774 
MORAL PH 
and even from the condition of the fenfitive Faculty, 
Time ; the pure conception of an objeft indeed re¬ 
mains, but all application of this conception is thereby 
deitroyed. It would be a very wrong way of attempting 
to difcover how the Categories, and particularly that 
of Caufality, can be applied to objeCts, to confider the 
empirical data, as objects before the application of thefe 
conceptions to them; for the refult of fuch a procedure 
mull be, that the connexion of Caufe and Effefl in obje&s, 
which is conceived as necelfary, will appear entirely un¬ 
founded. If A. and B. are already thought as objects, 
without the pure conception of underftanding producing 
their objectivity; it cannot be conceived, why, becaufe 
A. is pofited, B. which is entirely different from it, fhould 
be pofited alfo. As Hume, previous to all application of 
the Conception of Caufality to the empirical variety, 
admitted the exillence of objects ; he proceeded very con¬ 
fidently, when he declared the neceJJ'ity in the connexion 
of Caufe and EffeCt in thofe objeCts to be ufurped, and 
to be really only a fubjeCtive neceffity, which he called 
■habit. The Critic of Speculative Reafon has, on the con¬ 
trary, endeavoured to diftinguilh accurately th efubjetlive 
from the objective in our reprefentations; and has ffiown, 
that what we call an objeCt arifes from the application 
of the Categories to the empirical variety, in which way 
alone the neceffity of the connexion in the law of Caufality 
can be conceived, fince thereby objectivity is brought 
into the fucceffion of the reprefentations. 
Finding it difficult to comprehend that the conception 
of Caufality gives objectivity to the empirical variety, 
and that fucceffion cannot be thought in an object, but 
by means of this Conception, becaufe we conftantly per¬ 
ceive objets before its application ; we are aptto conclude, 
that this conception is improperly applied to experi¬ 
ence: it can, however, be attributed with far lefs ground 
to the things in themfelves. On the other hand, we 
eafily perceive, that, if the Categories give objetivity to 
the empirical variety, this very objectivity remains after 
we have feparated the empirical variety. Now, it muff 
indeed be confeffed, that neither by the conception of 
caufality, nor by any other Category, is an objeCt known, 
(in itfelf,) it is merely indicated by thefe means. If I fepa- 
rate the empirical variety to which I have applied the 
conception of Caufe, and thereby known an objeCt, the 
Conception of a Caufa nonmenon (or Efficient Caufe) 
remains. This conception, although it is very con- 
ceiveable, is Hill perfectly empty, and of no ufe to theore¬ 
tical reafon. For the praGlical ufe of Reafon, however, 
nothing more is indeed required than to unite this Con¬ 
ception of a Caufa Nonmenon with that of a pure Will, 
and to confider the latter as an efficient Caufe. Although, 
theoretically considered, this conception is without mean¬ 
ing, yet it derives in a praClical view, from the law of 
Morality, a pofitive fignification, and objective reality; for 
a being who makes the Moral Law his maxim, mull ne- 
ceffarily think himfelf free. 
Sect. 2. Of the Conception of an ObjeSl of Pure Practical 
Reafon. 
The conception of an objeCt of pure practical Reafon 
is the reprefentation of an objeCt as the poffible effeCl of 
a free Will. To determine whether a certain thing be 
of this defcription, is therefore to decide whether we are 
able to will this objeCl by practical reafon alone, unin¬ 
fluenced by all other determinations. The phyfical pof- 
libiiity of the objeCt is not taken into confideration in 
this enquiry. When the objeCt itfelf determines the 
Will, its phyfical poflibility mull precede the practical 
principle, which is directed towards it; becaufe, if the 
exillence of the objeCt be impoflible, it cannot be defired ; 
nor can we conceive a principle which can demand it of 
the Will. But, if the determining ground of the Will be 
in the principle itfelf, and is not in any way derived from 
the objeCt, the invelligation whether this can be an 
object of the will, has nothing, to do with its phyfical 
1LOSOPHY. 
poflibility. For, fince the Will in this cafe is the fame 
with practical Reafon r we have only to enquire into the 
moral poflibility of the objeCt; that is, to afcertain whe¬ 
ther it can be defired by a Will wdiich reafon alone 
determines. 
What, according to a principle of practical Reafon, 
mull be defired or abhorred by every rational being, we 
term g-oort and evil; which conceptions comprife all the 
objeCts of Practical reafon. 
Even Language dillinguilhes good and evil from the 
agreeable and difagreeable; the latter exprefling only the 
peculiar feeling of the individual. What is agreeable to 
me may be difagreeable to another, and what is agreeable 
to others may be difagreeable to me. On the other hand, 
the words Good and Evil apply to objeCts that are defired 
or abhorred by every one. Now Reafon is the Faculty 
ofUniverfal Knowledge; the objeCts therefore which we 
underhand by the Conceptions of Good and Evil mull 
be acknowledged as fuch by reafon; but, if we imagine 
a fubjeCtive end, and coniequently a Will whofe deter¬ 
mining ground is material; Hill, the adoption of the 
means which lead to this end, rells with reafon; and 
any aCtion which accords with reafon may properly be 
called good. But we eafily perceive that this merely im¬ 
plies Good for a certain purpofe; it is therefore equivalent 
with ufeful, but it by no means fignifies the abfolntely 
good, that which is good in itfelf. 
Now the correCtnels of procedure in the Critic will be 
evident to the reader. It does not commence with the 
explanation and analyfis of the conceptions of Good and 
Evil, as might have been expeCted; but firft eftablilhes 
the conception of a pure Will, not determined by any 
empirical data, but by reafon itfelf, and afterwards proves 
the objective reality of it by the faCl; namely, by the 
confcioufnefs of the Moral Law, which determines the 
Will merely by its form, and thereby renders it a pure 
Will. The Critic of Speculative Reafon takes a fimilar 
courfe with refpeCt to the conception of an objeCt. Al¬ 
though its bufinefs (asTranfcendental Philofophy) was to 
Hate the conditions of experience, that is, of the knowledge 
of objeCts ; yet it would have been very inconfiflent if it 
had pretended to commence with the Analyfis of an 
objeCl. For, befides, that it could never have attained 
the knowledge of the thing in itfelf,- it would have lhut 
up the path to the true underftanding of the conception, 
becaufe it would have found in this conception an em¬ 
pirical part, which would have impeded it in its enquiry, 
fince its bufinefs was to difcover the pure conditions of 
an objeCt given in experience. In the lame manner, had 
we developed firll the conception of the Good, we Ihould 
have been in danger of loling that of the abfolute good, 
fince we might have mifcaken it for the ufeful (which is 
indeed the very oppolite of abfolute good). Thus we fnould 
have been deprived indeed of the poflibility of thinking 
a practical Law even problematically; whereas, we have 
now, on the contrary, found, that the conception of the 
good does not determine and render poffible the Moral 
Law; but, converfely, that the Moral Law determines 
and renders poffible the conception of the Good; that is, 
of the abfolute good. This inconiillent proceeding has 
been the caule of the errors of Philofophers, with reipeCl 
to the true principle of Morality. They prefuppofed an 
objeCl, as a determining ground of the Will, the means 
of producing which, they called good, (becaufe, indeed, 
Reafon alone can conceive fuch a conformity to end;) 
and too readily lhut their eyes againll the reflexion, that 
aClions derived from this lource may perhaps correfpond 
with the law of morality; but, as they do not fpring 
from it, they are not morally and abfolutely good. 
The Conceptions of abfolute good and evil do not refer 
to objeCts in the fame manner as the pure conceptions of 
Underftanding do, lo as to produce their objectivity: 
they rather preluppofie it, fince they are merely modes of 
one Category ; namely, that of Caufality. Again, the 
categories leparated from all intuition afford no know.- 
« le'-lge* 
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