MORAL PH 
law, and not ejleeni for the law, it cannot be a moral 
determining ground. Inclination to do that, which the 
Moral Law commands, may indeed he conjidered Moral; 
but it mull not precede the law; it mull follow from it, 
and effeem for the law itfelf mull be the determining 
ground of the Will. None but rational beings of a hu¬ 
man kind can hold up a facred Will, whole inclinations 
are perfectly conformable to the law, as an Ideal, which 
they mull endeavour to attain, but which they never can 
hope completely to reach. 
Critical Illustration of the Analytic of Pure 
Practical Reason. 
This critical illullration is the jullilication of the fyf- 
tematical form which the Critic of Practical Reafon has 
obtained; and will be bell accomplilhed, by inllituting 
a companion between the fyltematical form of the Critic 
of Speculative Reason, and that of the Critic of 
Practical Reason. 
The Critic of Speculative Reafon inveliigated the validity 
of a knowledge d priori of objects, which reafon either 
really poffeffes or pretends to poffefs. It fought the con¬ 
ditions of experience, which, as they originally make 
experience poffible, mull necelfarily apply a priori to its 
objects; and thefe conditions were found to be the only 
knowledge which does fo apply. It was able to Ihow that 
the proceeding of reafon becomes diuleBic when it fancies 
that it difcovers knowledge d priori any where elfe than 
in thefe conditions of experience. But, fince all experi¬ 
ence commences with intuition, that is, with a reprelen- 
tation which does not yet contain any objectivity, and 
is therefore merely fenfible; it was firlt neceffary to 
feek the condition of the intuitions of objeCts, which 
the Critic of Speculative Reafon found to be pure intui¬ 
tions, that is, Time and Space: confequently, it was 
neceffary firlt to treat of Sense. But, as we found that 
no objective reference is immediately connected with the 
Intuition of an objeCt, and that we by no means perceive 
an objeCt by its intuition, but merely a thoroughly-deter¬ 
mined reprefentation, which is completely J'ubjeBive; it 
was neceffary to look for thofe conditions of experience 
that give vbjeBivity to our reprefentations. The Cate¬ 
gories are the conceptions which contain this objeBivity; 
and the function of the underllanding in thefe concep¬ 
tions is no other than the objeBive Jynthcfs. Thus it 
became neceffary to treat of Conceptions. But, fince the 
empirical intuition cannot be immediately lubfumpted 
under the Categories, but only by means of the reprefen¬ 
tation of their fynthefis in the form of Internal Safe, 
that is, only under their Schemata, provided experience, 
or a knowledge of objects, is to be effected; it was ne¬ 
ceffary that experience Ihould be coniidered as fubjeCted 
to this fyuthetical connexion; whence the propriety of the 
principles of Tranfcendental Judgment, which exprefs 
this Synthejis of the Schemata in experience, became evi¬ 
dent. 
The method of the Critic of PraBical Reafon is pre- 
cifely the reverie of this. That of which pure practical 
Reafon is immediately confcious is not Intuition, but a 
practical principle; namely, the Moral Law. It was 
therefore neceffary firlt to treat of the peculiar quality of 
objeCtively-praCtical principles, and their pollibility. This,- 
poffibility relts upon the conception of Liberty, and 
therein differs entirely from the poffibility of the prin¬ 
ciples of Tranfcendental Judgment. All that the Critic 
was able to perform here was, to affign as a Type of the 
Moral Law, a fuppoled Law in the Senfible World, cor- 
refponding with the pure practical Law of Liberty : but 
we mult guard ourfelves againll conlidering the Type as 
identical with the Moral Law, or deriving the latter from 
it. Thus, the Critic could proceed to the conceptions of 
pure practical Reafon ; namely, to the conceptions of 
abfolutc good and evil, which do not precede the practical 
Law in order to render it poffible, but on the contrary- 
are determined by this Law as its objeCts. The purg 
VOL. XV. No. 1083. 
ILOSOPHY. 777 
conceptions of Underllanding are in this refpeCt alfo 
totally different: they are entirely independent of the 
Synthetical principles, d priori, of Tranfcendental Judgment; 
thefe principles are only rendered poffible by Judgment, 
fince they only reprefent the objeCts of experience as fub¬ 
jeCted to the Jchemata of the Categories. 
As to the pure hnowledge effected by the Critic of Spe¬ 
culative Reafon, it obtained its confirmation from the 
Sciences ; and we addrefled ourfelves, in this refpeCt, 
rather to thefe than to common underllanding, becaufe 
in the latter we are lefs fecure from the fecret introduction 
of empirical grounds of knowledge, than in the fcientific. 
But that pure Reafon, without any empirical motives, 
may be of itfelf a determining ground of the Will, that 
is, that it can become practical; of this, Science could 
give us not the lealt proof; but, prior to all Science, the 
commonell Reafon mull be able to prove its own praBical 
faculty by the faB. Common Senfe immediately deteCls 
any empirical motive of the Will, by the representation 
ol the pleafure attending it, and which forms its foun¬ 
dation ; and it diffinguilhes very accurately the obfervance 
of a practical rule, with ^view to render one’s felf happy 
from obedience to the Moral Law, which promifes no 
happinefs. The moral feeling is indeed an auxiliary; but, 
before it can aril’e, reafon mull acknowledge the Authority 
of the Moral Law, fo that this Feeling is to be confidered 
merely as an ejicem for the moral law, and can only re- 
fult from it. Pure Morality, and its accurate feparation 
from all empirical motives, refembles geometrical truth. 
Their excellence becomes evident only upon a careful fe¬ 
paration of all that is empirical. But, although geometry 
receives no aid from the empirical intuition in alcertaining 
truth, yet the Geometrician has Hill the advantage of 
ufing the pure intuition in which he reprefents his pofi- 
tions. The philofopher is deprived of this advantage, 
and arrives, in his abltraClion, at the intelligible, with 
which no intuition ever can correfpond, namely, a lav > 
that contains an objeBive determining ground of the Will; 
that is, a Law of Liberty. On the other hand, he has 
this in his favour, that he can make experiments upon 
the common reafon of other men, who are not yet feduced 
from the right way by art. Here he perceives that reafon 
gives practical rules to itfelf, when it aims at happinefs, 
and confiders thofe aCtions good which lead to the end 
in view. But let us choofe a happinefs that is incon- 
fillent with Morality, and lay this cafe before the molt 
common Reafon for decifion, and we lhall find that it 
will at once moll correClly diffinguifh what is morally 
and abfolutely good from that which is merely fo with 
regard to fome lubjeCtive end; that which is abfolutely 
neceflary to be done in all refpeCls, from that which is 
only relatively fo. 
The principle of Morality Hands firm as a faCl; fo in¬ 
deed do the principles of tranfcendental Judgment; but 
of thefe the “ Critic” was alfo able to give a deduction, 
and could prove in this deduction the legality of their 
ufe with regard to objeCts of experience. The Critic of 
practical Reafon, on the other hand, inffead of this deduc¬ 
tion, can only give the Conception of Liberty. If this be 
prefuppofed, the law of Morality is conceivable as a ne¬ 
ceffary confequence from it; and inverfely this law leads 
neceflarily to that prefuppofition. But, as the poffibility 
of liberty cannot be at all explained, the “ Critic” was 
obliged to Hop at the reprefentation of this faculty of 
Liberty, which tranfeends all experience. What would 
at once overturn fuch a prefuppofition, would be the dif- 
covery of fome incongrifity in it. But the Critic of Spe¬ 
culative Reafon has lhown, that the idea of Liberty is 
quite different from the unconditioned of the firlt and fe- 
cond Antinomy; that the former may be thought as an 
ens rationis, whereas the latter cannot be thought even 
as a nihil negativum. Hence we plainly perceive, that, fo 
long as we guard ourfelves againff confounding a being 
endowed with liberty with an objeCt of experience, we 
are lecured from the apparent contradiction which arifes 
9 M when 
