MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
770 
lift, like that of Speculative Reafon, of an Analytic and 
a Dialectic ; but in the fubdivilion of the Analytic the or¬ 
der will be the reverie of that in Pure Speculative Reafon. 
The ground of this will be feen in the courfe of the work 
itfelf. 
Book I. 
ANALYTIC of PURE PRACTICAL REASON. 
Sedt. i. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reafon. 
Definition.— A Practical Principle is a pofition, which 
contains a univerfal determination of the Will, having 
other pradtical rules.under it. It is fubjedtive, ora maxim, 
when the condition is valid for the Will of an individual 
only; but objedtive, or a pradtical law, when it is valid 
for the Will of every rational being. 
Remark. —A determination of the will is a requilition 
that fomething lliall be done: a pradtical polition is a prin¬ 
ciple, when it applies to a whole clals of adtions, as 
“ Purfue thy own happinefs.” A principle, however, 
becomes a maxim to that individual who determines his 
will conformably to it. When the demand of the Will is 
merely fubjedtive, the principle is a maxim only, and not a 
law; but, when this demand cannot be derived from any 
fubjedtive end, the principle is objedtive, becaufe pure 
reafon itfelf eitabliflies it as a principle; audit is then 
called a practical law. If this law be conlidered in 
reference to a Will, that is alfo liable to fubjedtive grounds 
of determination which may prevent its being obeyed, it 
becomes an Imperative, that is, a rule which expreffes 
an ought, and indicates that, were it not for thefe lubjec- 
tive grounds, Reafon would not only determine the will 
(objectively), or make a demand upon it, but would ab- 
i'olutely govern it, (thatis, determine it alfo fubjedtively .) 
Every principle conlidered as a demand, is an imperative ; 
but every imperative is not a pradtical law'. Hypothe¬ 
tical Imperatives, being conlequences of fubjedtive ends, 
are indeed pradtical precepts, but not pradtical laws : in 
order to be fucli, they mull determine the will without 
regard to any fubjedtive end. This the Moral Law 
does ; it commands the action abfolutely, without regard 
to any thing that may arife from it. 
Theorem I.—All pradtical principles that prefuppofe 
an objedt (matter) of the defiring faculty, as a determin- 
ing ground of the Will, are empirical, and cannot be prac¬ 
tical laws. 
Proof. —A pradtical law is a principle which reafon im¬ 
mediately acknowledges as fuch, without regard to any 
end we may with to attain. Now, a pradtical principle 
prefupppoles an objedt, which implies a fubjedtive end, of 
which the principle is a mere conlequence. It is therefore 
no law. Such a material pradtical principle can only be 
difcovered empirically. We mult know the inclination 
or averfion of an individual for the objedt, in order to be 
certain that it is his end. 
Theorem 2.—All material pradtical principles are of 
one and the fame kind, and belong to the general princi¬ 
ple of J'ef-love or happinefs. 
Proof. —A material pradtical principle is one that is 
derived from the reprefentation of 3, Jubjedtive end. But, 
lince this fubjedtive end arifes from the reprefentation of 
Lome objedt, together with its influences upon the feel¬ 
ings; and fince the defire excited forms part of the luippi- 
1 tejs of the individual ; every material pradtical principle 
tends to the promotion of happinefs, and relts on the prin¬ 
ciple of Self-Love. 
Remark 1.—Hence arifes adiftindtion of theftiperior and 
inferior defiring faculty, more important than that com¬ 
monly made. If the reprefentation which excites defire has 
its ground in the fenfes, the Will, that is adtuated by it, is 
called the Inferior Desiring Faculty; and it is termed 
Superior, when the reprelentations which influence it 
have their origin in the underilanding. Thus, the defire to 
increale our knowledge on account of the pleafure which 
attends it, belongs to the Superior Defiring Faculty; and 
that of high living to the Inferior Defiring Faculty. But 
the Defiring Faculty itfelf remains one and the fame, 
lince this dillindtion does not concern the faculty, but 
only the reprelentations by which it is adtuated. On the 
other hand, the divifion of the Defiring Faculty itfelf 
takes place thus : If the will has 3 fubjedtive end, that is, 
if the reprefentation of an objedt adtuates it, it is the in¬ 
ferior Defiring Faculty; but it is the fuperior, when its 
end is objective; and therefore neceffary for every rational 
Being, though it is not yet on this account a fubjedtive end. 
Whether the Will be moved by reprelentations' of the 
Underilanding or of the Senfes ; it is Hill of the fame kind, 
and only differs in degree, which depends upon the difpo- 
fition of the individual. We may, for inltance, wifli to hear 
an eloquent fpeech, and at the fame time have a defire for 
Lome fenfual gratification ; and, after having tveighed the 
expedted pleafure in both, we may prefer the one to the 
other. The Will here regulates itfelf entirely according 
to the greatnefs of the pleafure expedted, and admits 
therefore of one further dillindtion. But, if the Defiring 
Faculty be diltinguilhed into Superior and Inferior, ac¬ 
cording to our method, it does not at all fignify whether 
the objedtive end is alfo the end of the fubjedl or indivi¬ 
dual, but only that it be objedtive. If, in the example ad¬ 
duced, we prefer the eloquent difeourfe to the fenfual 
pleafure, but only becaufe we anticipate a greater pleafure 
from it, then it is Hill only the inferior Defiring Faculty 
that is put in adtion. The truly fuperior Defiring Faculty 
would manifelt itfelf, were this choice made purely be¬ 
caufe it is a Duty to cultivate humanity for its own fake, 
and never to omit an opportunity of lb doing. Nay, this 
fuperior Defire manifeils itfelf in the mere acknowledg¬ 
ment of the Duty, even though the Will Ihould fail in 
its obedience to it. 
Remark 2.—The defire for happinefs is the neceflary 
conlequence of the indigent Hate of rational beings. But, 
notvvithffanding this, the pradtical principle, Take care of 
thy own happinefs, cannot be conlidered as a pradtical Law, 
In the firft place, .individuals, as experience Ihows, differ 
very much in opinion as to what conllitutes happinefs. 
Secondly, if we even fuppole that they were agreed upon 
this point, it never could be known d priori; confequently, 
fuch a principle could never be objedtive. 
Theorem 3.—If a rational being is to confider his 
maxims as univerfal pradtical laws, they mull be fuch 
principles as contain the determining ground of the 
Will, not in their matter, but merely in their form. 
Proof. —If the maxim of a rational being be grounded 
upon a fubjedtive end, then it cannot be conlidered as a 
pradtical law. For, as this fubjedtive end has arifen 
through the influence of the objedt (matter) of the will 
upon the feeling of inclination or averfion; it cannot be 
known d priori. Confequently this maxim is not a prac¬ 
tical principle, valid for every rational being. But, if the 
matter of a pradtical principle be put out of the quellion, 
nothing remains but the mere pradtical form. If then, the 
determining ground of the Will be not determined from 
its matter, it can only fpring from the practical form; 
that is to lay, in order to be certain that the maxim of the 
individual is conceivable as a pradtical law, the rational 
being, in abltradting the matter of the principle, mult 
quellion himfelf, whether he be able to confider it as va¬ 
lid in itfelf, that is, as valid lor Pure Reafon, and ft for 
univerfal legiflation. 
Remark .—To enquire whether pure reafon acknow¬ 
ledge a pradtical principle, or whether the latter be qua¬ 
lified for univerfal legiflation, is, in fadl, the fame thing. 
But the quellion in the latter lhape admits of a fignifica- 
1 tion. 
