PARIS. 
like other eminent commanders, would not place much 
faith in the intelligence received from fources that may¬ 
be fo eafily corrupted. Frederic II. was furprifed at 
Hochkirchen, in confequence (it is faid) of his fecretcor- 
refpondent in the Auftrian camp being difcovered by 
marlhal Daun, and obliged to fend him a falfe difpatch : 
but, be this as it may, the truth is, that the greateft mi¬ 
litary fuccefles are obtained, not by relying on fuch pre¬ 
carious information, but by vigilance and activity in 
watching the enemy’s movements. If ever a general was 
fitted for the intriguing bufinefs of efpionmge, it was Bo¬ 
naparte; yet, if we fcrutinize the caufes of his mightieft 
victories, whether in his memorable campaign of 1796, in 
bis capture of Mack in 1805, or in the movements that 
led to the more difaftrous day of Jena, we (hall perceive 
that the whole may be explained without a reference to 
fuch myfterious communications. It admits of no doubt 
that at the battle of Quatre Bras our troops were in a very 
unprepared ftate : but the explanation of this fail will be 
found to involve very little cenfure on a general who had 
been always diftinguilhed, when commanding feparately, 
for his promptitude in point of information. The duke 
feems to have erred in nothing but in placing too much 
confidence in the vigilance of the officers, whether Pruffian, 
Belgian, or Britifh, who were ftationed on the frontier: 
but the great caufe of our fighting unprepared is to be 
fought in the temper of a veteran (Blucher) glowing 
with all the impatience of youth to come into contaft with 
the opprefl'ors of his country, and determined to fight in 
Flanders, as he had done in Champagne, without allow¬ 
ing much time for the co-operation of his allies. 
The plan of the Pruffians, againft fo aftive an enemy as 
Bonaparte, (fiould have been to place in the advanced 
pofitions fuch fmall bodies of horle or foot as might have 
made a temporary reliftance during the two. days that 
were evidently neceflary to colleft the numerous bodies 
of the allied troops fcattered over an extent of fifty or fixty 
miles. Thefe detachments might have been ordered to 
retreat, or authorized to furrender, as foon as their com¬ 
manders had afcertained the decided fuperiority of the 
enemy, and could tranfmit fuch intelligence to head¬ 
quarters as would enable the allied generals to determine 
with confidence the real direction of Napoleon’s march. 
On this fyftetn, the day for a general adion would have 
been the 17th ; by which time all the allied troops might 
have arrived, from right and left, at a central pofition on 
the Bruffels road in the neighbourhood of Waterloo or 
Genappe. Blucher, however, cbofe to try the fate of 
arms on the 16th, without calculating the time required 
by the Britilh to arrive, and even without waiting for one 
of the divifions of his own army. “ The marflial’s plan,” 
fays the Pruffian official account, “ was to fight a general 
engagement with the enemy as foon as pofjible. On the 
16th, Bulow’s corps had been delayed in its march, and 
had not yet come up; neverthelefs, the field-marlhal re- 
folved to give battle a refolution in which he perfifted 
without confidering that the Britilh general was not on 
the frontier, but at BrulTels. 
No time appears to have been loft by the duke, in 
acting on the intelligence tranfinitted to him by the 
Pruffians. It reached him only on the evening of the 15th, 
and our troops (at lead our infantry) began their march 
from all points at daylight on the 16th. Had the aflem- 
bling of the French force been made from the eaft, the 
duke would have had lefs hefitation in directing his march 
immediately towards the Pru(fians : but a great part of 
the enemy came from the weft, and might have threatened 
Bruffels by a (horter road than that which they a&ually 
took. The confequence of making a ftand in fo advanced 
a pofition as Ligny was that, as early as the forenoon of 
the 16th, Ney’s vanguard was in poffeffion of the great 
road of communication between the Britilh and the Pruf¬ 
fians. The intercourfe of the two armies was thus inter¬ 
rupted ; fo that the duke remained during the whole of 
the fucceeding night in uncertainty as to the iffue of the 
S 
535 
battle of Ligny, A patrole fent by his grace in the di¬ 
rection of Ligny, in the morning of the 17th, feems to 
have brought him the firft account of Blucher’s retreat: 
it was confirmed by a Prulfian aid-de-camp fome time 
afterward, but too late to fave the double labour of firft 
bringing up our artillery, and afterward dragging it back 
all the way to Waterloo. 
In thusanimadverting on the over-eagernefs of Blucher, 
we muft not be deemed infenfible to the merits of that 
gallant and eftimable veteran. His fierce impetuous 
mode of fighting had great effect in checking and enfee¬ 
bling the P'rench ; which was apparent, among other 
things, by Bonaparte finding it neceflary to call to his 
afliftance, on the 16th, the corps of 25,000 men from 
under the command of Ney. 
While the Pruffian army was retreating, the duke of 
Wellington and the army under his command, remained 
on, the field-of-battle at Quatre Bras; (fo named from its 
Handing near where the roads from Bruffels to Charleroi, 
and from Nivelles to Namur, crofs each other.) He had 
been joined by the cavalry and artillery, and the reft of 
the army. By the morning of the 17th, he had placed 
the whole in the pofition of Quatre Bras, and was combi¬ 
ning his meafures to attack Ney at Frafnes, when he re¬ 
ceived a difpatch from Blucher, informing him of the un¬ 
fortunate reliilt of affairs on his fide. The retreat of the 
Prulfian army rendered a correfponding movement, on 
the part of the Britilh general, afifolutely neceflary, in or¬ 
der to maintain his communication with the Pruffians. 
He accordingly refolved on retreating towards Bruffels, 
which was done in the rnoft perfeft order. 
Such were the refults of the fanguinary combats of 
Ligny and Quatre Bras, where, according to marlhal 
Soult, “the overthrow was terrible, and the effedt thea¬ 
trical.''' The emperor had, indeed, at one point beaten, 
but not broken, the line, fo far as to compel the allies to 
choofe other ground to re-form it; but from that he was 
not able to derive any material advantage, and certainly 
none fuch as he had anticipated. Although the allies had 
found it neceflary to retreat, yet he did not attempt to 
purfue them. In the battle of the 16th, both Tides fought 
with the utmoft refolution; but the French foldiers with 
the bittereft animofity. The firft and third corps of the 
French army had lioifted the black flag, and refolved to 
give no quarter to their enemies. But the animofity of 
the French troops was particularly directed againft the 
Pruffians: “On the 15th, before Charleroy,” faid an of¬ 
ficial account to Davouft, “ feveral fquares of Pruffian in¬ 
fantry were broken by fome fquadrons : of 5 or 6000 
men, who compofed thofe fqmares, only 1700 could be 
faved.” The Moniteur, however, comes clofer and more 
boldly to the point. On the 16th, faid that paper, “the 
firing of our troops againft the Pruffians, whofe govern¬ 
ment has been the principal inltigator of this unjult war, 
was fuch, that the emperor was obliged to order the re¬ 
call to be beaten three times, for the purpofe of enjoining 
the making of prifoners, and of Hopping the carnage.” 
The retreat of the allied armies gave the French an op¬ 
portunity, at which they are adepts, and which at this 
time was peculiarly neceflary, namely, to claim great and 
brilliant victories ; and alfo to anticipate the moll happy 
and decifive refults in their favour. Bulletin after bul¬ 
letin was tranfinitted by telegraph to the interior, and to 
the Ihores of the ocean, to announce that the emperor 
“ had completely beaten the united armies of Wellington 
and Blucher.” Three of thefe difpatches were received 
at Boulogne on the morning of the 18 th. Paris was illu¬ 
minated. The moft extravagant joy was manifefted by 
the friends of the emperor. The whole vanity and arro¬ 
gance of the ambitious and thoughtlefs French people 
were again brought forward to public notice: “ His ma- 
jefty,” faid the Moniteur, “ was to enter Bruflels the day 
after this glorious adtion, in which, it is faid, the fafety 
of the general-in-chief, Wellington, is compromifed. 
Whole bands of prifoners are taken. We do not know 
what 
