77 S> 
MORAL P II 
ail Antinomy when it feeks its objeCt among the pheno¬ 
mena. 
It has already been fhown, in the Critic of Speculative 
Reafon, that the moral law contains in its form alone a 
Demand upon the Will, and is confequently an objective 
determining ground of it. Since this law rejeds every de¬ 
termining ground that depends upon the principle of happi¬ 
ness, it limits the natural define for happinefs to the con¬ 
dition of an agreement with its commands. Now, though 
'Morality and Happinefs are totally different from each 
other, To that we cin eafily conceive a virtuous man in 
mifery, and a wicked man happy; yet reafon is not in¬ 
different to the union of both, as conftituents of a higher 
conception, in one individual. It approves of the hap¬ 
pinefs of the virtuous man, and dilkpproves of that of 
the vicious. That we Jhould he happy in proportion as me 
are worthy of it , is the ultimate object of Practical Reafon. 
This combination of Virtue with a proportionate hap¬ 
pinefs conftitutes the highest good. That the union 
of both its elements can be conceived analytically, that 
the one is contained in the other, and that we need only 
develop the inferior conception in order to find the fu- 
perior; the Critic has proved to be fallacious. They are 
co-ordinate conceptions, and neither of them is contained 
in the other; but their union forms a third conception. 
This fynthefis is not accidental, but is neceflarily pro¬ 
duced by Reafon ; fince, if we conceive Reafon as the 
diftributer of happinefs, it can only determine, accord¬ 
ing to the moral conduct of rational beings, the propor¬ 
tionate fliare of each. 
The ancients, in endeavouring to conceive the higheft 
good, erred in this, that they confidered Virtue and 
Happiness as fubordinate to each other. The Stoics and 
the Epicureans differed only as to which of thefe con¬ 
ceptions was the fubordinate one. The former confi¬ 
dered Virtue as the inferior conception ; the latter, Hap¬ 
pinefs. According to the former, we become happy by 
ffriving after Virtue, and Virtue is therefore the higheft 
good ; on the principle of the latter, we become virtuous 
by endeavouring to render ourfelves happy, and Happi¬ 
nefs is the higheft good. Both erred by feeking to difi- 
cover the connexion of the two elements of the higheft 
good analytically; and their error arofe from miftaking 
an idea of pure Reafon. The Critic of Speculative Rea¬ 
fon has already given us examples of a necejfary fynthefis 
of heterogeneous conception in the principles of tran- 
fcendental Judgment. The ancients being confcious of 
the neceffary connexion of thefe conceptions, and yet, 
not finding its right explanation, took the pofition of 
Identity for their principle : they might have freed them- 
felves from this error by confidering the example of geo¬ 
metry, where the fynthefis of conception is clearly feen. 
With regard to the diverfity of the Elements of the con¬ 
ception of the higheft good, their entire difference, and 
confequently the fynthetical mode of their connexion, 
would have been evident to them, if, before they had 
attempted to form the conceptions of the higheft good, 
they had confidered the objectively-practical property of 
the law of morality. But, in all moral judgment, it is evi¬ 
dent that the idea of the higheft good is peculiar to pure 
Practical Reafon. The law of Morality itfelf certainly 
contains neither promife nor threat; but, while Practical 
Reafon thus commands, and promifes nothing, it ftill con- 
fiders tire man worthy of happinefs who, folely from ejteem 
for the law, fulfils its commands. The confcioufnefs of 
this is as much a faCt as the moral law itfelf. But we are 
unable to explain the poffibiiity of this faCt, for the rea¬ 
fon already fo often adduced; namely, becaufe we are 
( unable to explain how Liberty is poffible. To confider 
the virtuous man as worthy of happinefs, means, to will 
that heJkall be happy: this is a pure Will, determined by 
nothing material ; a Will whofe motive is the moral law 
itfelf. The Moral Law therefore commands us to pro¬ 
duce the higheft good. But here an Antinomy of Practi¬ 
cal Reafon manifelts itfelf which mult be removed. 
ILOSOPHY, 
I. Antinomy of Pure Practical Reason. 
It has been fliown that the connexion of Virtue and 
Happinefs is not analytical; fo that one of thefe fhoitld 
be the higheft good itfelf, and the other be contained in 
it as a partial conception. It mujl therefore be fynthetical; 
and, as the fynthefis is neceffary, the one Element mnft be 
a Caufe, and produce the other as its EffeCt. But, as hap¬ 
pinefs can never produce virtue, becaufe a fentiment which 
fprings from what is material cannot be moral; therefore 
morality mult produce happinefs. But, when we confi¬ 
der the moral law as the rule which ftiall difpenfe to every 
one his fhare of happinefs, that is, as the natural Caufe 
of happinefs, we can expeCt only an accidental meeting of 
happinefs, and of the worthinefs of being happy. The 
fynthefis of the elements of the higheft good is therefore, 
in this view, not at all neceffary; and the law of mo¬ 
rality itfelf, which reprefents this fynthefis it priori as 
neceffary, appears to be empty and fictitious. 
The Thefis and Antithefis turn upon an abfelutely- 
unconditioned thing; namely, the Idea of the liighelt 
good, which each in its own way endeavours to produce. 
The firft afferts, that virtue produces happinefs ; thefecond, 
that happinefs produces virtue ; and each pofition is proved 
by the refutation of the other. Happinefs cannot pro¬ 
duce virtue, becaufe the determining ground of the ge¬ 
nuine moral fentiment mull not be material; nor can 
virtue produce happinefs, becaufe this requires a mate¬ 
rial caufe. 
II. The Critical Removal of the Antinomy of Pradical 
Reafon. 
The Antinomy of Practical Reafon is of a fimilar na¬ 
ture with the conflict of Speculative Reafon refpeCting 
the Ideas of Liberty and an abjblutely-neceffary being. This 
conflict arofe from our feeking the unconditioned in the 
feries of phenomena; and either receiving as fuch a fingle 
member or the whole leries. The oppofition of the Thelis 
and Antithefis had the appearance of a logical oppofition, 
according to which one of two contradictory pofitions 
mull neceflarily be true. They were, in fad, both falfej 
and, though the one appeared to be confirmed by the re¬ 
futation of the other, the refutation was equally forcible 
on both fides, fince both fought the unconditioned anion? 
the phenomena. Thefe conceptions of nature diftinguifh 
themfelves from the Cofmological Ideas in this, that an 
objective fignification can be applied to them, provided 
we abltraft from the intuition in which the objeCt of 
thefe ideas cannot be given. We have only to think the 
Categories elevated to the unconditioned, by which 
an objeCt in general is thought; but all knowledge of 
this objeCt is excluded, and with it alfo every thing by 
which the objective reality of fuch a mental production 
is fecured. The Critic could only juftify the poffibiiity 
of the thought of an ens ratiouis which confills in an ob¬ 
jective reference, and which certainly does not require 
any intuition. 
The higheft good is no objeCt that can be found in the 
feries of phenomena, becaufe it does not require an acci¬ 
dental meeting of Virtue and Happinefs, but a neceffary 
Production of the latter by the former. Here alfo, as' in 
the Antinomies of Speculative Reafon, the remedy is to 
refer the objeCt of this idea to the intelligible world. We 
may at leaft think , that by means of an intelligible Author 
of Nature, the moral fentiment produces happinefs. 
The objective fignification of the fynthefis of Virtue 
and Happinefs, which reafon declares to be neceffary, is 
poffible only by placing the higheft good in the intelligible 
world, fince it cannot be met with in the fenfible world. 
The confcioufnefs of the determination of the Will by the 
Moral Law, is accompanied by a feeling properly termed 
felf-contentment, which is previoully neceffary, in order to 
render us capable of happinefs, though it does not amount 
to happinefs in itfelf. It is a fort of negative complacency 
in our e*iltence, which we mull be in feme degree vir¬ 
tuous in order to experience. It is therefore the effect of 
