MORAL P H 
quently, I mult perform the action that leads to it. With 
regard to this Hypothetical Imperative, the Will contains 
both the end and the adtion; the demand of the will 
may therefore be comprehended analytically. Whereas 
the end of the adtion of the Categorical Imperative is 
not fubjedtive: for it requires me to perform an adtion 
■whole end is not exclufively mine. Confequently this 
end mult be objective ; that is, Pure Reafon itfelf mult 
acknowledge it as an end. We have to enquire, there¬ 
fore, 'What is that end which every rational being mull 
acknowledge as an end in itfelf? 
Every Rational being exifts as an end in himfelf, and 
mnjt therefore conftder himfelf, and all other rational beings, 
as his end. This pofition, here laid down as the ground 
of all moral judgment, contains the conception which 
connects the will with the deed in the fynthetieally prac¬ 
tical or Categorical Imperative. Here the will does not 
contain the end as in the hypothetical, but the objedive 
end contains the Will. This objedtive end is the hu¬ 
manity itfelf in all rational beings. Accordingly the 
Categorical Imperative may be thus exprefled: Ad Jo 
that thou ujijl the humanity in thy own perfon as well as in 
every other, not as means only, but always as an end. It is 
thus changed into an analyticalpojition, fince the objec¬ 
tive end (the humanity in every one’s perfon) implies 
indeed the demand for the adtion. In the Hypothetical 
Imperative, the demand for the adtion is contained in the 
Will for the objedt; whereas in the Categorical Impera¬ 
tive the demand is contained in the objective end. 
On this relts the diltindtion between perj'ons and things. 
Every rational being is a perfon, becaufe he exills as an 
end in himfelf: all irrational, beings, on the contrary, are 
things, becaufe they ferve only the ends of the indivi¬ 
dual. The latter, therefore, have merely a relative worth, 
fince their ufe is optional; Whereas the worth of a perfon 
is wiconditional. 
The polition, Man exists as an end in himself, 
does not mean, however, that the humanity may be con- 
fidered as fomething that we may or may not conftitute 
our end; for this were to make it a fubjedtive end; 
whereas it is objedtive, and mull conftitute the fupreme 
limiting condition of all fubjedtive ends. 
Plence arifes the Idea of a Kingdom of Ends, in which 
every rational being is a member, who conliders himfelf 
and every other rational being as an objedtive end. We 
muft here remark another circumltance relpedting the 
Categorical Imperative, The Will according to this Im¬ 
perative gives the law to itfelf, which it obeys; for the 
objedtive end is not one which becomes fuch by the re- 
prefentation of the objedt, and its influence upon the 
accidental difpoiition of the mind, (the way in which 
fubjedtive ends arife,) but it is an end before this repre- 
fentation, that is, a priori. The Will, which is nothing 
but Pradtical Reafon, muft therefore determine itfelf fub- 
jedtively to follow the law which it gives to itfelf. Herein 
confifcs the Dignity of Pradtical Reafon as well as of the 
moral Law. The Categorical Imperative is therefore a 
principle of autonomy; that, on the other hand, is a 
principle of heteronomy, according to which the will does 
not determine itfelf, but is externally determined. By 
the mere analyfis of the conception of morality, it may 
be fliown that its principle cannot be heteronomical, fince 
it would then be an hypothetical imperative : “ I do 
this becaufe I will fomething elj’e .” The moral impera¬ 
tive, on the contrary, fays, “ I muft adt thus, even though 
I fliould with fomething elfe.” It may eaiily be Ihown, 
that the Moral Imperative, and the Categorical Impera¬ 
tive, are the fame. Suppofe a Man, for inftance, to be 
fo opprefled by misfortunes, and fo weary of life, that 
he delires to put an end to it. If he is induced to refrain 
from this adt by any hypothetical imperative, he is not 
moral. But let us take away all hope of ameliorating 
his fituation; let us fuppofe his bufferings fo great as to 
overbalance the natural fear of death and all its confe- 
quences; in fhort, let us conceive him deprived of all in- 
Vol. XV. No. 1082. 
I LOS O P II Y. 769 
citement from hypothetical Imperatives; if, notwithftand- 
ing all this, he avoids the adt, then, and not till then, 
can the refolution to endure his painful exiftence be con- 
fidered moral. Since he does not in this cafe follow an 
Hypothetical Imperative, it is the Categorical alone 
by which he is governed. 
If any one is tempted to lie by fome profpedl of ad¬ 
vantage or apprehenfion of misfortune, and yet tells the 
Truth; we may Hill fuppofe that he was reftrained by the 
fear of being difeovered. If he avoids the lie from the 
apprehenfion that it may bring difgrace upon him, he 
follows merely an hypothetical Imperative, and pradtifes 
the moral law according to the letter indeed, but not 
according to the fpirit. Had he been able to free himfelf 
from this fear, he would have told the lie. But, if he Hill 
fpeak the truth, though uninfluenced by every external 
motive, then his veracity is evident; that is, the true 
moral determination to fpeak the truth becaufe it is 
duty, and not becaufe the lie is difgraceful. 
Suppofe a man zealous in the purfuit of knowledge, but 
urged by the hope of fame and immortality; though you 
admire his adtivity, you will not praife it highly becaufe 
you cannot aferibe it to a moral fource. But imagine one 
whom the conlcioufnefs of inferior talent does not allow 
the hope that he lhall ever become famous ; nay, who con¬ 
tinually feels the weaknefs of his powers, and the deficiency 
of his underftanding, rather than the pleafure which attends 
an eafy progrefs in knowledge; and who Hill perfeveres 
indefatigably; we lhall doubtlefs efteem the latter more 
than the former, fince the one obeys a Hypothetical Im¬ 
perative, but the other the Categorical Imperative. Even 
the fliare of our efteem which the former gains muft be 
aferibed to our fuppofing that the principle of morality 
at lead enlivens his zeal. 
Again, fuppofe a Man in the conftant pradtice of cha¬ 
rity and benevolence ; he will appear to us as morally 
good only while we do not difeover in him any peculiar 
tendernefs of difpoiition, which makes him fympathize 
in the bufferings of others ; indeed only while we do not 
fee any external motive for his goodnefs, but confider his 
adtions as a pure obedience to the Categorical Imperative. 
It appears from this Moral Judgment, which even the 
moll common reafon forms, that a Moral Imperative is 
not hypothetical; and that an adtion can never be called 
good which is performed in order to obtain a fubjedtive 
end. The Moral Imperative is therefore a pradtical pre¬ 
cept of pure reafon itfelf; which, confequently, every rea- 
fon muft acknowledge, and which commands us to adopt 
for ourfelves that maxim which is Jit for a univerjal law. 
The Categorical Imperative is always a fynthetical 
pradical pojition. And, although we have exhibited 
the Conception of the polfibility of the fynthefis of the 
will with the deed, that is, the conception of an objedtive 
end, which does not lie in the Will, but precedes it, and 
cannot therefore be fubordinate to other ends, but muft 
limit all ends, having an abjblutc worth in itfelf; yet this 
conception we have here only pojlulated, though it can be 
perfedtly juftified by the analyfis of the conceptions of 
morality. 
We have treated of the Conception of a Pure Will, and 
of the Categorical Imperative arifing from it, by which 
alone pure reafon can become pradtical, and have proved 
that the Law of Morality exhibits to every one the reality 
of the Categorical Imperative. A Critic of Pradtical 
Reafon is now necefl'ary, in order to difeover the ground 
of this Categorical Imperative, which exifts as a fad in 
every one’s confcioufnefs. We have indeed fliown, that 
the end of a Pure Will, that is, an objedive end, being 
prefuppofed, the law of Morality arifes from it analyti¬ 
cally. The queftion now is, how pure realon is capable 
of an objedtive end : this can only beanfwered by a Critic 
of Pradical Reajbn. 
The Critic of Pure Pradical Reajbn will be divided, 
like that of Pure Speculative Rcaj'on, into Elementary 
Dodtrine, and Dodtrine of Method.' The former will con- 
9 K fill. 
