PAS 
they defire only as means of promoting that end ; and 
therefore he feems to think that thefe paffions mud be 
innate. To add ftrength to this reafoning, he obferves 
that we may perceive fome degree of thefe principles even 
in brute animals of the moft fagacious kind, who are not 
thought to defire means for the fake of ends which they 
have in view. But it is in accounting for the paflions 
which are difinterefted that the advocates for innate 
principles feem molt completely to triumph. As it is 
impoflible not to feel the paffion of pity upon the profpedt 
of a fellow-creature in diitrefs, they argue, that the bafis 
of that paffion muftbe innate; becaufe pity, being at all 
times more or lefs painful to the perfon by whom it is 
felt, and frequently of no ufe to the perfon who is its 
objedl, it cannot in fucli inflances be the refult of deli¬ 
beration, but merely the exertion of an original inftindt. 
The fame kind of reafoning is employed to prove that 
gratitude is the exercife of an innate principle. That 
good offices are, by the very conftitution of our nature, 
apt to produce good-will towards the benefadtor, in good 
and bad men, in the lavage and in the civilized, cannot 
furely be denied by any one in the lealt acquainted with 
human nature. We are grateful not only to the bene- 
fadtors of ourfelves as individuals, but alfo to the bene- 
fadtors of our country ; and that, too, when we are con- 
fcious that from our gratitude neither they nor we can 
reap any advantage. Nay, we are impelled to be grate¬ 
ful even when we have reafon to believe that the objedts 
of our gratitude know not our exiftence. This paffion 
cannot be the effedt of reafoning, or of afl'ociation founded 
on reafoning ; for, in fuch cafes as thofe mentioned, 
there are no principles from which reafon can infer the 
propriety or ufefulnefs of the feeling. That publicfpirit, 
or the affedtion which we bear to our country, or to any 
flibordinate community of which we are members, is 
founded on inftindt, is deemed fo certain, that the man 
deftituteof this affedtion, if there be any fuch, has been 
pronounced as great a monfter as, he who has two 
heads. 
This reafoning has certainly great force ; and, if au¬ 
thority could have any weight in fettling a queftion of 
this nature, we know not that name to which greater de¬ 
ference is due than the name of him from whom it is ta¬ 
ken. Yet it muft be confeffed that the philofophers, who 
confider the affedtions and paffions as early and deep 
rooted affectations, fupport their opinion with very plau- 
fible arguments. We have attended with much folicitude 
to the adtions of children; and have no reafon to think 
that they feel terror on the brink of a precipice till they 
have been repeatedly warned of their danger in fuch fitu- 
ations by their parents or their keepers. Every perfon 
knows not only that they have no original or inlfindtive 
dread of fire, which is as dangerous to them as any pre¬ 
cipice; but that it is extremely difficult to keep them 
from that deftrudtive element till they are either capable 
of weighing the force of arguments, or have repeatedly 
experienced the pain of being burnt by it. With refpedt 
to fudden refentment, we cannot help confidering the 
argument which is brought in proof of its being inftinc- 
tive, as proving the contrary in a very forcible manner. 
Inftindt is fome myflerious influence of God upon the 
mind, exciting to adtions of beneficial tendency : but can 
any benefit arife from wreakingour impotent vengeance 
on a flock or a flone ? or is it fuppofable that a Being 
of infinite wifdom would excite us to adtions' fo extrava¬ 
gantly foolifh ? We learn from experience to defend our- 
felves againft rational or fenfible enemies, by retaliating 
the injuries which they inflidl upon us; and, if we have 
been often injured in any particular manner, the idea of 
that injury becomes in time fo clofely affociated with the 
means by which it has been conflantly repelled, that we 
never receive fuch an injury—a blow for inftance—with¬ 
out being prompted to make the ufual retaliation, with¬ 
out reflecting whether the objedt be fenfible or infe.ofible. 
So far from being inftindlive does refentment appear to 
us, that we think an attentive obferver may eafily per- 
s I O N. 755 
ceive how the feeds of it are gradually infufed into the 
youthful mind ; when the child, from being at firft a 
timid creature fhrinking from every pain, learns by de¬ 
grees to return blow for blow and threat for threat. 
But, inftead of urging what appears to ourfelves of 
mod weight again!! the inftindlive fyftem, w’e fhall lay 
before our readers a few extradls from a diflertation on 
the origin of the paffions, by a writer whole elegance of 
language and ingenuity of invelligation do honour to 
the fchool of Hartley. “ When an infant is born (fays 
Dr. Sayers), there is every reafon to fuppofe that he is 
born without ideas. Thefe are rapidly communicated 
through the medium of the fenfes. The fame fenfes are 
alfo the means of conveying to him pleafure and pain. 
Thefe are the hinges on which the paffions turn : and tiil 
the child is acquainted with thefe fenfations, it would ap¬ 
pear that no paffion could be formed in his mind ; for, till 
lie has felt pleafure and pain, how can he defire any ob- 
jedt, or. wifh for its removal ? How can he either love or 
hate ? Let us obferve then the manner in which love 
and hatred are formed ; for on thefe paffions depend all 
the reft. When a child endures pain, and is able to de¬ 
tect the caufe of it, the idea of pain is connedted in his 
mind with that of the thing which produced it; and, if 
the objedl which occafioned pain be again prefented to 
the child, the idea of pain affociated with it arifes alfo. 
This idea confequently urges the child to avoid or to re¬ 
move the objedl; and thus arifes the paffion of diflike or 
hatred. In the fame manner, the paffion of liking or 
love is readily formed in the mind of a child from theaf- 
fociation of pleafant ideas with certain objedts which pro- 
-duced them. The paffions of hope and fear are flates of 
the mind depending upon the good or bad profpedts of 
gratifying love or hatred ; and joy or forrow arifes from 
the final fuccefs or difappointment which attends the 
exertions produced by love or by hatred. Out of thefe 
paffions, which have all a perceptible relation to our own 
good, and are univerfally acknowledged to be felfifh, all 
our other paffions are formed.” Difquifitions Metapby- 
fical and Literary. 
Thus have we flated the two oppofite theories refpect- 
ing the origin of paffions in the mind, and given our 
readers a fliort fpecimen of the reafonings by which they 
are fupported by their refpedlive patrons. Were we 
called upon to decide between them, we fliould be 
tempted to fay, that they have both been carried to ex¬ 
tremes by fome of their advocates, and that the truth 
lies in the middle between them. “ It is impoffibie (lays 
Dr. Price,) but that creatures capable of pleafant and 
painful fenfations, fhould love and choofe the one, and 
diflike and avoid the other. No being who knows what 
happinefs and mifery are, can be fuppofed indifferent to 
them, without a plain contradidtion. Pain is not a pof- 
Jible objedl of defire, nor happinefs of averfion.” To 
prefer a greater good, though diflant, to a lefs good that 
is prefent, or to choofe a prefent evil, in order to avoid a 
greater future evil, is indeed wife and rational conduct ; 
but to choofe evil ultimately, is abfolutely impoffibie. 
Thus farthen muft be admitted, thatevery being poffefied 
of fenfe and intellect neceffarily delires his own good as 
loon as he knows what it is; but, if this knowledge be not 
innate, neither can the defire. Every human being 
comes into the world with a capability of knowledge, 
and of courfe with a capability of affedtions, delires, and 
palfions; but it feems not to be conceivable how he can 
adtually love, or hate, or dread, any thing, till he know 
whether it be good or ill, fafe or dangerous. If, there¬ 
fore, we have no innate ideas, we cannot poffibly have in¬ 
nate defires or uverfions. Thofe who contend that we 
have, feem to think, that without them reafon would be 
infufficient, either for the prefervation of the individual 
or the continuation of the 1'pecies;'and fome writers have 
alleged, that if our affedtions and paffions were the mere 
refult of early affociations, they would neceffarily be more 
capricious than we ever find them. But this objection 
feems to arife from their not rightly underftanding the 
theory 
