M ORAL PHILOSOP H Y. 
of the law, (that is, of an objeCt defired ;) and the deter¬ 
mination of the Will, by the mere univerfal legillative 
form, of which a maxim mull be capable. This inde¬ 
pendence is Liberty in a negative fenfe; but the felf- 
legillation of pure practical Reafon, is Liberty in a pofi- 
tive fenfe. Confequently, the moral Law exprefles no¬ 
thing but the Autonomy of Pure Practical Reafon, or 
Liberty ; and this is, indeed, the formal condition of 
all maxims, under which alone they can agree with the 
higheft practical Law. When, therefore, the matter of vo¬ 
lition, which can only be the object of a delire connected 
with the law, is made a condition of its pojfibility, Hetero- 
nomy arifes, and the Will does not give the law to itfelf, 
but only a precept, for the rational obedience to patho¬ 
logical laws. A maxim, which thus departs from the uni¬ 
verfal legillative form, not only produces no obligation, 
but is itfelf oppolite to the principle of pure practical rea¬ 
fon, confequently to the moral fentiment, even though 
the aCtion which arifes from it Ihould be legal. 
Remark. —We have already lhown the quality of an ob- 
jeCtively-prafitical principle, that is, of a practical law; 
namely, that its form alone is the determining ground of 
the Will; which means that pure reafon, after the abltrac- 
tion of the matter of the principle. Hill acknowledges it 
as practically neceflary, and thus makes a demand upon 
the Will, which cannot in any way be derived from the 
matter of the principle. But this pofition does not con¬ 
cern itlelf with the exiftence of the practical law. Since, 
however, it is a faCt, that the Moral Law forces itfelf upon 
our confcioufnefs as an objeCtively-praCtical principle; this 
fourth Theorem has for its objeCt, to apply to the Moral 
Law all that has been faid of the objectively-practical prin¬ 
ciple ; namely, that the Will is free with refpeCl to this 
principle, confequently that it only follows a law which 
it gives to itfelf. Certainly every aft of Will has an object, 
or matter ; but, if thismatter be confidered as a determining- 
ground, as the ground of the demand, then the princi¬ 
ple is not a practical law. The happinefs of other rational 
beings mult, according to the Moral Law, be the objeCt of 
the Will of every rationalbeing. But if, in order to make 
it the determining ground of the will, we mult prefuppofe 
that the welfare of other beings is one of our Wants, then 
the Will cannot be confidered as free. It Lands, like all 
other phenomena, under the law of Car foand life St; and 
we find the Caule of its Caufality in the matter, or objeCt 
of its maxim. On the contrary, the law of morality bids 
us promote the happinefs of other rational beings, whe¬ 
ther we fympathize with them naturally or not. We are 
confcious of this principle as a law ; for, abftraCting from 
its matter, pare reafon alone mult accede to its demand. 
A practical principle derived from a fubjeCtive end of 
the Will, cannot be confidered as identical with the mo¬ 
ral law, though they Ihould even agree with refpeCl to 
their matter. The determining ground is always in that 
cafe material. On the contrary, the determining ground 
of the moral law is formal. Its demand is not at all to 
be conceived from the matter of the principle, and does 
not become evident to our conjcioujhejs till after the fepa- 
ration of the matter. All material determining grounds- 
of the Will, as well as all practical principles falfely confi¬ 
dered as identical with the moral law, are reprefented in 
the following Table: 
'TABLE 
of the 
PraCtical Material determining grounds in the Principle of Morality. 
Subjective. 
External. Internal. 
--A-.. . ' ■ ■ ■ ——. /—— ■■ -- — 
Education; Civil Government. Phyfical Senfe; 
Objective. 
Internal. External. 
Perfection. The will of God. 
--i 
Moral Senfe 
In thus diftinguifhing the fubjcSlive from the obje.Bivc 
determining grounds, both of which are falfely attri¬ 
buted, inftead of the formal determining ground, to the 
principle of Morality ; we mult be careful not to con- 
found the conception of a principle whofe determining 
ground is objective with that of a practical principle which 
refers to an objective end. The latter is quite identical 
with the principle whofe determining ground is formal, 
becaufe an objective end is that which pure practical rea¬ 
fon acknowledges as an end, which confequently is not 
the end of all rational beings, merely through the influ¬ 
ence of an objeCt upon the feelings; but prior to, and 
independent of, this influence, and becaufe a formal de¬ 
termining ground of a principle denotes a ground of its 
demand, not derived from any objeCtof the Will, but from 
pure reafon itfelf. On the other hand, the objective de¬ 
termining grounds are material, fince they are only deter¬ 
mining grounds of the Will under the preluppofition of its 
matter. But they are objective, becaufe they are concep¬ 
tions of Reafon ; thus perfection attributed to things, and 
that of the higheft perfection perfonified, namely, God, 
are Ideas which cannot be found in experience, but which 
reafon conceives only by removing all empirical limits 
or bounds. But the end with a view to which the idea 
of perfection is made the determining ground of the will, 
is lolely J'ubjeStive. It is indeed nothing but that Happi¬ 
nefs which is to be attained by the greateft poffible culti¬ 
vation of our natural endowments. Confequently the 
mutter of the will precedes -its determining ground, and 
the latter is therefore material. It is the fame with the 
Will of God; for God is here reprefented as the Being who 
has in his power rewards and punifhments, with regard to 
which his Will is confidered as the determining ground of 
the Will of the rational being. But all merely fubjeCtive 
determining grounds mull be at once rejeCted. The de¬ 
termining ground of the moral feeling approaches more 
than any other to the genuine moral determining ground of 
the will, as it is not at leaft diametrically oppofite to it, like 
the others. The moral feeling manifefts itfelf in the fa- 
tisfaCtion that is connected with the confcioufnefs of hav¬ 
ing performed a good aCtion, as well as in the diflatisfac- 
tion which accompanies a bad aCtion. We mult however 
remark the difappointment which takes place when we 
attempt to make this Moral Senfe the determiningground 
of the will with regard to. the moral law. For we mult 
confider the culprit, who is diflatisfied with himfelf on 
account of his evil aCtions, already as morally good, at 
leaft in fome degree; fince, were he entirely without a 
good mode of thinking, he could not have this feeling of 
dilfatisfaCtion. In the fame manner we mult confider him 
whom the confcioufnefs of a good aCtion delights, as 
really virtuous, fince he can enjoy that fatisfaClion only 
becaufe he is conlcious of having aCted virtuoully. The 
admifiion of a moral feeling in the mind of the guilty man 
indicates of itfelf a mete formal determining ground of 
the Will, fince, prior to the pang of remorfe, he mult 
have acknowledged the authority of the moral law. 
Of 
