M O R A L P III L OSOPHY, 
767 
Infinite by Speculative Reafon, they ftill depend upon 
'feeling. When they are determined by Practical Reafon, 
they depend upon univerfal laws. Their objects in the 
former cafe are material; that which is recommended to 
us by practical laws, independently of all fenfible im- 
pulfe, and which every man mull acknowledge it his 
Duty to perform, is formal. 
I. The Idea of Abfolute Totality produces a Delire for 
Perfect Univerfality; it declares that the principles of 
conduit ought to be the lame among all rational beings, 
and to be applicable to all the circumltances of life. 
II. The Idea of Abfolute Limitation produces a Delire 
for Perfect Difintereftednefs. This Idea elevates our views 
far above the things of this world, and teaches us to 
adt independently of external objedts and of the feelings 
they produce. 
III. The Ideas of Abfolute Subltance, Caufe, and Con¬ 
currence, produce a Delire for unalterablenefs, for Jelf- 
udivity, and for a peifedt moral world. 
IV. The Idea of Abfolute Necellity conftitutes thefe 
principles objeitive laws of liberty, which fay what ought 
to happen, though perhaps it never does happen. The 
laws of Morality are therefore Categorical Impera¬ 
tives, that is, direil commands of Reafon. 
Pure Practical Reason neceffarily excludes from 
its fphere all defires that have not this Reafon itfelf for 
their objeit. For, were it to recommend any objeit dif- 
tinil from itfelf, it muft derive its knowledge of it from 
experience; but experience only extends to a limited 
number of cafes, and never affords ftriil univerfality and 
necefity, which the moral laws require. The Human 
Will is thus determinable by Practical Principles, 
which are independent of experience ; it is therefore 
free. But in every Practical Principle, as applied to 
■ real adtions, we diltinguilh two things; matter and form. 
The matter is the objedt of the will; the form is the 
mode in which we will, or the reafonablenefs of the vo¬ 
lition, that is, the manner in which reafon ftrives to 
conned! a variety of human adtions fo as to produce a 
rational whole. But as Pure Pradlical Reafon excludes 
all matter, that is, all objedls of the Will diftindt from 
Reafon, as thefe would deftroy univerfality and necefity; 
nothing remains but the form or mode in which reafon 
adts in producing a Pradlical Principle. 
Man, then, arrives at the Knowledge of the moral 
Laws only through the conlcioufnefs of the operations 
of his own Reafon. Let him but put this queftion to 
himfelf; Is the principle of my conduit fuck as ought to he 
a univerfal law for all mankind? and he will not find him¬ 
felf at a lofs for an anfwer. Thus, though the pradtice 
of lying may be attempted to be defended, on account of 
the general torrent of moral corruption, as unavoidable; 
yet no man can feri<*nlly recommend it as a univerfal 
law of condudl. On the other hand, we acknowledge the 
law of our Pradlical Reafon, w'hich tells us with a loud 
voice that we ought not to lie upon any pretence what¬ 
ever, but to be ftridtly virtuous under all circumftances. 
It muft be obvious to every one, that a Law, in order to 
be morally valid, that is, to be the ground of an obliga¬ 
tion, muft carry with it abfolute necefity; and that the 
commandment, “ Thou fhalt not lie,” is not valid for 
man alone, but for all rational beings. 
All imperatives command either Hypothetically or 
Categorically. Every pradlical law reprefents a pof- 
fible adlion as good, and therefore as neceflary. When the 
adtion is only good as a means to obtain j'omething elfe, 
the imperative is hypothetical, and carries no moral obli¬ 
gation with it. But on the other hand, if the adlion be 
good in itfelf, the imperative which commands it is 
founded upon Reafon alone, and can have no other end 
in view but that of realizing the mode in which reafon alts. 
It is univerfal and neceftitory; it is therefore properly 
termed a CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, fince it 
impofes an obligation upon all Reafonable beings; and 
ehus alone VIRTUE IS POSSIBLE. 
What a fublime view’ does this analyfis of our Rational 
Faculty offer to Man ! It feparates him from the pheno¬ 
mena of nature, while his foul alone is the objedt of his 
contemplation ; and makes him deeply fenfible that, even 
at thisprefent moment of his exiftence, he is out of Time and 
Space, and aSlualhj a member of the Moral World. Here 
indeed are Laws conveyed from God to man through a 
channel fo pure,, and in a language fo univerfal and°in- 
telhgible, that they can never be confounded with the 
deceitful inventions of men. All difficulty, therefore, of 
acknowledging thefe Laws, and their divine origin, is 
now convincingly removed. 
I have great fatisfadlion in prefenting to the rea¬ 
der the fpirit of Kant’s Critic of Pradlical Reafon; as 
I am perfuaded that, although he may not have pene¬ 
trated fo far into Tranfcendental Philofophy as to follow 
all the dedudlions which flow in a regular manner from 
that fublime fyftem, he will undoubtedly agree to its re- 
fults, which harmonize fo perfedlly with the found Reafon 
even of the commoneft individual. Here then we have, 
at length, a System of Morals, for ever fecured from 
all fophiftical attacks, and perfedlly eftablifhed in its 
elementary principles. It requires now only to be ex¬ 
plained and developed in its minuter parts, in order to 
render it univerfally comprehenfible, and effedlually con¬ 
ducive to the great aim of human exiftence. 
68, St. James's-ftreet, ~ 
July 1 9 , 1817. Thomas Wirgman. 
CRITIC of PRACTICAL REASON. 
Preliminary Remarks. 
Transcendental Philosophy proves, as has already 
been fhown in the article Metaphysics, (p. 198.) that, 
by abftradting from Experience all its empirical part, we - 
difeover its conditions a priori. The empirical part of ex¬ 
perience is its matter, and the conditions a priori confti- 
tute its form. Let us now proceed to analyfe the Will 
in a fimilar manner. If I will an objedt, I become imme¬ 
diately confcious of the reprefentation connedted with 
this adt of the will. The reprefentation of the pleafure 
which the poffeffion of the objedt might give me is the 
empirical part of the will, and conftitutes its matter. By 
abftradting from this we obtain the reprefentation of a 
Pure Will, which muft be confidered as the condition 
of every empirical Will. If we deftroy in thought all 
that is empirical, and ftill imagine a Will completely 
determined to perform an adlion ; nothing remains but 
Reafon itfelf as the determinative of that Will. Thus 
arifes the Idea of a Practical Reason, that is, a Fa¬ 
culty to determine the Will without the impulfe of 
Senfc. A Critic of Practical Reason means nothing 
more than an inveftigation of this faculty : We fhall now 
proceed to this inveftigation. 
What is meant by a good Will, even the moll common 
perfon knows; and he proves that he knows it, by form¬ 
ing a juft eftimate of its worth, placing it above every 
thing elfe that is called good. Riches, Honours, nay 
even the powers of the mind, are only good when con¬ 
nedted with a good Will. Even adtions which accord 
with a good Will admit of the queftion whether they 
merely conform to it, or have fprung out of it. Thus the 
adt of educating and fupporting an orphan, though we 
perceive no immediate advantage accruing from it to the 
benefadtor, nay, though many privations are connedted 
with the adlion, awakens a lufpicion that fome diftant 
advantage which he has in view may have influenced him 3 
and this fufpicion greatly leflens, in our judgment, the 
worth of the adtion. But when all hopes of advantage 
are precluded, and we are certain that no motive extrinftc 
to the will itfelf is the caufe of the good adtion (which 
however 
