O N T 
Ontology bears this name, becaufe it contains 
conceptions and principles that apply to objects in 
general, and not merely to thole of a particular kind. 
Indeed, the ontological conceptions do not only refer to 
real objects, but alfo to conceivable or poflible objedls. 
Ontology is alfo called Transcendental Philosophy, 
becaufe it treats of the pure representations whole origin 
lies in the nature of the knowing faculty, from the com¬ 
bination of which conceptions with fenlible reprefenta- 
tions or intuitions, experimental knowledge arifes. 
All our knowledge not only begins in experience, but 
this is indeed the proper field for human knowledge and 
adiion. Though the objects of experience are, accor¬ 
ding to their nature and properties, different from each 
other, yet we find in all of them certain univerfal deter¬ 
minations,-without which they could not be objects of 
our knowledge, and which we muff confider therefore as 
conditions under which alone experience is poflible. The 
ground of this rauft. not be fought in the objedls of ex¬ 
perience, but in the knowing fubjeft itfelf. On the other 
hand, thcfe determinations and properties, without 
which human knowledge in general is ltill poflible, have 
not their ground in the original predifpofitions of the 
knowing J'ubje£l, but in the objects prefented to the mind. 
Suppofe the reprefentation of the red colour were to¬ 
tally wanting in us, it would not flop the courfe of hu¬ 
man knowledge ; confequently, this reprefentation arifes 
merely from impreflions derived from experience,•or it is 
empirical. But, were the reprefentations of Time and 
Sface, of Quantity, of Reality, of Substance, of 
Cause, & c. defective in us, we could then have no expe¬ 
rimental knowledge at all. Thefe latter we mull there¬ 
fore confider as fomething appertaining to the human 
mind. We call them therefore, in opposition to empiri¬ 
cal, pure reprefentations, or reprefentations a priori; not 
as if we could be ccnfcious of them in the mind prior to 
all experience, but becaufe, as the eflential conditions 
of all our knowledge, they have their ground, not in the 
known objedls, but in the original confutation of the know¬ 
ing faculty-. 
As the knowing faculty confifts of Sense, Under¬ 
standing, and Reason, (fee the article Kant, vol. xi. 
p. 608.) it mult form pure reprefentations of Senfe (Tim© 
and Space), pure reprefentations of Underji'anding (twelve 
Categories), pure reprefentations of Reafon (fix Ideas). 
Thefe pure reprefentations conftitute the matter of Me¬ 
taphysics (Ms-raf vcr . y .-/ i ), n fcience fo named, becaufe it 
goes farther than Phujics, or experimental fcience ; and 
treats of thofe reprefentations which lie at the founda¬ 
tion of all our knowledge, as well as of thofe which 
Reafon arrives at, when it concludes, from the things 
given, upon a firft and chief condition. 
We have always admitted the divifion of Metaphyfics 
into four parts. Ontology, Cofmology,' Pfychology, and 
Theology. Agreeably to this divifion, Ontology deve¬ 
loped the pure reprefentations of Senfe and XJnderJianding ; 
Cofmology, Pfvcology, and Theology, treat of the Ideas 
formed by Reafon of the World, the Soul, and the Deity. 
We may here remark, that, befides a theoretical, there is 
alfo a practical, ufe of the knowing faculty, or of Reafon, 
in its wideft fignification. 
That knowledge is called theoretical by which we per¬ 
ceive what is real, p- fible, or nece.ffary ; and that practical, 
by which we know how to regulate our conduct, uhat to 
do, and what to leave undone; or how our volitions and ac¬ 
tions mud be regulated, in order to fulfil the laws of our 
nature. Befides the inclinations and inIfigs of ourfen- 
fible nature, which tend to pleafure and happinefs, we 
find alfo within us, a pure unconditioned law, namely, 
the Moral Law ; and Reafon, as the author of this, is 
called pure practical Reason. Hence it is clear, that, 
by Metaphyfics of Morals, mu ft be underftood,an inveftiga- 
tion and-development of the principles of pure practi¬ 
cal reafon. They may perhaps be more intelligibly 
termed Metaphysics of Practical Reason, in order 
Vgl. XVII. No. 1193. 
O N U 50L 
to diftinguifli them from the Metaphyfics of Theoretical 
Reafon, which are (imply termed Metaphyfics. Laftlv, by 
the Metaphysics of Natural Philosophy, is under- 
ftood, that application and more extended development 
of the theoretical metaphyfical fundamental conceptions, 
which has in view to eftablifti and elucidate the original 
principles of our knowledge of corporeal nature, and 
treats of the laws of Motion, of Attradlion, Repul« 
fion, See. 
The reader will find under the article Logic, vol. xfii. 
p. 1, &c. the laws of thinking, or formal philofophy, not 
only amply difeufled, but the theoretical and fundamental 
parts of this fcience completely exhaufted ; fo that, in 
conlequence of the great difeoveries of Immanuel Kant, 
we now poffefs the advantage of a permanent and univer- 
JalfyJiem of Logic, the grand defideratum of fcience. 
Under the article Metaphysics, vol. xv. p. 198. the 
theoretical ufe of Reafon is fully treated, the queftiort 
How are Metaphyfics as a Science pofiible ? amply dif- 
cufl’ed, and its folution fatisfadlorily given ; (bowing, that 
metaphyfics are a gift of nature, implanted in every hu¬ 
man mind. Since the profound analyfis of our knowing 
faculty, in Kant’s Critic of Pure Reason, meta¬ 
phyfics can no longer be confidered as a mere fyftem of 
plaufible opinions, but mull claim the firft rank among 
Sciences, having been brought to alfolute completenefs, 
and to a permanent Jlate, that admits of no further difeo¬ 
veries. For reafon mnit be able to judge of the. nature 
and validity of its own knowledge ; and, having once 
reprelented the fundamental laws of its own powers in a 
determinate manner, there is nothing more for it to do 
theoretically: this alone gives complete and lading fatis- 
fadlion to reafon. 
In the article Moral Philosophy, vol. xv. p. 763. 
the practical ufe of reafon is difplayed. It is here that 
Kant’s tranfeendant merit (bines forth in its fulleft luftre. 
This extraordinary man, by the deepeft refearch, has un¬ 
folded human reafon, and difeovered that it is divilible 
into two diftindt parts, whole ufes are equally diftindt : 
Theoretical and Practical Reason. The former 
department of this faculty refers to the nature, the poffibi- 
hty, the reality, and relation, of things, as theyexift. The 
latter is a faculty to determine the Will without the im- 
pulfe of Senfe. Hence arifes the Moral Law, a fail of 
Practical Reafon as felf-evident as the faff of our exiftence. 
Here come under confideration Right and Wrong, Good 
and Evil, the Freedom of the Human Will, all our Du¬ 
ties, as well as the Idea of God, of a future State, and of 
a Pure Moral Religion, which elevates us above the things 
of this earth, and enables us to confider every thing in 
reference to that Being, who awards a happinefs propor¬ 
tionate to virtue, and makes virtue to be the caufe of 
happinefs ! For further information on this fubjedt, fee 
the article Philosophy. T. W. 
ONTONG' JA'VA, a group of Iflands in the Pacific 
Ocean, twenty-two in number, called by Mendana Iiaxos m 
de la Candelaria; they are now called New Ireland, 
which fee, vol. xi. Lat. 6.15. S. I011.156.E. 
ONTO'RIA, a town of Spain, in Afturia, nearthe fea: 
forty-five miles eaft-north-eaft of Oviedo. 
ONTOS'OPHY, f. [from the Gr. uv eno;, being, and 
trotpicx ., wifdom.] Ontology; the fcience which coniiders 
the various diftindtions and affedlions of being. 
ON PS," a town of Spain, in Afturia : forty-one miles 
eaft of Oviedo. 
O'NUM, a town of Sweden, in Weft Gothland : thirty- 
fix miles eaft of Udd-evalla. 
ONU'PHIS, in ancient geography, a town of Egypt, 
and capital of a nome called Onuphites Nomos, fituated 
about the middle of the Delta, on the right bank of the 
canal called Atbribiticus Sinus, between Sebennytus and 
Butus. 
ONU'PHRIUS (Panvinius), a celebrated Auguftine 
monk, born at Verona in 1529, who, applying to the 
■ ftudy of eccleiiaftical hiftory, continued the “ Lives of the 
6 M Popes,” 
