PARIS. 
tiled on tile public by the minifters, in taking no notice 
of the Treaty between the allies, on the 25th March ; of 
which they had received an account on the 5th of April, 
when the regent’s meflage was brought down on the 6th, 
and taken into confideration on the 7th; by which fup- 
preflion they had held forth the pofJibi 1 ity of an alternative 
between pence and war, whilft, in faft, they had engaged 
themfelves to the latter. He then made fome fevere ani- 
madverfions on the declaration of the allies, by which one 
individual was placed out of the pale of civil 1’ociety; and 
endeavoured to fhow that there was neither juftice nor 
policy in making him the objeft of a w'ar. He concluded 
by moving, “That an humble addrefs be prefented to 
the prince-regent, to intreat his royal-highnefs that he 
will be pleafed to take fuch meafures as may be neceflary 
to prevent this country being involved in war, on the 
ground of the executive power being inverted in any par¬ 
ticular perfon.” 
Lord Caftlereagh oppofed the motion, and defended 
the conduit of government with refpeft to the charge of 
concealment, by faying, that he was unwilling, by a 
premature difclofure of a treaty, of which the ratifications 
had not been exchanged, to prevent a reconfuleration of 
the policy to be purfued towards France, under the cir- 
cumftances which had recently occurred. In the courfe 
of his fpeech his lordfhip unequivocally declared it to be 
the firm conviftion of all the allied fovereigns, that it was 
not poflible to avail themfelves of the blefiings of tran¬ 
quillity ; and that Bonaparte was a perfon with whom it 
was impofiible to live in relations of peace and amity : in 
fine, that war with him was unavoidable. As an inftance 
of his bafl faith, this man, when he made his movement 
upon Bar-fur-Aube, on the rear of the allies, the fuccefs 
of which was problematical, fent inrtrudlions to Caulin- 
court at Chatillon, which inftruftions happened to come 
into his (Lord C.’s) pofieflion, directing him to accede 
to the terms propofed by the allies; but to contrive, by 
keeping certain points fufpended and delayed, to afford 
him (Bonaparte) an opportunity, if circumftances fhould 
enable him, to prevent the fulfilment of the treaty. He 
wifhed to retain Antwerp, which was not the key of 
France, but of Great Britain ; Mayence, which was the 
key of Germany ; and Alexandria, which was the key 
of Italy. The motion was negatived by 273 to 72 votes. 
The following are the inftruftions alluded to by lord 
Cartlereagh in his fpeech. They were fent in a difpatch 
from the duke of Baflano (Maret) to Caulincourt at Cha¬ 
tillon. “ Sir, Your excellency will have received, or will 
doubtlefs in the courfe of to-day receive, a difpatch from 
Rheims, of which M. Frochot was the bearer, and which 
was accompanied by a letter from the emperor. The em¬ 
peror defires that you will avoid explaining yourfelf clearly 
upon every thing which may relate to delivering up the 
fortrefles of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alexandria, if you 
fhould be obliged to confent to thefe celfions: his majelty 
intending, even though hejhould have ratified the t\caty, to be 
guided by the military Situation of affairs. Wait till the 
laft moment. The bad faith of the allies, in relpeft to the 
capitulations of Drefden, Dantzic, and Gorcum, autho- 
rifes us to endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, 
thefe queftions to a military arrangement, as was done at 
Prefburg, Vienna, and Tilfit. His majefty defires that 
you will not lofe fight of the dilpofition which he feels 
not to deliver up thole three keys of France, if military 
events, on which he is willing Hill to rely, fhould permit 
him not to do fo, even if he fhould have ligned the ceffion 
of all thofe fortrefles. In a word, his majelty wifhes to be 
able, after the treaty, to be guided by circumftances to 
the laft moment. He orders you to burn this letter as 
foon as you have read it. March 19, 1814.” 
The allies at that time declared that they w’ould no 
longer treat with Napoleon or his family. What reliance 
then could be placed on his prefent profeflions ? Not yet 
firmly feated on his throne, his army diforganized, and 
bis funds exhaufted, there was every probability of 
Vol. XVIII. No. 1262. 
521 
crufhing him by one fimultaneous effort. But if he was 
permitted to mature his projefts, and call into aftion the 
yet powerful refources of France, the attempt to deftroy 
or even to curb him might be impracticable. If they 
fuffered him to remain unmolefted, the peace, if peace 
it could be called, would be a feverifn ftate of anxiety and 
fufpicion, as expenfive and burdenfome as war itfelf. 
But it was the general and very reafonable opinion, 
that it was his full intention to take the firft opportunity 
of recovering Belgium and the Rhine as a boundary. 
This was the with alfo of the majority of the French na¬ 
tion. A number of pamphlets were published in Paris, 
at this time, which tended to encourage the public opi¬ 
nion in this idea. In one of them, entitled De I'JEmpe- 
reur Napoleon et du Comte de Lille, is the following paf- 
fage : “ What have we feen, great God ! After twenty 
years of combats, of fatigues, and glory, all the fruits of 
our labours parting into foreign hands; and, if any aft of 
our government difpleafe, in two days they can reach the 
walls of our capital, and impofe laws upon us at their 
pleafure ! What ! Belgium, our firft conqueft, palfes un¬ 
der other mafters ! What! all the country extending 
from the Meule and the Mofelle to the Rhine is the prey 
of a fovereign whom we have twice driven from his ftates !’’ 
The fame pamphleteer alfo talks of the “ treafon of Pruf- 
fia, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg;” of the “ clemency and 
pity of Napoleon towards Auftria in 1S09, and of the 
total oblivion of the benefits which the magnanimous 
Napoleon had conferred on the whole of the allies, &c.” 
One Gaillard, in a pamphlet entitled Du Retonr des Hour- 
Ions en France, fpeaking of the Treaty of Paris, fays : 
“ We well recolleft the bitter vexation which this high- 
minded people felt when this humiliating treaty was pub- 
lifhed. An indefcribable aftonilhment leized all French 
hearts: thus were deftroyed, in one day, the labours of 
five-and-twenty years : the fruits of fo many battles, 1b 
many facrifices, fell into foreign hands.” Another pam¬ 
phlet, entitled L'Homme du Siecle et de la Patrie, con¬ 
tains the following : “ We were told, that with the return 
of the Bourbons we obtained peace with foreign powers. 
What a peace ! the peace of difgrace and of death ! our 
military renown was impaired ; the natural boundaries of 
France, thole glorious fruits of twenty-five years labour, 
were furrendered.” 
On thefe grounds, therefore, the war which united 
Europe prepared to wage againft him, was not only julti- 
fiable, but neceflary. The difpolition of the French, army, 
nay, even of the French people, and the charafter of the 
individual at the head of the government, demonftrated 
that furrounding nations could not be at peace. The 
relllefs ambition and third of foreign conqueft, and the 
dilregard for the rights and independence of other ftates, 
which had characterized Napoleon and his army, exported 
the whole of Europe to renewed rtcenes of devaftation 
and blood. His deltruftion, as a ruler, was therefore re¬ 
quired, not only as an expiation of former crimes, but 
as a neceflary meafure of precaution and fecurity. The 
unbounded influence which he had hitherto exerted over 
a people fo vain-glorious, fo volatile, and fo demoralized, 
as the French, and the calamities in which, by thele 
means, he had involved every furrounding country, not 
only juftified thofe countries in uniting, but imperiously 
called upon them to unite, and prohibit France from 
again placing berfelf at the dilpofal of a man in whole 
hands Ihe mult ever be an objeft of alarm and terror. 
Candour requires the acknowledgment, that fome en¬ 
lightened men, who had the belt opportunity forobferving' 
him, and who would not be eafily imported upon, were 
perluaded that the intentions of Napoleon were honelt. 
They imagined that he had feen the folly of his conduft; 
that he wilhed to atone for his errors ; and that he had de¬ 
termined to refpedt the liberties of France and the peace 
of Europe. Carnot was of this opinion. 
Others, with fome degree of plaulibility, reartoned thus : 
The ruling paflion of Napoleon is ambition. That paflion 
6 R is 
