548 
NAP 
or. Calabria to the utmoft of his power. Finding him 
favourably inclined to their fchemes, and anxious to dif- 
tinguilh liimfelf by fome great exploit, their Sicilian ma- 
jefties invefted the Britifh admiral with the mofc ample 
authority in Calabria, and even conftituted him their 
viceroy in that province. But, though aCtive and in¬ 
defatigable in the duties of his new department, and fuc- 
cefsful in diftributing money, arms, and ammunition, 
among the Calabrians, he foon found that, unlefs an 
Englifh army made its appearance in the country, there 
was no chance of his producing an infurreCtion againft 
the French. It became, therefore, neceflary for the court 
of Palermo, either to abandon the fruit of all its intrigues 
and machinations, or to prevail on the commander of the 
Englifh forces in Sicily to invade Calabria with part of 
his army. 
After the evacuation of Naples, fir James Craig had 
retired with the Englifh army to Sicily, and eftablifhed 
his head-quarters at Medina, as the ftation belt adapted 
for protecting the ifland from invafion. There he re¬ 
mained till April, w'hen bad health compelled him to 
refign his command to fir John Stuart, who was foon 
after entrufted by his Sicilian majelty with the defence of 
the eaft coall of Sicily from Melazzo to Cape Paffaro, and 
with the command of the Sicilian troops in that diftriCt. 
The army continued in its pofition at Meflina till the end 
June, without attempting offenfive operations againft the 
enemy. It was of the utmoft importance to England 
that Sicily fliould not fall under the dominions of France; 
and therefore fir John Stuart, when folicited by .the 
court of Palermo to affift in its fchemes on Calabria, hefi- 
tated long, and deliberated maturely before he complied. 
He confidered that an expedition to Calabria, however 
it might gratify their Sicilian majefties, could not, on the 
moft favourable fuppofition, lead to their re-eftablifhment 
at Naples, nor even fecure to them the poffefTion of any 
part of their continental dominions; whereas, if it failed, 
it mull weaken the defence, and endanger the fafety, of 
Sicily. He was therefore averfe to fuch an expedition, 
and refufed to engage in it when firft propofed to him; 
but, overcome by the urgent and repeated inftances of 
the Sicilian government, encouraged by flattering ac¬ 
counts of the difpofition of the Calabrians, and forefeeing 
that, if fuccefs attended his firft operations, he fhould be 
able at any rate to deftroy the ltores and ammunition 
collected in Calabria for the invafion of Sicily, he con- 
fented at length to land with part of his army on the 
continent, and make trial of the loyalty and affection of 
the people to their former mailers. The enterprife, 
which fir John Stuart thus reluctantly undertook, he con¬ 
ducted with fingular judgment and ability, and brought 
to a fortunate conclulion, with infinite glory to the 
Britifh arms, but without any of thofe advantages to the 
court of Palermo, which it had fondly anticipated from 
the experiment. 
The troops deftined to this expedition by fir John Stuart, 
amounted to about 4800 effective men. With this fmall 
force he landed on the morning of the ift of July, in a bay 
in the gulph of St. Eufemia, near the northern frontier of 
Lower Calabria. Little oppofition was made to his land¬ 
ing by the enemy, who had not yet collected their forces. 
A proclamation was immediately iffued by the Englifh 
general, inviting the Calabrians to join the ftandard of 
their lawful fovereign, and offering them arms and ammu¬ 
nition for their defence. Few or none, however, obeyed 
the fummons. Difappointed in his expectations from the 
inhabitants, fir John Stuart was heiitating whether to re¬ 
embark his troops, when intelligence was brought to him 
that general Regnier was encamped at Maula , about ten 
miles off, with an army nearly equal to his own. Under- 
ftanding at the fame time that the French general was in 
daily expectation of reinforcements, he determined to 
advance next morning(J uly 4,1806), and attack him before 
they arrived. The two armies were feparated by a plain, 
from four to fix miles iu breadth, extending from fca to 
L E S. 
fea, and bounded on the north and fouth by chains of 
mountains. The French occupied a ftrong pofition on 
the floping fide of a woody hill, below the village of 
Maida, having the river Lamato in front, and their flanks 
ftrengthened by a thick impervious underwood. In 
numbers they were greatly fuperior to the Englifh, hav¬ 
ing received the expeCted reinforcement before the battle. 
Their force is fuppofed to have been about 7000 men, 
while that of the Englifh did not amount to 4800. Had 
Regnier remained upon the heights, the Englifh muft 
have attacked him with great difad vantage; and, though 
the event of the engagement would have been probably 
the fame, the lofs on their part muft have been more con- 
fiderable: but, fortunately, blinded by an excefs of con¬ 
fidence in his own troops, and an undue and unbounded 
contempt of the enemy, he quitted his ftrong pofition, 
and drew up his army on thfe plain. The Englifh, fur- 
prifed at the number of his troops, which was greater 
than they expeCted, but in no wife difmayed by their ap¬ 
pearance, advanced with undiminifhed alacrity to the 
attack. The aCtion began on the right of the Englifh 
army. After fome firing, both fides prepared to charge 
with the bayonet, and advanced with apparently-equal 
refolution ; but the French, who had probably imbibed 
from their general his contemptuous opinion of the enemy, 
were fo aftonifhed at the firmnefs with which the Englifh 
advanced to the charge, that, ftruck with a fudden panic, 
they gave way after the bayonets of the two armies had 
began to crofs, and endeavoured to fave themfelves by 
flight. It was too late, however, to efcape. They were 
overtaken with immenfe daughter, and in a fhort time 
the whole of the left wing of their army was totally 
routed and difperfed. The enemy, being thus completely 
difcomfited on their left, made an effort with their right 
to retrieve the honour of the day; but they were refilled 
with great fteadinefs by the Englifh left, and their cavalry 
being thrown into diforder, in an attempt to turn the 
Englifh flank by an unexpected fire from the twentieth 
regiment, which landed during the aClion, and came up 
at this critical juncture, they abandoned the field of battle 
with precipitation, and left an undifputed victory to their 
opponents. About 700 French were buried on the fpot 
and 1000 prifoners taken, among whom were general 
Compere and feveral other officers of rank ; but their 
total lofs from this conflict is eftimated by fir John Stuart 
at not lefs than 4000 men. The Englifh had only forty- 
five men killed and 282 umunded in the aCtion. 
This glorious victory, which was gained on the 6th of 
July, was the fignal for a general infurreCtion in both the 
Calabrias. The peafants, already prepared to take up 
arms, rofe in every direction againft the French, cut off 
their ftragglers, purfued their flying parties, and attacked 
their polls. The French, provoked by their defeat, and 
exalperated by the cruelty of the infurgents, who gave no 
quarter to fuch as fell into their hands, retaliated with a 
favagenefs and ferocity more dilgraceful to their cha¬ 
racter than the panic terrors which had feized them at 
Maida. The villages, which declared againft them, were 
plundered and burned to the ground, and the inhabitants 
maffacred without diftinCtion of age or fex. This ufage 
ftill farther inflamed the Calabrians, whofe attacks on their 
ports were incefl’ant and furious, till, with the affiftance of 
the Englifh, they drove them entirely out of their country. 
Unable to contend with their numerous and exafperated 
aflailants, the French were compelled at length to eva¬ 
cuate both Calabrias, and to abandon all the cannon, 
ltores, and ammunition, which they had collected in 
thefe provinces for the invafion of Sicily. Not a tingle 
place along the coaft was left in their pofleffion from 
Coohne to Sicofa. Of 9000 men, which was the amount 
of their force in Lower Calabria, before the battle of 
Maida, not above 3000 made good their retreat; and in 
Upper Calabria their lofs from the infurgents, for the 
Englifh did not penetrate into that province, was by their 
own confeffion very confiderable. 
But, 
