G90 
ORATORY, 
cuftom and habit thefe things become fo familiar to us, 
that vve do not always attend to them feparately in their 
natural order. 
Oratory is again divided into the demonstrative, the 
deliberative, and the judicial. Ariftotle is laid to be the 
author of this divifion, which feems to be very juft; fince, 
perhaps, there is no fuhjedt of oratory, whether facred or 
civil, that may not be referred to one or other of thefe 
heads. It is a divifion which runs through all the an¬ 
cient treatifes on rhetoric, and is followed by the moderns 
who copy them. Dr. Blair, however, though upon the 
whole he approves and commends this divifion, fomewhat 
deviates from it; and prefers following that divifion 
which the train of modern fpeaking naturally points out 
to usj taken from the three great fcenes of eloquence, po- 
jrular ajfemblies, the bar, and the pulpit, each of which 
has a diftindl character that particularly fuits it. This 
divifion coincides in part with the ancient one. The 
eloquence of popular aflemblies, confifts moftly of what 
the ancients term the deliberative fpecies, and yet admits 
alfo of the demonftrative. The eloquence of the bar is 
precifely the fame with what the ancients called the judi¬ 
cial. The eloquence of the pulpit is altogether of a dif- 
rindl nature, and cannot be properly comprehended under 
any of the heads of the ancient rhetoricians.. 
I. Popular Oratory, or Elocution of the Senate. 
The rules laid down by Cicero and Quintilian, though 
necefl'ary perhaps fora young orator to know, cannot be ri¬ 
gidly followed at prefent in our own fenate, where all mull 
appear extempore, and free even from the femblance of for¬ 
mal or ftudied arrangement. Long fpeeches are indeed 
faftiionable, and yet are feldom heard with patience; but 
the rule drawn from thefe claflical models, that the orator 
fliould proceed in the peroratio by every moving art to 
complete his conqueft over the paffions, fuch as, admira¬ 
tion, furprife, hope, joy, fear, grief, pity, anger, in courts 
of juftice, and indeed in a national aflembly, where an in¬ 
dividual’s life or character is at Hake, or where a public 
meafureis to be attacked or defended, has often appeared 
to us an abufe of rhetoric and eloquence ; plain fabts, and 
unadorned truth, would be more ufeful to mankind, than 
fpeaking to the paffions, and endeavouring, by oratorical 
flouriflies, to make black pafs for white, and white for 
black. 
Yet, as the eloquence of the fenate is partly delibera¬ 
tive, partly controverfial, and partly declamatory, it ad¬ 
mits, and even occationally demands, a more impetuous 
warmth, a more rapid and vehement emotion, than in 
other circumftances could be at all decorous. The fer- 
mons of Mafliilon might require, or at leaft their effedl 
might be heightened by,a denunciative feverity, an awful 
aufterity of manner, that fliould imprefshis audience with 
all the ideas and feelings of a fupernatural agency; and, 
under fuch circumftances, the oratory of the pulpit might 
feem to have been carried even above the heights, and 
beyond the force, of fenatorial and popular oratory; but 
it is in the fenate alone, and the popular aflemblies-of the 
’nation, that the orator is to hurry away the impetuous 
paffions, and. tranfport the hearer into abfolute adlion; 
and there only are, of courfe, required the full thunders 
of elocutionary energy. But it is not only in the fervid 
tones of an impetuous declamation, that the fenatorial 
elocutionift fliould excel; in the calm dignity of a well- 
modulated cadence, and the polifiied grace and propriety 
of enunciation, he fliould alfo lurpafs; and in the ealy 
urbanity of tone and euphony (when the ftronger exer¬ 
tions of eloquence are not required) he fliould manifeft, 
at once, the dignity of the ftatefman, and the elegance 
and refinement of the polite Icholar. How little thefe 
circumftances (almoft all of them within the reach of a 
well-dire£ted education) are attended to, is but too ge¬ 
nerally known; and, in the humble Hate of modern ora¬ 
tory (as judged by its eft'efts), the confequences may but 
too well be difcovered. 
II. Judicial Oratory, or Eloquence of the Bar. 
The judicial is the fame with the eloquence of the bar 
employed in addreffing judges, who have power to abfolve 
or condemn. In judicial affairs, both the Grecian and 
Roman youth who weredefirous to gain a reputation for 
eloquence, ufed commonly to give the firft proofs of their 
genius and ability. The firft of Cicero’s orations now ex¬ 
tant is_his defence of Publius Quintius, which he fpoke 
in the 26th year of his age. It was indeed at the bar 
that young orators ufed firft; to exercife and try their ge¬ 
nius in public ; and they took care to prepare themfelves 
for this, by declaiming beforehand, either in the fchools, 
or under the inftruftion of fome fkilful perfon in private. 
In judicial controverfies there are two parties, the plain¬ 
tiff or profecutor, and the defendant or perfon charged. 
The fubjedt is fomething pall; and the end propofed by 
them Cicero calls “ equity,” or “ right and equity ;” the 
former of which arifes from the laws of the country, and 
the latter from reafon and the nature of things. 
All judicial caufes are either private or public; that is, 
they relate to the right of particular perions, and thefe 
are alfo called civil caufes, as they are converfant about 
matters of property; or they are thofe which relate to 
public juftice and the government of the ftate ; and thefe 
are alfo called criminal, becaufe by them crimes are pro- 
fecuted, whether they be capital or of alefs heinous nature. 
In the eloquence of the bar, or that which is employed 
in judicial cafes, the great objebl is convidlion. Here it is 
not the fpeaker’s bufinefs to perfuade the judges to what 
is good or ufeful, but to fhow them what is jult and true; 
and, of courfe, it is chiefly, or folely, to the underftanding 
that his eloquence is addrefled. Belides, fpeakers at the 
bar addrefs themfelves to one, or to a few judges, who are 
perfons generally of age, gravity, and authority of cha- 
rafler. And, moreover, the nature and management of 
the fubjedls which belong to the bar, require a very dif¬ 
ferent fpecies of oratory from that of popular aflemblies. 
From the confiderations here l'uggefted it appears, that 
the eloquence of the bar is of a much more limited, more 
lober, and chaftened, kind, than that of popular aflem¬ 
blies; and, for fimilar reafons, the judicial orations of 
Cicero or Demofthenes are not to be regarded as exabl 
models of the manner of fpeaking which is adapted to the 
prefent ftate of the bar. The nature of the bar anciently, 
both in Greece and Rome, attained a much nearer ap¬ 
proach to popular eloquence than it now does. Stribl 
law was much lefs an objebt of attention in ancient judi¬ 
cial orations than it is become among us. Eloquence, 
much more than jurifprudence, was the ftudy of thofe 
who were to plead caufes; and, accordingly, Cicero fays, 
that three months ftudy was fufficient to make any man a 
complete civilian ; nay, it was thought that a perfon might 
be a good pleader at the bar who had never ftudied law 
at all. Befides, the civil and criminal judges, both in 
Greece and Rome, were commonly much more numerous 
than they are with us, and formed a fort of popular af- 
fembly. Thus the renowned tribunal of Areopagus at 
Athens confifted of at leaft fifty judges. In Rome, the 
praetor, who was the proper judge both in civil and cri¬ 
minal caufes,named, for every catife of moment, the “ Ju- 
dices felebti,” as they were called, who were afways nu¬ 
merous, and had the office and power of both judge and 
jury. 
On the other hand, it fliould be duly confidered, that 
among us the foundation of a lawyer’s reputation and 
fnccels mull always be laid in a profound knowledge of 
his own profeffion. Having laid this foundation, by being 
well acquainted not only with the law in general, but by 
a knowledge of the caufe which he is to plead in particu¬ 
lar, he fliould be apprifed, that eloquence in pleading is 
of the highell moment for giving fupport to a caufe. 
There is perhaps no fcene of public fpeaking where elo¬ 
quence is more necefl'ary; and the effedt of good fpeak¬ 
ing is always very great. Confequently, of all the liberal 
profeflions, 
