MORAL PH: 
merely to render a neceffary fynthejis of Practical Reafon 
comprelienfible. This, therefore, can only be termed 
Belief, though it is indeed a pure and neceffary Belief of 
Reafon. 
The Grecian fchools might well fail in their object, if 
they wiflied to fhow the pofiibility of the Higheft Good, 
without admitting the exiftence of God, of hoped to obtain 
this objefit merely by the ufe of Moral Liberty. The 
Epicureans agreed with the Stoics in confidering the con¬ 
nexion of the elements of the higheft good as analytical. 
They differed, however, as to its origin ; that is to fay, as 
to which of the two conceptions, Virtue and Happinefs, is 
obtained by analyfing the other. Though both neceifa- 
rily erred, fince neither of thefe conceptions involves the 
other ; yet, with refpefit to the moral fentiment itfelf, the 
fault that Epicurus committed was the greateft. Accord¬ 
ing to him, Happinefs was a fpecies of the Good, and con¬ 
tained the genus in it: it followed therefore that it fltould 
be the determining ground of the Will, and that he who 
endeavoured to renderhimfelftruly happy muft neceflarily 
be virtuous. Virtue therefore was degraded to Prudence. 
The error of the Stoics, on the other hand, did not cor¬ 
rupt morality itfelf; they did not ftrive after Happinefs, 
but Virtue ; and perfuaded themfelves that they found 
happinefs in the confcioufnefs of virtue. They con¬ 
founded therefore Happinefs with J'elf-contentment, which 
indeed always accompanies the confcioufnefs of Virtue, 
and might eafily have been refuted by the voice of Nature. 
The Doftrine of Chriftianity diftinguifhes itfelf very 
eminently from that of thefe philofbphical fchools. Its 
Ideal is San&ity itfelf; that is, the complete fupremacy of 
Reafon over the Inclinations. This certainly can never 
be attained by finite beings; but it muft always ferve them 
as a model, according to which they muft determine the 
moral worth of their fentiments, and their claim to be ad¬ 
mitted into the Kingdom of God. By this Idea of a King¬ 
dom of God, in which happinefs is to be given to every 
one according to his conduft, the Gofpel reprefents Nature 
and Morals as in a ftate of harmony, which is foreign to 
them, when confidered in themfelves. Notwithftanding 
this, it by no means makes happinefs the determining- 
ground of the will, much lefs reprefents the Moral Law 
as the arbitrary command of a chief, againft whole ar¬ 
rangements it is not advifable to contend. It reprefents 
this Chief himfelfas a facred being; and confequently, the 
Moral Law as objective, and as a Law of Liberty with 
which the fentiments of the Higheft Intelligence himfelf 
moft intimately accord. Viewing this Intelligence, how¬ 
ever, as the chief of all rational beings, and the only in¬ 
fallible Judge of their morality, Chriftianity rightly holds 
the moral precepts as the commands of God. 
In this manner Religion muft be grounded in the 
mind. The Moral Law muft ferve as its foundation ; but 
this law mull not be confidered as in any way derived 
from it, becaufe this were to make the moral law an arbi¬ 
trary arrangement of another’s will. Religion teaches us 
to confider our Duties as the command of God ; but they 
are not derived from the Will of God. Religion ^cannot 
arife until the moral fentiment be firft firmly eftablifhed 
upon the authority of the law itfelf. It is thus that the 
hope is awakened of a happinefs proportionate to the purity 
of the moral fentiment, namely, by means of the belief 
in a Sacred Being who is the chief of moral, that is to fay, 
of rational, Beings. 
VI. On the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason 
in General. 
Thefe poftulates are all prefuppofitions, adopted for the 
purpofe of conceiving a neceffary fynthejis of Pure Prac¬ 
tical Reafon : they are Immortality, Liberty, and the Exift¬ 
ence of God. With refpeft to the firft, Speculative Reaibn 
could arrive at nothing but parallogifms ; for, in order to 
aflert that the foul is immortal, it had firft to eftablilh its 
fubjiantiahilily, which however it could not do, fince this 
Category Hands in need of an intuition, if it is to be any 
thing more than a mere logical funftion. But, inllead of 
Vol. XV. No. 1083. 
[LOSOPHY. 781 
the intuition, we have here only the aft of felf-confciouf- 
nel's, the I think-, fo that it remains entirely undecided, 
whether the foul itfelf be a fubftance or not. Praftical 
Reafon, on the other hand, contains a law which is no 
pcjlulate, but a praftical pofition, of which we are imme¬ 
diately confcious. This praftical lav/, contains the con¬ 
ception of the objectively practical, and reprefents ac¬ 
tions as abfolutely neceflary, whofe determining ground 
muft not be fought in any thing different from the law it? 
felf. Here, then, is a fynihetical connexion of the Will 
with the Deed, neceflary and a priori ; but, as this cannot 
be completely attained by any finite being in any period 
of his exiftence, but can only be approximated to, by an 
infinite feries of degrees, we muft adopt an exiftence not. 
limited to the Senfible World. The immortality is not 
required in order to fhow that this connexion of the will 
with the deed is neceffary, for the confcioufnefs of this 
neceffity is a fa fit of Praftical Reafon ; but it is required » 
in order to give objeftivity to that connexion, that is, in 
order to render it conceivable. For, if we admit the pof- 
fibility of the immortality of the foul, w'e thereby admit 
the pofiibility of holinefs, as attainable by finite beings. 
With refpeft to the Idea of Liberty, Speculative Reafon 
can juftify its conception only in a negative fenfe, by 
placing its objefit in the intelligible world; but it muft 
refrain from all pofitive determination of it. If Specula¬ 
tive Reafon, on the contrary, feeks this objeft in the 
feries of phenomena, it muft unavoidabty find itfelf in an 
Antinomy. The Law of Morality is a fyntheticalprablical 
pofition. This J'ynthefis is that of the Will with the Deed. 
The Poftulate of immortality explained only how fuch an 
agreement, fuppofing it in itfelf poffible, can be complete¬ 
ly attained. But, if we feek this pofiibility, we can only 
find it in the poftulate of Liberty, which comprifes in 
it that of Immortality itfelf, fo that, by means of the 
Conception of Liberty, this connexion is conceived ; but 
the conception, left undetermined by Speculative Reafon, 
receives a pofitive fignification. 
Practical Reason leads at laft to a praftically-deter- 
mined conception of a Higheft Being, which Speculative 
Reafon could only reprefentas a Transcendental Idea, 
but in no way poiitively determine. The Synthejis which 
compels us to the prefuppofition of this being, is that of 
the elements of the higheft good, which reafon neceflarily 
connefts, but whofe objeft is only conceivable under the 
prefuppofition of an intelligible world, in which the 
Higheft Being will conneft Happinefs with Morality; that 
is, of a Kingdom of God. 
VII. How it is poffible to conceive Pure Praftical Reafon 
as proceeding further in a praftical view than it can be 
permitted to do in a fpeculative view. 
In order to conceive the pofiibility of the higheft good, 
whofe elements reafon necefffarily connefts with each other* 
(though experience never can correfpond with this con¬ 
nexion,) we find it neceffary to~prefuppole three theoreti¬ 
cal conceptions ; namely, Liberty, Immortality, and 
God. In this manner, thefe conceptions of fpeculative 
reafon attain objective reality; for it is not fuflicient to 
our purpofe merely to think them problematically ; they 
muft really be referred to objects, which Speculative Reafon 
never could efteft, becaufe there was .no intuition as a 
foundation for them ; fo that indeed the objeftive refer¬ 
ence of the Categories may be conceived in thefe 
thoughts, but no objeft is known. Speculative Reafon 
forms to itfelf the conception of a firft Caufe, whofe cau- 
fality is grounded v/holiy in itfelf: but in the feries of 
Phenomena, it could not find any objeft correfponding to 
this conception, and it was confequently deftitute of all 
objeftive reality. All that Speculative Reafon could do, 
was to tranfpofe the objeft of this conception into the 
intelligible world ; whereby, however, it did not receive 
objefitive reality. This faculty, indeed, might conceive it 
problematically, but it was notjuftified in admitting it aj - 
fertorically. The Law of Morality, which is no arbi¬ 
trarily-conceived praftical pofition, but a Categorical 
9 N Imperative, 
