MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
782 
Imperative, and a fafl of practical reafon, firft gives 
the right of attributing to the conception of Liberty a 
correfponding object, becaufe a law at once practical and 
neceffary a priori, can only be conceived under the pre- 
fuppofition of a free being. Thus, the conception of 
Liberty obtains in a practical view objective reality ; and 
the fame thing occurs with the immortality of the Soul and 
the exiflence of God. 
But, although the field of reafon is thus extended, yet 
it receives this extenfion by no means in fuch a way as to 
warrant its ufing it for a theoretical purpofe. For in the 
pofitive determination of thefe objedls, it cannot advance 
one flep further than to prefuppofe them in a pradlical 
view. As reafon has no intuition of thefe objedls, its 
J'ynthetical pofitions do not in the leaft extend its know¬ 
ledge. Confequently nothing more is attained than an 
objedlive reference by means of the Categories; and 
thus an objedl is pofited aflertorically; that is, an objedl 
in general is thought. The Categories, it is true, are in 
this cafe applied to Ideas, and not to Intuitions. But to 
prefuppofe that thefe Ideas are not empty, and that they 
do not merely designate an objedl, but that real objedls 
correfpond to them, is neceffary in a practical view, fince 
they are not fancied conceptions, that is, not mere pro¬ 
ductions of imagination, but necelfary ideas of Pradlical 
Reafon itfelf. What Speculative Reafon has here to do, 
is, to ufe thefe Ideas negatively, that is, illuftratively. 
This procedure is necelTary, in order to check Superfi- 
tion and Fanaticifm. If, however, we attempt to deter¬ 
mine thefe objects in a fpeculative point of view, we arrive 
at properties of which we are not able to form the lead 
conception. When, for inftance, we abftradl from all that 
is anthropomorphijlical in the determination of the Under- 
ftanding and Will of the Higheft Being, we conceive an 
Underftanding which does not think, but intuit, and whofe 
feprefentations do not follow each other; a Will which 
refers to objedls whofe exigence have no influence upon 
its contentment; fo that, after this abftradtion, we have in 
fa 61 nothing left to refledl upon. But, if we undertake 
the determination of thefe objedls with a pradlical refer¬ 
ence, by which their objedlive reality is fecured, we obtain 
predicates of them, which, it muft be admitted, are in¬ 
telligible only in this refpeCt. In order, for inftance, to 
think the Higheft Good as pofiible, an Author of Nature 
muft be prefuppofed. He muft be Omnifcient, in order 
to know our moil inward thoughts; he mull be Omnipotent, 
in order to be able, in every cafe, to apportion happinefs 
to morality ; Omniprefent, Eternal ;—properties of which 
in themfelves indeed no conception is poflible, but which 
are very intelligible in reference to the tligheft Good. 
VIII. Of the taking for true from a NeceJJity of Pure 
Reafon. 
What is the diflindtion between a pojiulate of Pure 
Pradlical Reafon and an Hypothefis? Both are Jynthetical 
pofitions, by the adoption of which, the fynthejis of cer¬ 
tain other pofitions can be explained. In the latter cafe, 
the pofitions refer to really-given objedts, whofe poflibi- 
lity is comprehended by means of the hypothefis. But 
the pofition of Pradlical Reafon is the Moral Law; and its 
objedt, the Higliejl Good, is not, as in the former cafe, really 
extant; the Moral Law commands us to produce it. The 
Pojlulales of Pradlical Reafon are confequently prefuppo- 
fitions to enable us to confider as poflible, that connexion 
of the Higheft Good which the Pradlical Law commands 
us to realize. 
The neceflity of thefe populates arifes folely from the 
principle of Duty. The highest good is to be produced; 
it muft therefore be confidered poflible, and whatever is 
neceffary to its accomplifhment muft be admitted. 
It is however not a duty to adopt thefe poftulates, be¬ 
caufe it never can be a duty to confider any thing as true. 
A command for the adoption of thefe poftulates would 
indeed be quite fuperfluous ; for, fince fpeculative reafon 
has nothing to objedl againft them, the field is left open to 
the moral interefi, in a pradlical view, to give the deeijion. 
If the conception of the HiglicJIGood be an empty concep¬ 
tion, the Law of Morality, which commands us to realize 
it, is only a chimera. The adoption of thofe objedls, there¬ 
fore, under whole prefuppofition alone the Higheft Good 
can be conceived poflible, is grounded in the interefi which 
every rational being muft take in Morality itfelf. 
Doctrine of Method of Pure Practical Reason. 
By the Dodlrine of Method of Pure Practical Reafon, 
is not meant the confideration of the procedure requifite 
to reprefent pure pradlical principles as a fcientific whole; 
but rather the enquiry how we may procure the laws of 
pure pradlical reafon accefs to-the human mind, i. e. how 
u'e can render the objcCiively-praCtical Reafon fubjeCiively 
pradlical alfo. 
It is certain that adtions can only be called moral fo 
far as they are purely performed from a reverence for the 
Law; confequently only fo far as the Law, which con¬ 
tains an objective determining ground, has alfo become a 
JubjeElive determining ground of the Will. It is true, 
alfo, though it does not appear to be fo, that the mere re- 
prefentation of the Law of Morality has far more influ¬ 
ence over the mind in exciting it to legal adlions, than 
all the views of pleafure or advantage, which may alfo 
produce legal, but never moral, aClions. For, fince the aim 
at advantage under the pretence of a moral intention is 
but hypocrify, it is clear that there is either no true 
maxim of obedience to the moral Law to be found among 
men ; or, wherever this genuine maxim exifts, the law of 
morality muft influence it; and fo far only as it does in¬ 
fluence it, is it moral. In order to convince ourfelves of 
this, let us fuppofe a man careful to render his adlions 
conformable to the moral law, but whofe principle not- 
withftanding is heteronomical; for inftance, obedience to the 
will of God. He will tell us that he does good merely be¬ 
caufe God has commanded it; we might conclude therefore, 
that, if God did not command it, he would not do it. But 
let us for a moment fuppofe, (and it muft be allowed that 
we may think fo problematically,) that there is no God, or 
that a revelation equally accredited with that in which he 
believes he has found the Will of God, promulgates as 
Duties, the very reverfe of what the moral law commands; 
then this Theological Moraliji muft confefs, that in fuch 
a cafe he would be willing to adl contrary to the Will of 
God; or at leaft that he would defire to pofl’efs the power 
of doing fo. Hence it appears, that, notwithftanding his 
heteronomical principle, his fentiments are in fadl truly 
moral, fince, although he conceives them to depend folely 
upon the Will of God, they are in truth grounded upon 
the Moral Law. 
The attempt thus to corrupt Morality may convince 
every one, that the Moral Law in its own purity may be¬ 
come a J'ubjeCiive determining ground of the Will, without 
any heteronomical addition. We may be flill further 
convinced of this from the judgment puffed by all per- 
fons upon the moral worth of adtions. Here every body 
judges ; thofe even who give no other proof of diferimina- 
tion, and to whom every thing fubtile and fpeculative is 
a burthen, join with alacrity in difcufling the morality of 
adlions, and are fometimes extremely quick in difeover- 
ing an interefted motive that may detradl from the moral 
worth of an adtion. Others perhaps may take the fame 
adtion under their protedlion ; but both the contending 
parties admit that it might have been performed purely 
from reverence for the laic, and thus perfectly agree as to 
what conflitutes True Morality. Though they may not 
have very clear conceptions of morality in general, yet 
to diftinguifh a good from a bad adtion is as eafy to them 
as to diftinguifh their right hand from their left. Thofe 
who educate youth ought long fince to have availed 
themfelves of this conftant propenfity of Reafon to judge 
of the moral worth of adlions. Children from early youth 
are capable of thefe exercifes. Let us lay before their 
judgment examples from ancient and modern biography, 
and make them attentive to the moral corredlnefs or in- 
corredlnefs of the adlion ; and let them be left to decide 
for themfelves on its moral worth. We (hall then find 
them very penetrating; and they will become interefted 
