from Hif¬ 
paniola, amounted to 86 horfemen, and 818 foot-folaiers; 
of whom 118 were armed with mulkets or crofs-bows. 
Their train of artillery confifted of three battering can¬ 
non, and fifteen field-pieces. He referved for himfelf, as 
the ftation of the greateft importance and danger, the 
conduft of the brigantines, each armed with one of his 
fmall cannon, and manned with twenty-five Spaniards. 
As Alvarado and Olid proceeded towards the polls af- 
figned them, they broke down the aquedudls which the 
ingenuity of the Mexicans had eretted for conveying 
water into the capital; and, by the dillrefs to which this 
reduced the inhabitants, gave a beginning to the calami¬ 
ties which they were deftined to fufter. Alvarado and 
Olid found the towns, of which they were ordered to 
take poffeffion, deferted by their inhabitants, who had 
fled for fafety to the capital, where Guatimozin had col¬ 
lected the chief force of his empire, as there alone he 
could hope to make a fuccefsful Hand againft the formi¬ 
dable enemies who were approaching to affault him. 
The firft effort of the Mexicans was to deftroy the fleet 
of brigantines, the fatal effefts of whole operations they 
forefaw and dreaded. Though the brigantines, after all 
the labour and merit of Cortes in forming them, were 
of inconfiderable bulk, rudely conltrufted, and manned 
chiefly with landmen, hardly polfelfed of Ikill enough to 
conduft them, they mull have been objeCts of terror to 
a people unacquainted with any navigation but that of 
their lake, and pofleffed of no veffel larger than a canoe. 
Neceflity, however, urged Guatimozin to hazard the at¬ 
tack; and, hoping to fupply by numbers what he wanted 
in force, he affembled fuch a multitude of canoes as co¬ 
vered the face of the lake. They rowed on boldly to the 
charge, while the brigantines, retarded by a dead calm, 
could fcarce.ly advance to meet them. But, as the enemy 
drew near, a breeze fuddenly lprang up ; in a moment 
the fails were fipread, and the brigantines with irrefiftible 
impetuofity broke their feeble opponents, overfet many 
canoes, and diflipated the whole armament with fuch 
daughter, as convinced the Mexicans, that the progrefs 
of the Europeans in knowledge and arts rendered their 
fiuperiority greater on this new element than they had 
hitherto found it by land. 
From that time Cortes remained mailer of the lake; 
and the brigantines not only preferved a communication 
between the Spaniards in their different ftations, though 
at a confiderable diltance from each other; but were em¬ 
ployed to cover the caufeways on each lide, and keep off 
the canoes, when they attempted to annoy the troops as 
they advanced towards the city. He formed the brigan¬ 
tines in three divifions, allotting one to each ftation, with 
orders to fecond the operations of the officer who com¬ 
manded there. From all the three ftations he pulhed on 
the attack againft the city with equal vigour; but in a 
manner fo very different from that by which lieges are 
conducted 
