018 PARLIAMENT. 
The remaining rights of voting are of a (fill more com¬ 
plicated deftription. Burgageholds, leafeholds, and free¬ 
holds, fcot-and-lot inhabitants, houfeholders, inhabitants 
at large, potwallopers, and commonalty, each in differ¬ 
ent boroughs prevail, and create endlefs mifunderftand- 
ings and litigation. This arifes from the difficulty which 
is daily found in defining and fettling the legal import of 
thole numerous diftinffions which, in fome places, com¬ 
mit the choice of two members to as many inhabitants 
as every houfe can contain ; in others, to the poffTeffor of a 
fpot of ground where neither houfes nor inhabitants have 
been feen for years; and which, in many inftances, have 
even baffled the wifdom of parliament to determine who 
are entitled to vote, or what conftitutes their right. 
Religions opinions create an incapacity to exercife the 
elective fianchife. All catholics are excluded in England, 
but not in Ireland; and by the operation of the teft- 
laws, proteftant diffenters are deprived of a voice ill the 
election of reprefentatives in all thofe horoughs where 
the right of voting is confined to the corporate officers 
alone. 
The reprefentation of the kingdom of Scotland, which 
contains two millions of inhabitants, is confined to the 
tenants of the crown in the feveral counties, to a corpo¬ 
ration of thirty-three individuals in the city of Edinburgh, 
and to fixty-five delegates from the fame number of felf- 
eleffed corporations of the royal burghs of Scotland. 
The whole number of electors in fome of the fliires does 
not exceed nine; and the wholeconftituent body of thir¬ 
ty-three counties is no more than 1368, a number 
greatly inferior to that of the freeholders in the ftnalleft 
county of England ; while the number of reprefenta¬ 
tives is only one more than is furnifhed from the rotten 
boroughs of Cornwall. We (hall forbear to make any 
comment where the external evidence of defective re¬ 
prefentation is (0 glaring as to fet at defiance all fophif- 
try, and imprefs convidtion on the unprejudiced part of 
mankind ; where the reprefented part of the community 
does not amount to a hundred in a hundred thoufand ; 
and where property, held in tenure from the crown and 
corporate bodies, deriving exclufive privileges from ac¬ 
cident and intrigue, can alone exercife the rights of 
freemen. 
“To reftore the ancient right of elediion, as it was ex- 
- ercifed in the tythings of the refpedtive hundreds in each 
county by the houfeholders in numerical divifions,” fays 
Mr. Oldfield, “ would at once corredl all the exifting 
abufes, and eftablifh a reprefentation of the people per¬ 
fectly fair and equal ; it would extinguifli all contentions 
about elective lights, and fave millions of money wafted 
in expendve contefts. Theeledtive franchife ought to be 
common and perfonal ; and, if not ex ercifed by all, which, 
by the earlieft writs of Edward the Firft, we find to have 
been the conftitutional right of the people, the qualifica¬ 
tion ftiould be fo moderate, that there might be no con¬ 
dition in life in which it ftiould not be in the power of 
every individual to acquire it by labour, by induftry, or 
by talent. 
“ If, in the end, this ftiould furnifli an election, as we 
believe it would do, for the whole united kingdom, by 
nearly a million and half of heads of families, enough 
would he done to guard the rights of property on one 
hand, and to fatisfy the national claims of perfonal re¬ 
prefentation on the other; and, if a conftituent power fo 
formed, fo extended, and fo limited, be not fufficient to 
create a free and independent houfe of commons, the 
cafe is defperate ; the object can never be obtained. 
“ In fupport of perfonal right it is contended, that every 
one has what may be called property ; every man has life, 
perfonal liberty, character, a right to his earnings, a 
right to his religious profeffion and worlhip according to 
bis confcience, &c. Thus the poor are liable to be in¬ 
jured by the government in a variety of ways. Accor¬ 
ding to the commonly-received doCtrine, that fervants 
and thofe who receive alms have no right to vote for mem¬ 
bers of parliament, an immenfe multitude of people are 
deprived of all power to determine who (hall be the pro¬ 
testors of their lives, their perfonal liberty, their little 
property, (which, though fingly confidered, is of fmall 
value, yet is, in the aggregate, a great objeCt,) and the 
virtue of their wives and daughters, That which is pe¬ 
culiarly hard upon the poor in this cafe is that, though 
they have no (hare in determining who (hall be the law¬ 
givers of their country, they have a heavy (hare in railing 
the taxes which fupport its government. The taxes on 
malt, beer, leather, foap, candles, and other articles, 
which are paid chiefly by the poor who are allowed no 
vote for members of parliament, are equal in amount to 
a heavy land-tax. The landed intereft would complain 
grievoufly if they had no power of electing reprefentatives ; 
and it is in free dates an eftablilhed maxim, that whoever 
contributes to the expenfes of government, ought to be 
fatisfied concerning the application of the money contri¬ 
buted by him, and confequently ought to have a (hare in 
electing thofe who have power over its application. 
“ That the collective body of qualified electors ftiould 
be as numerous- as poffible is alfo defirable for many rea- 
fons; but principally becaufea great number of electors, 
by making each individual vote of no venal value, and 
hardly worth folicitation, is of itfelf a better fecurity 
again ft corruption than the fevered laws again ft: bribery. 
The fecurity which, on the other fide, this would afford 
againft violence and faff ion, depends on the perfonal cir- 
cumftance, character, and lituation, of the voters. To ex¬ 
clude the effeCt of influence and favour on human affions 
is impoffible; but, when the eleffor has fomething to 
give and nothing to fell, it may reafonably be expeffed 
that his inclination and his judgment will go together, 
and determine him in favour of the worthielt candidate. 
A houfe of commons thus chofen by the combined ope¬ 
ration of property and population, will be free and inde¬ 
pendent, if any thing can make it fo. To maintain it free 
and independent of any influence or intereft but that of 
its conftituents, the choice of new reprefentatives mult 
frequently revert to the people. 
“ The advocates, however, for limited right off iff rage 
defire to reftore the confutation to the ftate in which it 
exifted from the earlieft times to the paffmg the ftatute of 
the eighth of Henry the fixth; and to reinftate every 
honfeholder in Great Britain, paying parifti-taxes, in the 
right of voting for one member of parliament. 
“ The fpecies of property which conftitutes this quali¬ 
fication, has the advantage of being open, oftenfible, and 
incapable of being difputed. It indicates a real relidence, 
and implies a ftationary intereft in the place for which 
the vote is given and the reprefentative chofen. But, 
befides the poffeflion of a competent property, of which 
the occupation of a houfe paying taxes is a fufficient pre¬ 
emption, a honfeholder has other qualities, which ought 
to recommend him to favourable diltinCtion, and particu¬ 
larly to the truft in queftion. He is neceifarily the matter, 
and probably the father, of a family. In the firft charac¬ 
ter, he has perfonal credit and refpect to maintain ; in the 
fecond, he has given affual hoftagesto fociety. He is the 
natural guardian and virtual reprefentative, not only of his 
family and fervants, but of all thofe who depend upon him 
for fupport, protection, or employment. Sucli a ftation 
deferves confidence, and ftiould be made refpeftable, that 
all men may be prompted and encouraged to rife to it. 
The relations and duties that belong to it are antecedent 
to all pofitive inftitutions, and conltitute at once the ba-. 
fis and the fecurity of civil fociety. 
“By the re-eftabli(hment of the-hundreds and tythings 
in each county, the lyftem of reprefentation may be re¬ 
novated, and a reform obtained upon either of thefe 
principles. Such a number of the hundreds as would 
have a right to choofe one member of parliament, might 
be affociated into a diftriff for that purpofe, and the poll 
be taken in eacli hundred before the conftable on the 
fame day and hour all over Great Britain and Ireland. 
