776 MORAL P I I 
ferved muft produce univerfal happinefs, means, to admit 
the type of the Moral Law as a touch-ftone of Moral 
actions, fo far as they belong to the fenfible world. But 
to confider this happinefs as the determining ground of 
the Will, and good and evil, to mean merely what renders 
us happy or unhappy, were to take the type of the Prac¬ 
tical Law for the Law itfelf. 
To Empiricifm is oppofed Myfticifm. The latter ima¬ 
gines intuitions of the intelligible ; and, though it is only 
permitted to man to conceive a Kingdom of Ends, and 
every Rational being as a member of it, Myfticifm pro¬ 
ceeds to realize in imagination that world of fpirits, to 
which however fpeculative reafon has proved that we 
can have no accefs. HationaKfm avoids both, by ufing 
the type of the Moral Law merely as a touch-ftone of 
moral adlions, and thus leaves Morality pure, which Em- 
piricifm entirely corrupts. 
Sedt. 3. The Motives of Pure Practical Reafon. 
The Moral Law contains a demand which every Ra¬ 
tional being muft acknowledge ; that is, an objeftively-Ae- 
termining ground of the Will. This is however J'uhjedive, 
when the individual not only acknowledges the demand 
of the law, but admits it alfo in himfelf to become the 
caufe of the adlions which it demands. A fubjedlive de¬ 
termining ground of a Will, notin itfelf necelfarily con¬ 
formable to the objective Law, is called a motive. Hence 
it follows that we can attribute motives to fuch rational 
beings only as are fubjedt to wants. The fubjedlive de¬ 
termining ground of the Will however muft be alfo the 
objeflive one, and the moral Law alone muft be the de¬ 
termining ground of the action, if it is to be Moral, as 
well as legal. The objedl of this fedlion is to (how how 
the moral law can be a motive to the Will. As however 
the poflibility of Liberty cannot be explained, and as it 
cannot be lhown how the Moral Law exercifes a Cau- 
fality upon the Will; we fhall only ftiow, d priori, what 
the Moral Law effects in the mind, not how it eftefts it. 
If the moral Law be confidered as the motive of a 
Will, the total abfence of fenfible determining Grounds 
is thereby admitted; but the exiftence of inclinations, 
which may frequently ftand in the way of this objedlively- 
pradtical Principle, is alfo prefuppofed, and which therefore 
are infringed upon. This fubjedtionof the inclinations, fo 
far as they contradidl the moral Law, excites a feeling of 
pain. All inclinations taken together conftitut e felftjh- 
nefs (folipfifmus) 5 which is either felf-love, an indulgence 
of one’s felf predominating over every thing elfe, (phi- 
lautia;) or a J at isfadlion with one's felf, (arrogantia.) 
Self-love is merely infringed upon by the moral law, 
as a fubjedive determining ground of the Will: it fub- 
mits to be limited to the condition of its agreement with 
this law. But the fatisfadlion with one’s lelf, arrogance, 
is entirely overthrown by it. The feeling which annihi¬ 
lates arrogance is humiliation: yet, as the moral law is 
the caufe of it, this conlideration awakens a feeling of 
Iftecm for the Moral Law. Efteem for this law, then, is 
a feeling, produced by an intellectual caufe, whofe ne- 
ceffity is entirely known, <i priori; this is the moral 
feeling which is an effeCt of the moral Law; and 
confequently muft not be reprefented as forming its 
foundation. 
The Moral Law is the objective determining ground of 
the Will; that is, contains a demand that cannot be de¬ 
rived from its matter, and neverthelels is obligatory; this 
Law is alfo the fubjeCtive determining ground, that is, 
the motive of the Will, lince it produces a feeling which 
Is favourable to the influence of the law upon the Will. 
This feeling is therefore pradlically produced. Every 
other feeling is pathologically produced, becaufe the objeCt 
of the Will affects our fenfes, and thus produces the fub¬ 
jeCtive determining ground of the Will, whereas the 
genuine moral feeling Jucceeds the determining ground, 
and can only be confidered as advantageous to it. If we 
place this moral feeling under the clafs of fenfible feelings, 
ILOSOPHY. 
by explaining it as that emotion, which a tender mind 
experiences at the fight of human mifery; we not only 
wholly miftake it, but alfo aCt contrary to genuine mora¬ 
lity, fince this miftake refpeCting the moral feeling pro¬ 
duces a mifconception of the moral law. Every'feeling 
is indeed in its nature fenfible, fince it prefuppofes 
Senfe, which is a faculty of being affedted. But if, 
under the name of a fenfible feeling, that is underftood 
which has been produced by the influence of the matter 
of the Will upon Senfe; then the moral feeling muft be 
entirely excluded, fince this is produced folely by the in¬ 
fluence of the Moral Law, as the fubjedlive-detennining 
ground, upon fenfe. And thus efteem for the law is not 
a motive for Morality, wdien confidered as the caufe of 
morality; but this morality muft exift previoufly, in order 
that efteem may take place; which can be confidered as 
favourable to, but not as the caufe of, Morality. 
Efteem never refers to things, but only to perlons ; and 
indeed to thefe only, fo far as we compare their mode of 
thinking with the moral law, and believe that they 
agree. Great talents may indeed command admiration; 
but this feeling, which is entirely different from efteem, 
is only then connedled with the latter when we fuppofe 
the induftrious cultivation of thefe talents : ifthis fup- 
pofition be difproved, or if we find, upon a nearer view, 
that ambition and other merely-fubjedlive ends have 
actuated the individual, our admiration indeed remains, 
but all efteem vanifhes. If, on the other hand, we fup- 
pofe a man, as it were, negledled by nature, and yet pof- 
feffing a purity of character of which we are not con- 
feious in ourfelves; we feel an efteem for him, even 
though againft our will. This is indeed no feeling 
of pleafure; for it is grounded upon humiliation, which 
is connedled with pain. We fuffer this feeling there¬ 
fore unwillingly. We even endeavour to find out 
fome blemilh in the perfon whofe condudl appears 
to command our efteem, in order to efcape from this 
feeling. On the other hand, confidered in itfelf, this is 
no feeling of averfion. We muft already have laid afide 
our own arrogance, and muft have been humbled by the 
Moral Law, in order to feel efteem for it without hatred. 
This efteem for the Moral Law is the foie pofllble moral 
motive of the Will, fince the reprefentation of the fub- 
limity of the moral law awakens an intereft in it, upon 
which the maxim of the Will muft reft, in order to be truly 
moral. The adlion which according to the moral law 
is neceflary, that is, which Reafon acknowledges, and 
which is in confequence objcElively praElical, is named 
Duty. This contains a pradtical compulfion, however 
unwilling we may be to perform the adlion ; confequently 
the total rejedlion of all inclinations, however impor¬ 
tunate they may be as determining grounds of the Will. 
As the moral law is the fubjedlive determining ground 
of the Will, the feeling of averfion arifes from this com¬ 
pulfion. But, in as much as Reafon neverthelefs regards 
itfelf as legiftative , a felf-elevation and felf-approbation 
arife again, which as a pofitive feeling leads to that fub¬ 
jedlive determining ground, and'is a real motive of the 
WUl. 
Duty, objcElively confidered, is the neceffity of an adlion 
which is conformable to the moral law; but , JubjeElively, 
it is a Compulfion which has reference to a Will not in 
itfelf conformable to that law. A facred Will therefore 
has no Duties, becaufe no inclinations can aftedl it which 
are contrary to the Moral Law. But to a rational Being 
who finds himfelf limited and fubjected to wants with 
refpedt to. all that belongs to the fatisfadlion of his 
exiftence, the adlions which the law demands muft always 
be Duties. It is dangerous to entertain the idea that 
we have naturally an inclination for dutiful adlions, and 
thus to place ourfelves above the thought of Duty. For 
it is not merely to be apprehended, but certain, that 
adlions thus produced, though Dutiful, would not be 
Moral; becaufe, if the fubjedlive determining ground of 
the Wiil be a feeling which precedes the demand of the 
1 law, 
