MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
764 
evident that each is individually bound to obedience; 
and the Judgment in any particular cafe, whether we 
have obeyed the law, or not, is left to our own Con¬ 
science. Confcience is indeed an internal Judge, ever 
vigilant, who watches all our aftions, decides what is 
conformable to duty, and what contrary to duty. 
There would be no difficulty in man’s fulfilling the 
Moral Laws were lie merely homo noumenon, or a pure 
rational Being whofe ultimate end is Virtue. But he is 
alfo homo phenomenon, or a being of Nature, formed with 
particular inftinfts and defires, which all centre in Hap¬ 
piness. Now, in order to fulfil our two natures, a ftrug- 
gle arifes between virtue and happinefs. Neither of thefe 
important ends is to be crufhed by the other, fince this 
would defeat the plan originally laid in our nature; 
and which entirely confifts in this ftruggle: the worth 
of a man is evinced folely by his ftrength of mind to 
overcome the allurements to pleafure that militate againfl 
his obedience to the moral law. The more the delire of 
Happinefs tempts man to difobey the Moral Law, if he 
Hill obeys it and attends to the Voice of Reafon, the more 
confpicuous it is that he afts from a principle of Virtue, 
and the greater is his viftory in the ftruggle. The con- 
lcioufnefs of having afted from duty alone, is accom¬ 
panied by a Jenliment that may properly be termed a moral 
feeling. It may eafily be diftinguilhed from every fen- 
ftual pleafure, fince the latter always precedes the aftion; 
but the moral Jentiment waits until the aftion is performed, 
and that ltriftly for the fake of Duty, before it manifefts 
jitfelf in approbation of our conduct. It would be abl'urd 
to pretend that a virtuous conduct is influenced by this 
moral pleafure, fince it can only arife after the perform¬ 
ance of the aft. On the other hand, it is true that the 
purfuit of fenfual enjoyment is wholly aftuated by the 
anticipation of the pleafure we have in view. Were this 
the cafe with Virtue, it would ceafe to be difinterejled, 
and would no longer be virtue. 
The two conceptions of Virtue and Happinefs are not 
fubordinate conceptions, as the ancients conceived ; fo 
that, by inveftigating the inferior, we might arrive at the 
fuperior. Such an analyfts would here never accomplifh 
the defired end. The truth is, that they are co-ordinate 
conceptions, and neither of them is contained in the other; 
yet their combination produces a third and higher con¬ 
ception, which may be called the highest good, accord¬ 
ing to the right ule of reafon, which fays, that Virtue 
merits a proportionate happiness. 
Suppole for a moment that Happinefs were to take the 
lead in this arrangement of the Conceptions, according 
to the plan of Epicurus ; it is evident that a fibjedive 
end would be fubftituted for an objeftive one, and that 
Vi rtue would be entirely deftroyed, which would defeat 
the ultimate objeft of our nature, by the perverfion of 
the higheft good; nay, by the deftruftion of one of its 
elements. But, reftore the rational order of thefe con¬ 
ceptions, and make Happinefs fubjeft to Virtue, and 
Virtue to be the Cause of Happiness; then indeed 
do the predifpofitions of our nature ftand in harmony 
with each other, and a fublime and celeftial view of our 
rational conltitution preients itfelf fo forcibly, that we 
cannot contemplate the Author of fuch an arrangement 
with fufficient awe and reverence. 
Practical Reason here afts in a diftatprial manner. 
It abfolutely orders the performance of certain aftions, 
without regarding what effeft they may have upon our 
happinefs. This- procedure of Reafon may well be 
termed Imjycrative, and with great propriety a Cate¬ 
gorical Imperative, being its chief law, an abfolute 
commandment. It fhys, “ Be ftricily virtuous, whatever 
may be the confequence /” That .we poflefs the power 
to obey this commandment, is proved by an appeal to 
cur confcioufnefs. Hiftory teems with inftances of 
p.erfecuted individuals who have expired under, the 
torture of the rack rather than facrifice their veracity. 
This proves molt decidedly that man not only poflelles 
i 
the power to obey the commands of Reafon, but that 
all the powers of nature, even though concentrated 
in the hands of fcience, utterly fail when they are at¬ 
tempted to be ufed in violation of the freedom of Rea¬ 
fon, or of that part of man which is no phenomenon, but 
an abfolute end in itfelf, or noumenon, out of Time and 
Space. Hence all moral aftions mull be confidered as 
immediately commanded by Reafon. 
That we Ihould gain Happinefs in the fame degree that 
we have rendered ourfelves worthy of it, is the ultimate 
end of Practical Reason. But, though this polition 
is regularly deduced from an Analyfis of our Praftical 
Reafon, it does not follow that this perfeft harmony of 
Happinefs and Virtue (hould take place in this life. Ex¬ 
perience too often exhibits inftances of Virtuous men 
under great fufferings, and Wicked men furrounded by 
luxuries and all that contributes to earthly blifs. But 
does reafon approve of this accidental concurrence of 
of circumftances ? certainly not. Reafon is never in- 
confiftent: it looks upon mankind, therefore, as placed 
herein a probationar)^ ftate; andalfuresusthat the ultimate 
views of the Deity which it opens to our view will cer¬ 
tainly be accompliffied. It allures us that what does 
not appear confiftent with a moral arrangement in our 
prefent contrafted view of things, will be Ihown to be fo 
hereafter to our entire fatisfaftion, and to the Glory of 
our Almighty Maker. Nay, thele accidental circum¬ 
ftances, fo far from diminilhing our Virtue, afford more 
opportunity for its exercife, and ought to induce us to 
brave the vicillitudes of life, and exert a greater portion 
of Moral Strength. Thus we may aftually become more 
virtuous than if we had not been placed in thele circum¬ 
ftances ; and by this exercife be led to love virtue for 
its own fake, and fo to fulfil the ultimate defign of 
Reafon. 
I know not how to render a more cfiential fervice to 
the ftudy of this divine Science, than by prefenting to the 
reader the inimitable exhortation of Profefior Snell in his 
popular Afcetics. 
“ The gifts and faculties requifite to virtue are im¬ 
parted to every individual, without his own interference 
or exertion ; but Virtue itfelf, the exertion of a good 
Will, depends upon Liberty, and is therefore man’s 
own work: for much induftry, much labour, and a con- 
feientious ufe of the means of Virtue, are required, in 
order that it may become the predominating Sentiment 
in the mind. 
“ He who afpires to true virtue mull never perfuade 
himfelf that he does enough, in endeavouring to obey 
the precepts of a refined Self-Love, which prudently 
and nicely calculates his permanent advantage; and in 
freeing himfelf, by a fenfe of honour, and other natural 
good feelings and inclinations, from the coarleneis of 
fenfuality and the more ignoble felfilhnefs, he mull 
awaken the better and more elevated powers of the mind, 
which tend to a Rational Self-Love. This prudence 
is indeed good; nay, it is highly necefiary, were it only 
to weaken the reiiftance which the too-powerful incli¬ 
nations and defires of a grofs fenfuality oppofe to virtue. 
It prepares and facilitates the true moral improvement. 
This is, however, but the firft Hep in the path to our 
fublime deftination, which lies far beyond the limits of 
the fenfible world. 
“ Man, thou who wifheft to approach continually to 
this laft and higheft aim of thy exiftence, let the thought 
be ever prefent to thee, that thou doll not live in this world 
for fenfual enjoyment, but to govern all thy fenfible de- 
frts by reafon, and thus to increafe thy moral well-being. 
Preferve within thee a lively confcioufnefs of thy own 
dignity as a rational being, a ftrong fenfe of the facred- 
nefs of the moral law, and of the high obligation 
which it impofes upon thee. Endeavour to ftrengthen 
within thy foul the conviftion of the eflential and eternal 
difference between good and evil: to clear up thy moral 
Ideas; to render thy duties more diftinft and precife ; to 
exercife 
