MGRA L PH 
ledge, and denote objedls but indeterminately ; thefe con¬ 
ceptions, on the contrary, afford knowledge, fince they 
determine objedls immediately independent of all intui¬ 
tion ; for they prove them'felves to be real by the difpolition 
of the Will determined by the Moral Law ; and thus they 
actually produce their objedls. We call thefe Concep¬ 
tions Categories of Liberty, in contradiftinftion to 
the pure Conceptions of Underfunding, which, as they render 
nature poflible, may be termed Categories of Nature. As 
the latter bring the variety of intuition to an objective 
unity of confcioufnefs, in order to conftitute objects of 
knowledge, the former bring the variety of our delires 
to an objective unity of confcioufnefs, in order to fubjedl 
them to pra&ical Reafon commanding in the Moral Law, 
and thus conftitute their objeft. 
The conception of tranfcendental Liberty is the Con¬ 
ception of a Caufality, as a merely-intelligible objedl; 
i. e. conceivable. Although practical Liberty be alfo a 
merely intelligible objedl, the eftedls of this caufality are 
objedls in the fenfible world. The Conception of Liberty, 
in reference to its effedts in the fenfible world, mull 
confequently admit of being reprefented conformably 
to the Categories j and this is done in the following 
Table. 
TABLE 
of the 
• CATEGORIES of LIBERTY, 
in reference to the 
Conceptions of Good and Evil. 
I. Of Quality. 
Subjedtive, according to Maxims (Opinions of the in¬ 
dividual). 
Objedlive, according to Principles (Precepts). 
A Priori, objedlive as well as lubjediive principles of 
Liberty (Laws). 
II. Of Quality. 
Pradlical Rules of Performing (Prasceptivse). 
Pradlical Rules of Forbearing (Prohibitivae). 
Pradlical Rules of Exception (Exceptivse). 
III„ Of Relation. 
Perfonality. 
State of the Perfon. 
Reciprocally of one Perfon on the ftate of others. 
IV. Of Modality. 
Allowed and difallowed. 
Duty, and contrary to Duty. 
Perfect and imperfedl Duty. 
Of the Type of Pure Practical Judgment. 
The Critic of Speculative Reafon treated of Tranf¬ 
cendental Judgment as the faculty to fubl'umpt intui¬ 
tions, under the pure conceptions of Underftanding, and 
gave the rules under which Judgment performs its func¬ 
tions. Thefe were found to be all fynthetical pofitions 
a priori; whofe neceftary fyntheiis, as for inftance that 
of the Law of Caufality, cannot otherwife be conceived, 
with refpedl to objects, than by fhowir.g that by their 
means alone experience can be brought about. This 
could only be rendered evident by fhowing, that in ex¬ 
perience a fubfumption of the empirical variety under 
the Schemata of the Pure Conceptions of Underftanding 
actually takes place, thus reprefenting the adt of objedlive 
reference in the form of Internal Sense ; that confe¬ 
quently thefe fynthetical Judgments & priori fubjedl the 
variety of the empirical intuition to the fchemata, and 
thereby produce experience. Thus the poiition, “ Every 
thing, that happens has a caufe,” arifes, fince by means of 
it the variety is reprefented in an objective whole, not as it 
fucceeds fubjeclivcly in the apprehenfton, but as it follows 
in time determinately, and therefore objectively. 
There is in the Moral Law alfo a Synthetical pofitiou 
it priori, and here arifes a fimilar queftion to that refpedt- 
ILOSOPHY. 775 
ing the fynthetical pofitions of tranfcendental Judgment $ 
namely, how Inch a pofition can apply to empirical ob¬ 
jects. For, fince it contains a neceftary rule, it does not 
immediately appear how certain actions.which belong to 
the fenfible world as phenomena can conform to it. With 
refpedl to the theoretical pofitions, the queftion was, How 
can objedts of experience conform to them ? and, How 
can nature diredl itfelf in this manner, and accord with 
laws of the Underftanding which appear to be totally 
diftindt from it ? We come now to enquire. How 
Actions which are alfo objedts of experience, and belong 
to nature, can be thought as fubjedl to a Synthetical 
pradlical pofition, which is not a law of nature ? in other 
words, How' can we know that adtions, which, as phe¬ 
nomena belong to the fenfible world, really ftand under 
that rule it priori? 
Flere we are deprived of the advantage that we had in 
the illuftration of the treatment of Tranfcendental Judg¬ 
ment. In order to comprehend that an object Hands 
under a rule <1 priori of tranfcendental Judgment, we 
referred the Schemata of the pure Conception of Under¬ 
ftanding to the intuition of that objedt, from which in¬ 
deed it received its objedlivity. So that the queftion 
how the objedt comes to ftand under the fyntheiis of the- 
Schema, was at once filenced, fince it was only by that- 
means that it became an objedt. If for inftance we en¬ 
quire, with what right we confider the objects of the 
fenfible world as fubjedted to the pofition, that in all phe¬ 
nomena the relation of the fubftance to the accidence 
forms the foundation, in which only the accidences 
change, w'e have but to fubfumpt an empirical intuition- 
under the fchema of Subftantiality, and we immediately 
fee that, by this very fubfumption under the Synthetical 
connexion of Subjlance and Accidence, which the Schema 
reprefents, this intuition receives its objedlivity. 
However, although no Schema of this can in fadl 
correlpond with the moral law; we here require no 
Schema in order to think an empirical intuition as an 
objedt, namely, a fenfible event. As an adlion in the 
Senfible world, it certainly Hands under the fchema of 
CauJ'ality; but in its fubfumption under the pure practi¬ 
cal Law, we need not concern ourfelves about its poftl- 
bility as an event in the fenfible world; though, in as muclr 
as the adlion belongs to the fenfible world, it certainly 
can only be thought as an objedt by the fchema of 
Caufality. 
It is not therefore neceftary to difcover a Schema for a 
fingle cafe or adlion ; but certainly for the practical prin¬ 
ciple itlelf as a Law, that is, as a univerfal practical prin¬ 
ciple, it is neceftary, fo far as it can be reprefented by 
intuitive objedts in the concrete to find a fchema. This 
we lliall denominate the Type of the Moral Law. 
This Type of the Moral Law is the following : “ Is 
the maxim of my aflion fnch that I can will its adoption as a 
univerfal law of nature of which I am a part?" But this 
is not the fame as the Moral Law itfelf. The latter con¬ 
tains the determining ground of the Will ; whereas its 
type, which does not contain that ground, is merely cal¬ 
culated to ferve as a rule for pradlical Judgment. Indeed, 
common Underftanding judges of moral good and evil 
according to this type. If an adlion is fo qualified that 
its maxim, taken as a law of nature, contradicts itfelf, 
it is morally impoftible. The moral Law itfelf is how¬ 
ever far fuperior to every law of Nature; and Reafon 
connects with it, a priori, the confcioufnefs of neceffity 
and univerfality, without any view to the maintenance of 
an order of nature. But, as it is applied to the nature of 
the Senfible world, it may fo far be exprefted by this type, 
which is a fit touch-ftone of adlions, fince they are indeed 
phyfical, and can only be exprefted as objedts by the 
Schema of Caufality, though they are conformable to the 
Moral Law. It is therefore merely the legality of actions 
that is reprefented by this type. 
If we milunderftand the type, and take it for the moral. 
Law itfelf, an Empiricifm of Pradlical Reafon arifes. Ta 
adl according to that maxim, which when univerfally ob- 
ferved 
