MORAL P III L O S O P H Y. 
tion referring to an order of nature. It then afics whe¬ 
ther, if a praftical principle be univerfally followed, an 
order of nature can exi/t, or whether, if it were eftablilhed as 
auniverial law, it would not on the contrary defray itfclf. 
If, for inftance, the queltion is, whether the maxim to deny 
a juft debt be conceivable as a praftical law ; I need but 
feparate its matter (felf-intereft), and pure reafon proves 
itlelf immediately practical, by declaring this maxim in- 
admifble. I fee farther, however, that this maxim, con- 
Jidered as a univerfal law, defroys itfclf; for, if every one 
followed it, there could be no fuch thing as credit. This 
conlideration furnilhes a touch-ltone, by which we can 
prove whether a maxim can be thought as a practical 
law. But here we mull not omit to remark, that the va¬ 
lidity of a maxim as a praftical law, or the ground of the 
poftibiiity of conceiving it as a praftical law, does not lie 
in its fitnefs for fuch a univerfal legiflation as is compa¬ 
tible with an order of nature. This ground lies in Pure 
Reafon itlelf, which, as fuch, lays down a praftical prin¬ 
ciple as univerfally valid for every rational being, and 
therefore as a practical law, and that fitnefs ferves only as 
a mark of the dignity of the maxim. 
Problem i. —Suppofe the mere legiflative form of the 
maxim to be the fufficient determining ground of a Will: 
then find the quality of that Will, which is thereby alone 
determinable. 
Proof. —If the matter of apraftical principle contains 
the determining ground of the Will; then the Will that 
has this principle for its maxim, is fubjeft to the law of 
Caufality, and in this refpeft does not differ from other 
objefts of nature. But let us fuppofe a will which is de¬ 
terminable by the mere form of a practical principle: this 
will is not fubjeft to nature’s law of Caufality, fince this 
principle is its maxim. For in this cafe nothing can be 
found in the fenlible world, which is the caufe of the ac¬ 
tivity of the Will. Confequenlly a Will, determined by 
the mer e. form of its maxim, mult be confidered as a power 
which contains the ground of its Caufality in itlelf; and, 
as this is the charaileriftic of Freedom, fuch a will mull be 
a Free Will. 
Problem z. —Suppofe that the Will is Free : then 
find the Law which is alone fit to determine it necejjarihj. 
Proof.— A Will that is thought as free cannot be confi¬ 
dered as determinable by the matter of a praftical princi¬ 
ple. This matter belongs to the fenlible world ; and the 
will that is determinable by it, is conl'equently not free. 
But,if the matter of a practical principle be not confidered, 
there Hill remains its legiflative form, whereby pure reafon 
alone determines the Will. It is therefore folely the le- 
gi/lative form of a Maxim, which can contain the deter¬ 
mining ground of a Free Will. 
Remark.— -The maxim, whofe form alone determines 
the Will, implies its Freedom in the fame manner as a 
Free Will implies a maxim that determines it folely by its 
form ; that is, a practical law. But, if the queftion be, 
whether the conception of Freedom commences in our 
knowledge, and proceeds thence to the practical law, it is 
ealily perceived that this courle is impollible. For whence 
flioulcl we have the conception of Freedom, fince pure fpe- 
culative reafon finds itfelf, with regard to it, in an Anti¬ 
nomy ? Nor is this conception of any utility in the ex¬ 
planation of natural phenomena, fince, in their derivation 
as (‘feels from caufes, reafon does by no means permit the 
leap to a Caufe whofe caufality is not again an Effeft, and 
which does not render a higher Caufe neceflary. It is there¬ 
fore theLAW of Morality which prelents itfelfas a fact 
to our confcioujhefs, from which our knowledge proceeds 
to the conception of Liberty, and determines it poli- 
tively. The original conception of Liberty is merely ne¬ 
gative : it is the conception of a caufe whofe caufality 
cannot be confidered as an effeft; but this can by no 
means be admitted for the explanation of the phenomena. 
771 
The Law of Morality adds to this Conception fometliing 
politive, though it does not thereby become in the - lead? 
better adapted to the ufe of Speculative Reafon. 
Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason. 
Aft in fuch a manner, that the maxim of thy will may 
be valid as a principle of univerfal legiflation. 
Remark .— If the Freedom of the Will be prefuppofed, 
the fundamental law of Practical Reafon follows from it 
analytically, becaufe a free will is a will under prafti- 
cal.laws. But this is equivalent to a praftical principle, 
which Pure Reafon, and of courfe every rational being, 
holds valid for itfelf; confequently it is the fame as the 
principle of univerfal legiflation. Now, here we have only 
to remark, that we mull not miftake this principle, by un- 
derftanding it as if it arofe from its fitnefs for an order of 
nature. It is a practical law, becaufe reafon, ahftraCling from 
every thing empirical as matter of the will, becomes con- 
feious that it is a law abfolutely valid for all rational 
Beings. The fundamental law of Praftical Reafon,' in 
obeying which, the Will fliows itfelf to be free, may in. 
other words be exprefled thus: Make that practical. 
PRINCIPLE THY MAXIM, WHICH REASON ITSELF AC¬ 
KNOWLEDGES as practically necessary. Foraprin- 
ciple which Reafon declares to be practically necefary, 
and one which is valid as a principle of univerfal legifla- 
tion, are identical conceptions. But reafon’s acknow¬ 
ledging a praftical principle as a praftical law, is a faft. 
which cannot be derived from any further data, and con- 
lifts, as we have already Ihown in the introduftion, in a, 
fyntketical connexion of the will with the deed. 
A Fact of Pure Reason. 
Pure Reafon is praftical in itfelf alone, angl gives (to 
man) a univerfal law, which we call the Moral Law. 
Remark. —The fundamental law of pure praftical Rea¬ 
fon does not concern itfelf about the exiftence of an ob- 
jeftive praftical principle: it only preferibes that we ought 
to make fuch a principle our own maxim provided it really 
exifts. Now the Moral Law prefents itfelfas fuch, to the 
confcioufnefs of the Rational Being; confequently, that 
fundamental law commands us to make this very morality 
our own maxim. But the faft itfelf is undeniable. We 
need only analyze the moral judgment of our aftions, as, 
was done in theIntroduftion,to convince ourfelves of this; 
whence it refults, that an aftion is morally good only when 
it lprings from a maxim freed from all matter of the Willy 
and which therefore, pure reafon alone declares to be prac¬ 
tically necefary. The Jaw of morality is therefore valid for 
every rational being, including even the higheft intelli¬ 
gence. But with refpeft to fuch rational beings as are lubjeft 
to wants, confequently to fubjeftive motives, which often 
oppole the law of morality, this law takes the form of 
an imperative,. A Will, free from all fubjeftive incite¬ 
ments, and therefore neceflarily conformable to the moral 
law, is a J'acred Will. The relation of a Will affefted by 
wants, to the praftical law, is a dependence, which, being- 
confidered as praftically neceflary, is termed Obligation. 
The aftion itfelf, which is necefarily determined by the 
practical law, but neverthelefs only by the overcoming 
of fubjeftive hindrances, is called Duty. We cannot,; 
therefore, call the relation of a facred will to the moral 
law Obligation, nor its aftions Duties. The facrednefs 
of the will, though it never can be a property of finite 
beings, mult ftill lerve them as a model,, according to. 
which they mull judge of their own moral worth. 
Theorem 4. —The Autonomy of the Will is the foie 
principle of the Moral Laws, and of the Duties conformable 
to them. The Hetcronomy not only grounds no obliga¬ 
tion, but oppofes the principle of morals altogether. The 
foie principle of Morality is independence of the matter 
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